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Abstract 
This articled-based dissertation consists of five self-contained chapters. 
The first chapter presents the motivation of the dissertation and a 
summary of the four papers contenting the dissertation. Three of the 
chapters are applied microeconomics papers dealing with the economics 
of recharging electric cars. The last chapter deals with analysis of energy 
consumption rate and its determinants of electric cars under the hands of 
customers. A variety of techniques are used including analysis of field 
data, economics laboratory experiments and theoretical modeling with 
simulation.  
Chapter one presents an introduction to the main parts of the dissertation 
and a summary of the articles contenting the dissertation.  
Chapter two, ‘The Economics of Workplace Recharging’, proposes a 
microeconomic model of the demand for and supply of recharging facility 
at workplace (WPC), and uses the approach to shed light on the incentives 
and barriers employees and employers face when deciding on the 
demand for and supply of WPC. Using the model and simulation, the 
paper also examines the existence of WPC market under the current 
prices, and finds that no WPC contract exists that an employer is willing 
to offer and, at the same time, that the majority of employees are willing 
to accept. To overcome the lack of demand for or under-provision of 
workplace recharging, various remedies are discussed and suggested.  
Chapter three, ‘Myopic Loss Aversion Behavior under Ultimatum Game 
Framework in the Scheduling and Pricing of Electric Vehicle Recharging’, 
proposes, and tests at laboratory, contracts about recharging BEVs 
combining the ultimatum game framework and the myopic loss aversion 
(MLA) behavioral hypothesis. The model represents the behavior of EV-
owners trading-off between the amount of the discount on fee for 
postponing recharging, the risk of being eligible to the discount and the 
risk of not recharging the BEV on time for unforeseen trips. Findings from 
the experiment show that indeed individuals perform decisions 
exhibiting MLA behavior. The intuition from the result is that presenting 
time-of-use recharging price as long-term contracts may curtail MLA 
behavior and help BEV owners to choose cost minimizing recharging time 
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and, simultaneously, may help to reduce BEVs impact on the electricity 
grid system.  
The fourth chapter, ‘Using the Peer Effect in Scheduling and Pricing 
Electric Vehicles Recharging: Laboratory Evidence about Peer Effect in 
Risk-Taking’, presents experimental evidence about peer effect in risk 
taking in general and, in particular, the use of peer effect in scheduling 
BEVs recharging. The study investigates whether individuals want to see 
the choices of others, if observing peers’ choices influences the observers’ 
choices, to what extent the peer effect is pervasive and who are being 
influenced by peers’ choices as well as the role the type of peer 
information plays on peer effects. The results show that a lion share of 
individuals want to see peers’ choices, but only a moderate percentage of 
them, mostly those with relatively lower scores in our math test (usually 
used to test cognitive ability) and lacking self-confidence, use the peers’ 
choices to revise their intrinsic choices. The results reveal also that the 
type of peer information plays a significant role in peer effects.  
The fifth chapter, ‘Harnessing Big-Data for Estimating the Energy 
Consumption and Driving Range of Electric Vehicles’, analyzes the 
electricity consumption of BEVs and its sensitivity to the various driving 
environments in the hands of customers. The results show that the 
energy consumption rate of BEVs is highly sensitive to weather 
conditions and to driving styles. The results may help individuals to make 
informed decisions about BEV choice, manufacturers to build trust with 
customers by provide more accurate information, and governments to 
design policies based on reliable information.        
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Dansk Resumé  
Formålet med denne Ph.D. afhandling er at foreslå og eksperimentelt 
analyzere kontrakter mellem brugere af elbiler og udbydere af opladning 
til elbiler med henblik på at analyzere, hvordan brugernes adfærd bliver 
påvirket af pris og udskydelse af opladning, samt at analyzere elbilers 
strømforbrug i forskellige omgivelser. Afhandlingen består af fem 
uafhængige kapitler, hvor der er benyttet en bred vifte af metoder, såsom 
empirisk data-analyze, økonomiske eksperimenter samt teoretisk 
modellering med simulering.  
Kapitel 1 giver en introduktion til emnet og beskriver, hvorfor det er 
relevant at analyzere elbiler og opladning. Kapitlet præsenterer et kort 
resumé af de fire artikler, som tilsammen udgør denne afhandling. 
Kapitel 2,  ”The economics of workplace charging”, foreslår en 
mikroøkonomisk udbuds- og efterspørgselsmodel for 
opladningsfaciliteter på arbejdspladser (WPC), og benytter denne 
fremgangsmåde til at belyse incitamenter og barrierer som arbejdsgivere 
og arbejdstagere står over for, når de fastlægger udbud af og 
efterspørgsel efter WPC. Ved hjælp af simuleringer med denne model 
undersøger artiklen desuden forekomsten af WPC under de nuværende 
vilkår, og konkluderer, at der ikke eksisterer nogen WPC kontrakt som en 
arbejdsgiver vil udbyde, og som størstedelen af arbejdstagerne samtidig 
vil efterspørge. Til slut foreslår og diskuterer artiklen forskellige måder, 
hvorpå man kan fremme udbud af og efterspørgsel efter WPC.  
Kapitel 3, ”Myopic Loss Aversion Behavior under Ultimatum Game 
Framework in the Scheduling and Pricing of Electric Vehicle Recharging”, 
foreslår og afprøver vha. økonomiske eksperimenter kontrakter mellem 
brugere af elbiler og udbydere af opladning til elbiler, som kombinerer 
adfærdsteorierne inden for ”Ultimatum game” og ”Myopic Loss Aversion” 
(MLA). Modellen repræsenterer elbilbrugeres adfærd, når de afvejer, 
hvor meget de kan få i rabat  for at udskyde opladning, risikoen for ikke 
at kunne få rabatten, samt risikoen for at elbilen ikke er opladet i tide til 
eventuelle uforudsete ture. Resultaterne viser, at respondenterne udviser 
MLA, og tyder på, at langtidskontrakter med specifikke priser for 
bestemte ladetidspunkter kan begrænse MLA adfærd og hjælpe 
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elbilbrugere til at vælge et prisoptimalt opladningstidspunkt og samtidig 
reducere elbilernes belastning på elnettet. 
Det fjerde kapitel, ” Using the Peer Effect in Scheduling and Pricing 
Electric Vehicles Recharging: Laboratory Evidence about Peer Effect in 
Risk-Taking”, præsenterer eksperimentel dokumentation for 
gruppeeffekters generelle indflydelse på risikovurdering og, mere 
specifikt, betydningen af gruppeeffekter i forbindelse med planlægning af 
elbilers opladning. Artiklen undersøger, hvorvidt individer vil se andres 
beslutninger, om indsigt i andres beslutninger påvirker individets 
beslutning, i hvilken grad gruppeeffekten gør sig gældende, hvem der 
bliver påvirket af andres beslutninger, samt hvilken rolle en bestemt type 
information har på gruppeeffekten. Resultaterne viser, at en stor del af 
respondenterne gerne vil se andres beslutninger, men kun en begrænset 
andel - for det meste dem med lavere score i din matematik test (normalt 
bruges til at teste kognitive evne) og med lavere selvtillid - bruger andres 
beslutninger til at genoverveje deres umiddelbare beslutning. 
Resultaterne viser envidere, at der er stor forskel på effekten af 
forskellige typer af information, der deles i en gruppe. 
Det femte kapitel, ”Harnessing Big-Data for Estimating the Energy 
Consumption and Driving Range of Electric Vehicles”, undersøger 
strømforbruget af elbiler under almindelige forhold. Artiklen analyzerer 
således, hvordan strømforbruget påvirkes af forskellige virkelige 
omgivelser. Resultaterne viser, at strømforbruget bliver meget påvirket 
af vejrforhold og kørestil. Resultaterne giver en større viden om elbilers 
forbrug, som både kan benyttes af potentielle købere før den endelige 
beslutning om at anskaffe en elbil, af producenter til at give et mere 
præcist og troværdigt billede af elbilernes egenskaber samt af 
myndigheder til at opbygge målsætninger baseret på pålidelig 
information. 
 
 
 
 vii 
 
Contents 
Preface ....................................................................................................................................i 
Abstract ............................................................................................................................... iii 
Dansk Resumé ................................................................................................................... v 
1. Introduction .............................................................................................................. 1 
1.1. Motivation ...................................................................................... 1 
1.2. Methods ......................................................................................... 6 
1.3. Summary of studies ........................................................................ 8 
References ................................................................................................ 15 
2. The Economics of Workplace Recharging ................................................. 22 
Abstract .................................................................................................... 23 
2.1. Introduction .................................................................................. 24 
2.2. Analytical Framework ................................................................... 29 
2.2.1. The employee’s perspective: the demand for WPC ............. 29 
2.2.2. Second-stage decision: traveling .......................................... 34 
2.2.3. Third-stage decision: location of recharging place ............... 36 
2.2.4. Comparative statics: Determinants of   ............................. 37 
2.3. The employer’s perspective: the provision of WPC ..................... 45 
 viii 
 
2.4. The joint perspective: WPC contracts .......................................... 49 
2.4.1. Employer-paid recharging .................................................... 49 
2.4.2. Wage discount only .............................................................. 49 
2.4.3. Recharging fee only .............................................................. 52 
2.4.4. Fully flexible contract ........................................................... 54 
2.5. Simulation result........................................................................... 57 
2.5.1. Functional forms and data .................................................... 57 
2.5.2. Results .................................................................................. 64 
2.5.2.1. Benchmark ........................................................................ 64 
2.5.3. Remedies .............................................................................. 69 
2.5.4. Sensitivity Analysis ................................................................ 73 
2.6. Discussion and Conclusion ........................................................... 78 
Appendix 1 ................................................................................................ 82 
Appendix A. The demand for WPC when HPC is not available ............ 82 
Appendix B. Derivation for Equations (0.52) and (0.53) ...................... 87 
Appendix C. Comparative statics for (𝛚W)* and (PW)* .......................... 89 
References ................................................................................................ 92 
3. Myopic Loss Aversion Behavior under Ultimatum Game Framework 
in the Scheduling and Pricing of Electric Vehicle Recharging .................. 100 
 ix 
 
Abstract .................................................................................................. 101 
3.1. Introduction ................................................................................ 102 
3.2. Behavioral model ........................................................................ 106 
3.2.1. A brief Overview of MLA and UG ....................................... 106 
3.2.2. The Proposed Model .......................................................... 108 
3.3. Experimental Analysis ................................................................. 118 
3.3.1. Experimental design ........................................................... 118 
3.3.2. Experiment 1: Acceptable discount for postponing the 
recharging time .................................................................................. 120 
3.3.3. Experiment 2: Willingness to postpone the recharging 
time 125 
3.3.4. Experiment 3: Acceptable discount for supplier-controlled 
recharging ........................................................................................... 129 
3.4. Discussion and Conclusions ........................................................ 132 
Acknowledgments .................................................................................. 135 
Appendix 2. Experimental Instructions .................................................. 136 
References .............................................................................................. 144 
4. Using the Peer Effect in Scheduling and Pricing of Electric Vehicles 
Recharging: Laboratory Evidence about Peer Effect in Risk-Taking ..... 151 
Abstract .................................................................................................. 151 
 x 
 
4.1. Introduction ................................................................................ 152 
4.2. Related literature ....................................................................... 159 
4.3. Theoretical Framework .............................................................. 162 
4.4. The Experimental Design ............................................................ 170 
4.4.1. The Decision-Making Problem ............................................ 170 
4.4.2. The Procedure .................................................................... 171 
4.4.3. The Treatments .................................................................. 173 
4.5. Results ........................................................................................ 178 
4.5.1. The desire to see the choices of others .............................. 178 
4.5.2. The peer effect ................................................................... 181 
4.6. Conclusion .................................................................................. 195 
Acknowledgment .................................................................................... 197 
Appendix 3 .............................................................................................. 198 
A) Supplementary results ................................................................ 198 
b) Histogram of correctly answered math tests ............................. 201 
B) Experimental Instructions .......................................................... 202 
Reference ............................................................................................... 206 
5. Harnessing Big-Data for Estimating the Energy Consumption of 
Electric Vehicles ........................................................................................................... 210 
 xi 
 
Abstract .................................................................................................. 211 
5.1. Introduction ................................................................................ 212 
5.2. Methods ..................................................................................... 216 
5.2.1. Data Collection ................................................................... 216 
5.2.2. Data analysis method ......................................................... 218 
5.3. Results ........................................................................................ 222 
5.3.1. Overview of trips by BEVs ................................................... 222 
5.3.2. Observed ECR of BEVs ........................................................ 225 
5.3.3. Estimates of the ECR ........................................................... 230 
5.4. Conclusions ................................................................................. 237 
Acknowledgments .................................................................................. 238 
Appendix 4 .............................................................................................. 239 
Appendix A: How cheap is to drive BEVs in terms of fuel (electricity) 
cost? ................................................................................................... 239 
Appendix B: Descriptive Statistics of variables used in the energy 
estimation ........................................................................................... 240 
Appendix C. Estimating ECRp .............................................................. 241 
References .............................................................................................. 243 
 
 1 
 
1. Introduction  
This section presents the motivation of the dissertation. The section 
presents the motivation and main results of each paper constituting the 
PhD thesis. An overview of the papers is also presented following a brief 
presentation of the methods applied in the study.    
1.1. Motivation  
At the time when the steadily increasing pollution from the transport 
sector (Eurostat, 2015; Hacker et al., 2009) is becoming a critical issue 
(BBC, 2015; Malykhina, 2015; Schofield, 2014), battery electric vehicles 
(BEVs henceforth) bring new opportunities in the transportation system. 
They use electricity that can be generated from sustainable sources such 
as hydro, wind and solar. They also pollute less than diesel and petro cars 
do even when the electricity for recharging comes from unsustainable 
sources (Hooftman et al., 2016; Nanaki and Koroneos, 2013). In addition 
to this, the BEV batteries offer potential to balance the electricity grid 
system by recharging the BEVs when electricity supply exceeds demand 
and/or by (possibly) de-charging the battery power back to the electricity 
grid system when demand exceeds supply and when BEVs are parked. 
Moreover, the BEVs could also be used to balance the power when there 
is prediction error in the renewable energy generators (Kempton and 
Tomić, 2005).   
BEVs, however, also present new challenges. One of the main concerns 
about BEVs is that recharging (under the current technology) takes long 
time, from about 20 minutes to hours depending on the type of the 
recharging tool and on the battery type. Added to this is that the driving-
range of currently available (and affordable by a representative car 
buyer) BEVs is limited. These result in driving-range anxiety (Franke and 
Krems, 2013a), making recharging time and place decisive issues (Bonges 
and Lusk, 2016; Lieven, 2015). The long recharging time makes on-the-
road recharging costly because of the value of time (of the BEV user(s)), 
the parking fee associated with the long recharging time and of the 
distaste of waiting long time in the car while recharging the BEV in the 
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middle of the trip1. Certainly, BEVs can be recharged at residence while 
the BEV user doing household activities without almost any waste of 
valuable time for recharging. However, not all individuals have private 
parking to install recharging tool and even those who have private 
recharging tool at their residence may need to recharge at non-residential 
areas to extend the driving-range of the BEV for planned and unplanned 
trips2 and when there are technical problems to recharge at residence. 
One suggested solution of addressing the recharging problem particularly 
for individuals without having private parking is to provide recharging 
service at workplace, which is considered as the second major recharging 
option next to residential recharging (Neubauer and Wood, 2014). 
However, this requires agreements at least between employers and 
employees about having recharging facility at workplace, workplace 
charging (WPC). There has been a literature gap that systematically 
analyzes the economics of the demand for and supply of recharging at 
workplace.  
One objective of this dissertation is, thus, to propose a microeconomic 
model to investigate the demand for and supply of WPC. The model 
focuses on cost issues driving the supply of WPC on the employer side and 
user (net) beneﬁts on the employee side. The model is used to shed light 
on the incentives and barriers employees and employers face when 
deciding on WPC. Using the model and simulation, the paper also 
examines the existence of WPC market under the current prices, i.e., 
whether a contractual agreement can be reached between employers and 
                                                          
1 Working in the car while the BEV is being recharged on the roadside may not 
be convenient, and it could even be distasting for the BEV user(s). The fee for 
recharging at (future) commercial recharging places may include parking fees 
since, under the current technology, recharging takes longer time in that 
charging only for the electricity and the service may not be profitable.   
2 Hahnel et al. (2013) find from 6 % (for work related) to 21 % (shopping) 
underestimates of trips, i.e., unplanned trips. 
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employees for WPC to exist without interventions from other economic 
agents, e.g., government and BEV makers.  
Another challenge concerning BEVs is that the default recharging time, 
unfortunately, coincides with peak electricity consumption hours 
(Robinson et al., 2013). For example, recharging at residence (upon 
arrival from work) and using energy for household consumption, and 
recharging at workplace and using energy for office and company use. 
This could have a substantial effect on the electricity grid system (see, e.g., 
Grahn, 2013; Pan and Zhang, 2016). This apprehension necessitate 
investigating the ways to curtain BEVs impact on the electricity grid 
system and to save a substantial amount of electricity expansion cost that 
will be required to recharge a mass penetration of BEVs (Grahn, 2013; 
Hajimiragha et al., 2011; Waraich et al., 2013; Zhang et al., 2013). There 
have been numerous studies about smartly integrating BEVs in to the 
electricity grid system (see, e.g., Mwasilu et al., 2014; Waraich et al., 
2013). Most of these studies focus on the feasibility, logistics and 
optimization algorithm of getting BEVs recharging smartly integrated 
with the grid system (Finn et al., 2012; Grahn and Soder, 2011; He et al., 
2012; Hu et al., 2014). Most of these studies assumed, explicitly or 
implicitly, that BEV users will be willing to postpone charging and/or will 
accept their charging activity controlled by electricity suppliers in return 
for discounted fee for recharging (Pan and Zhang, 2016; Sundstrom and 
Binding, 2012). Empirical studies show, however, that individuals are 
bounded rational and that there are biases in decision-making (see, e.g., 
Holt and Laury, 2002; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Thaler et al., 1997) 
in that BEV users may not evaluate recharging decision on the bases of 
only the net gains from postponing recharging. These behavioral biases 
and bounded rationality, however, have received very limited attention 
in the emerging literature about BEV recharging (Caperello et al., 2013; 
Franke and Krems, 2013a).  
The second objective of this study, thus, is to propose recharging 
contracts about smart integration of BEVs and to conduct 
 4 
 
experiments tailoring behavioral biases to give insight about how to 
better induce BEV users to participate in smart integration of BEVs with 
the electricity grid system. One of the papers presents a behavioral model 
and experimental validation combining myopic loss aversion (MLA) 
behavioral hypothesis3 (often used in financial investment literature) and 
an ultimatum game (UG) framework. Like individuals participating in 
financial assets investment, participating in smart integration of 
recharging involves making sequential decisions that may have the risk 
of losing more than the cost saving from discounted fee for recharging 
when unforeseen trips occur or if the individual need to revise initial trip 
plan while the BEV battery power is flat and is awaiting for recharging 
later at discount hours.4 This, added with the small share of income of the 
recharging cost, may result in loss aversion and myopia behavior 
hindering participation in smart integrating of the BEV that needs 
treatment. The MLA and UG frameworks are combined and 
experimentally tested to enlighten on designing contracts about BEV 
recharging taking behavioral biases in to account. This may benefit BEV 
users to get discounted recharging fees and the electricity supplier to 
reduce the potential impacts of BEVs on the electricity system that also 
may benefit the society at large. The second paper that addresses 
                                                          
3 MLA combines the two concepts of loss aversion and mental accounting, where 
loss aversion is the tendency of individuals to be more sensitive to losses than to 
gains and mental accounting is the activity that individuals perform to evaluate 
alternatives and take decisions (Benartzi and Thaler, 1995). 
4 For example, if a BEV user arrives at home at, say, 5 pm with flat battery BEV 
and postpones recharging to, say, 9 pm in return for a discount, then there is a 
risk of paying more, say to a taxi or a higher distaste of not using the EV, if 
unforeseen trip that cannot be covered by the available battery power occurs 
before 9 pm. 
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behavioral issue is about peer effect in risk-taking that aims at giving 
insights about the use of peer influence in scheduling BEVs recharging.    
Uncertainty about energy consumption rate (ECR henceforth) and its 
sensitive to the various driving environments in the hands of customers 
is also another setback of BEVs. Providing accurate information to people 
about the energy consumption rate of BEVs using real-world data where 
the drivers are the people themselves is crucial for individuals to make 
informed decisions and to build trust about BEVs, particularly in the 
current situation where big carmakers have been mistrusted after they 
have been found providing incorrect information about fuel efficiency 
(Kubota, 2016; Randazzo, S and Boston, W, 2016). Analyses of the factors 
affecting ECR of BEVs are also relevant to figure out the ways to improve 
the electricity efficiency of BEVs (analogous to fuel efficiency to 
conventional cars).  
Insights into the factors that influence the ECR of BEVs have been scarce, 
mainly because of their recent market penetration. Most studies include 
technical analyses that investigate the effects of car components on the 
ECR (see, e.g., Duke et al., 2009) and studies using either only few BEVs 
or drivers and without full account of the weather condition (Birrell et al., 
2014; Wu et al., 2015) mostly by stakeholders in BEVs. Large differences 
about fuel consumption of passenger cars are usually observed between 
the results of car manufacturers and the results observed in real-world 
driving (Huo et al., 2011).  
The third objective of the dissertation is to analyze the energy 
consumption rate of battery electric vehicle using big-data consisting of 
each driving pattern of 741 drivers, weather condition during the trips, 
road type and drivers’ households’ characteristics.    
To sum-up, the dissertation aims at giving insights about scheduling and 
pricing of BEVs recharging as well as about energy consumption of BEVs 
and its sensitivity to the various driving environments in the hands of the 
customers. In addition to contributing to the very scarce literature in 
economics about BEV recharging, the results from the study may give 
clues to better diffuse BEVs among urban dwellers and to curtain the 
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expected impacts of BEVs on the electricity grid system by designing and 
offering recharging and pricing options tailoring behavioral biases.  
 
1.2. Methods 
A variety of methods are used in this study. These include theoretical 
analyses, simulation, economics laboratory experiments and field data 
analyses.   
To substantiate the theoretical findings about WPC and to examine the 
existence of a market for the employers to supply and the employees to 
demand for WPC without third party intervention, simulation is used in 
the analyses about WPC. Data about labor market, electricity tariff and 
cost of recharging tools is obtained from Germany.  
Economic laboratory experiments are used in two of the papers 
consisting of the dissertation. As discussed in detail by Camerer (2011), 
laboratory experiments provide some unique advantages that 
complements field and other studies. For example, laboratory 
experiments are ideal to disentangle the effect of a treatment from other 
possible confounding factors that could be challenging to do so in field 
surveys. Well-designed experiments allow to truly drawing causal 
inferences without measurement error, allow neutralizing the effects of 
uncontrolled determinants and allowing controlling the information 
condition whenever required, and are easily replicable. There have been 
concerns and discussion about the external validity in terms of the ability 
to generalize the results of the economics lab experiment to the general 
population (Camerer, 2011; Levitt and List, 2007, 2009). Numerous 
studies have been also undertaken to investigate the laboratory-field 
generalizability of findings from economic laboratory   experiments to the 
real world (Andersen et al., 2010; Beshears et al., 2011; Brookshire et al., 
1987; Camerer, 2011), and most experiments demonstrated that 
laboratory findings could indeed be generalized to comparable field 
settings (Camerer, C., 2011). Thus, while the doubt about internal validity 
of the results from the experiments conducted for this dissertation is 
little, the magnitude of the numerical findings generalizability requires 
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further research, particularly from filed experiment using representative 
sample. A field survey representing the population will be an ideal future 
work and a nice complement to this study. However, it is difficult to 
currently find representative samples from the current BEV users since 
companies own a lion share of the BEVs and since early adopters may not 
represent the population.  
Other methods applied in this dissertation include analyses using 
econometrics models for the experiment data and for the estimation of 
electricity consumption of BEVs.   
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1.3. Summary of studies  
I now present a summary of the papers. The papers are also presented in 
the same order in the dissertation. 
Paper 1:  The Economics of Workplace Recharging 
(Joint work with Georg Hirte, Sigal Kaplan, Carlo G. Prato and Stefan 
Tscharaktschiew, and published at Journal of Transportation Research Part B: 
Methodology. Volume 88, June 2016, Pages 93–118. DOI: 10.1016/j.trb.2016.03.004. 
Presented at the 4th European Association for Research in Transportation (hEART) 
conference that took place from 9 - 11 September, 2015 at Technical University of 
Denmark, Lyngby, Denmark. 
Presented at the International Conference on Travel Behavior Research (IATBR) 
held in London, UK, in July 2015.) 
While residential recharging is the foreseen primary option even though 
limitations exist in large apartment buildings, workplace recharging 
opportunities are gaining increasing attention as the major secondary 
option, particularly for urban dwellers without having private parking 
place. WPC may have benefits for employees, employers, electricity 
suppliers and even for the society at large. For example, WPC could be an 
ideal recharging option for employees without having private parking. It 
is also expected to be the favorite alternative to public and commercial 
recharging stations for individuals having private parking but who need 
to extend the driving range of their BEVs recharged at residential areas. 
For employers, WPC can be a recruitment and retention tool and may 
attract more productive employees. For electricity suppliers, WPC has a 
potential for balancing the electricity grid system by recharging/de-
recharging the batteries of BEVs according to the electricity balance 
condition during the working hours. However, there might also be social 
costs because employer-provided fringe benefits favoring car use may 
increase travel demand and so traffic congestion. By increasing electricity 
consumption during peak-periods the electricity overload problem could 
be aggravated and thereby an increase in electricity prices and 
inefficiency. 
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However, WPC related research is still in its infancy and to the best of our 
knowledge there is currently no systematic assessment of the economic 
rationale of WPC demand and supply. We propose a microeconomic 
model of WPC and use the approach to shed light on the incentives and 
barriers employees and employers face when deciding on the demand for 
and supply of WPC. In the model, we show the determinants of WPC 
demand and supply as well as the role that the electricity supplier (via 
electricity tariffs for companies and for recharging fees at residential and 
commercial sites) and the government (via income and energy taxes) play 
in affecting WPC provision. In addition to this, using the model and data 
calibration, we examine existence of WPC market without governments’ 
or other agents’ intervention. The simulation results show that under the 
current market conditions, there is no WPC contract that an employer is 
willing to offer and, at the same time, that the majority of employees is 
willing to accept. To overcome the lack of demand for or underprovision 
of WPC we discuss various `remedies', involving subsidies to recharging 
facility costs and adjustments in electricity tariffs or loading technologies. 
The results concerning remedies show that while incentives for the 
supply side of WPC are promising, incentives that aim at boosting the 
demand side of WPC are less feasible. A pure (non-distortionary) 
redistribution from employees to the employer may also help to 
overcome WPC underprovision since WPC generates private net-beneﬁts 
when there is employer-paid recharging in that employees beneﬁt from 
WPC but the employer does not.  
Paper 2. Myopic Loss Aversion in the Response of Electric Vehicle 
Owners to the Scheduling and Pricing of Vehicle Recharging 
(Joint work with Sigal Kaplan, Alexander C. Sebald and Carlo G. Prato, and is 
accepted for publication at the Journal of Transportation Research Part D: 
Transport and Environment.  
Earlier version of the paper was presented at the 94th Annual Transportation 
Research Board meeting, Washington D.C. from January 11 – 13, 2015.)  
Upward expectations of future electric vehicle (EV) growth pose the 
question about the future load on the electric grid system. This expected 
BEV growth is expected to load significantly the electric power grid 
system. Charging times are expected to coincide with peak hours of 
electricity demand for household consumption and industrial use. 
Demand side management of BEV charging, by encouraging EV-owners to 
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change their charging patterns in response to changes in electricity 
prices, is viewed as a possible solution to reduce grid overload at peak 
hours and to reduce investments in grid capacity expansion (Finn et al., 
2012; Flath et al., 2014). Economic evaluations have shown that DSM of 
BEV charging has positive welfare effects. For example, smart charging 
grids in Finland could produce benefits of 227 EUR per vehicle per year 
(Kiviluoma and Meibom, 2010).  
While existing literature on BEV charging demand management has 
focused on technical aspects and considered EV-owners as utility 
maximizers, this study proposes a behavioral model incorporating 
behavioral and psychological aspects relevant to EV-owners facing 
charging decisions and interacting with the supplier. The behavioral 
model represents utility maximization under myopic loss aversion (MLA) 
behavior in an ultimatum game (UG) framework with two players:  EV-
owner and the electricity supplier. We test the validity of the behavioral 
model by designing 3x2 (there treatments with two groups of 
participants for each treatment) economics laboratory experiment.  
The main objective of the laboratory experiment is to investigate whether 
lessening the MLA behavior by providing contracts under UG framework 
and in long-term contract bases helps individuals to make better choices. 
Findings from the experiment show that individuals indeed reveal MLA 
behavior when taking BEV charging decisions. Thus, presenting long-
term BEV charging contracts under UG framework may curtail MLA 
behavior and help BEV owners to choose cost-minimizing charging time 
by participating in discounted off-peak charging hours. 
This study contributes to the literature about MLA behavior as well by 
considering MLA under UG framework that may have application in other 
areas such as trade and investment. We also extended the UG framework 
in situations where accepting the proposal entails risk for the responder. 
Moreover, while previous studies about MLA behavior considered a 
single individual, this is the first model exploring MLA behavior within a 
two-player UG framework and hence investigating MLA as related not 
only to the individual’s gains or losses, but also to the individual’s 
cautiousness in the proposal because of the need to consider the 
responder’s strategy.  
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Paper 3. Using the Peer Effect in Scheduling and Pricing of Electric 
Vehicles Recharging: Laboratory Evidence about Peer Effect in Risk-
Taking 
Working paper. 
 
Numerous theoretical studies (e.g., Banerjee, 1992; Bikhchandani et al., 
1992; Leibenstein, 1950) and empirical studies (e.g., Avery and Zemsky, 
1998; Bursztyn et al., 2014; Olaussen, 2009; Weizsäcker, 2010) have 
found that individuals are influenced by the choices and behavior of 
others. The insights into the effects of peer information on choice and on 
behavior have been used to guide individuals to take one choice or 
another (Hoff and Stiglitz, 2016). The peer effects play significant and 
lasting role in societies political, socio-economic and demographic 
aspects (Akerlof, 1997; Bardhan and Udry, 1999; Ellison and Fudenberg, 
1995; Hoff and Stiglitz, 2016; Jones, 1984). 
We design a laboratory experiment mimicking the real-world situation 
where BEV users may experience to tradeoff between the cost saving 
from postponing recharging towards off-peak electricity consumption 
hours and the risk of the current battery power not being enough for 
unforeseen trip occurrence. The standard economic theory prediction in 
this case is that individuals will make choices according to their risk 
preference without being influenced by peers’ choices. This is so because 
observing peers’ choices does not convey new information as the 
electricity tariff and the distribution of the unforeseen trip distance are 
common knowledge. Recent field and laboratory studies find, however, 
that the choices of individuals are affected by peers’ choices even when 
the peers’ choices do not convey new information and when there is no 
payoff commonality (Cooper and Rege, 2011; Chung et al., 2015; Gioia, 
2016). For example, Allcott (2011) and Schultz et al. (2007) have found 
from filed experiments that households decreased (increased) energy 
consumption after learning that their consumption was higher (lower) 
than their neighbors consumption.  
This study aims to shed light on whether and how peer effect may be used 
for policy-making in areas involving uncertainty in general and, in 
particular, about smooth integration of BEVs in to the electricity grid 
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system. By providing for the current BEV users attractive incentives and 
tips that helps to reduce the psychological barrier of postponing 
recharging and then, by sharing the charging experience and cost of these 
customers, electricity suppliers may induce the current and future BEV 
users to postpone recharging towards off-peak electricity consumption 
hours.  
The study investigates whether individuals want to see the choices of 
others, if observing peers’ choices influences own choices, to what extent 
the peer effect is pervasive and who (in terms of self-confidence and math 
test scores) are being influenced by peers’ choices as well as the role the 
type of peer information plays on peer effects. We conducted five 
treatments tailoring peer information. In one treatment, risk-averse and 
risk-seeking participants received each other’s choice. In the second 
treatment, each participant received the mean of the choices of all other 
participants excluding the recipient’s own choice. In the third treatment, 
each participant received the same information as the second treatment 
but by framing the peer information as the choice of a peer instead of the 
mean choice of all participants. In the fourth treatment, each participant 
received the choices of two other participants to examine providing the 
choices of two peers looms larger peer effect than providing the choice of 
a peer. In the last treatment, each participant received the choice of 
randomly chosen participant. 
The results show that a lion share of individuals wants to see peers’ 
choices. However, only a moderate percentage of them, mostly those with 
relatively lower scores in our math test and lacking self-confidence, use 
the peers’ choices to revise their intrinsic choices, implying that learning 
could be the main reason for peer effect. Accordingly, the use of peer 
effect in inducing individuals to choose one action or the other depends 
largely on the analytical ability and on the self-confidence on own 
decisions of the under-consideration decision problem of the target 
population. The results reveal also that the type of peer information plays 
a significant role in peer effects. 
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Paper 4. Harnessing Big-Data for Estimating the Energy Consumption 
and Driving Range of Electric Vehicles 
(Joint work with Carlo G. Prato, Sigal Kaplan, Stefan L. Mabit and Anders F. Jensen, 
and is under review at Journal of Transportation Research Part D: Transport and 
Environment.  
Earlier version of the paper was presented at the 95th Annual Transportation 
Research Board meeting, Washington D.C. from January 10 – 14, 2016.)  
This study analyzes the electricity consumption rate, i.e., energy 
consumption per unit distance driven, of BEVs and its sensitivity to the 
various driving environments in the hands of customers. Analyzing the 
factors that affect the energy efficiency of vehicles is crucial to the overall 
efficiency improvement in the transport sector, one of the top polluting 
sectors at the global level. This may help individuals to make informed 
decisions about BEV choice, manufacturers to build trust with customers 
by provide more accurate information, and governments to design 
policies based on reliable information.        
The results of the analysis measure the (unweighted) mean energy 
consumption rate of BEVs at about 0.183 kWh/km for BEV models used 
in this study. Energy consumption rate of BEVs is highly sensitive to the 
various driving environments. Particularly, the weather effect is strong 
with energy consumption rate in December being higher by about 65 %, 
on average, than the consumption rate in July or August. Moreover, the 
results of the analysis show that driving speed, acceleration and 
temperature have non-linear effects.  
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To summarize, the four papers contenting the dissertation are 
1. Gebeyehu M. Fetene, Georg Hirte, Sigal Kaplan, Carlo G. Prato and 
Stefan Tscharaktschiew (2016). The Economics of Workplace 
Recharging. Published at Journal of Transportation Research Part B: 
Methodology. Volume 88, June 2016, Pages 93–118. DOI: 
10.1016/j.trb.2016.03.004 
2. Gebeyehu M. Fetene, Sigal Kaplan, Alexander C. Sebald and Carlo G. 
Prato (2015). Myopic Loss Aversion in the Response of Electric 
Vehicle Owners to the Scheduling and Pricing of Vehicle 
Recharging. Accepted for publication at Journal of Transportation 
Research Part D: Transport and Environment 
3. Gebeyehu M. Fetene (2016). Using the Peer Effect in Scheduling 
and Pricing of Electric Vehicles Recharging: Laboratory Evidence 
about Peer Effect in Risk-Taking. Working paper.  
4. Gebeyehu M. Fetene, Carlo G. Prato, Sigal Kaplan, Stefan L. Mabit 
and Anders F. Jensen (2016). Harnessing Big-Data for Estimating 
the Energy Consumption and Driving Range of Electric Vehicles. 
Under review at Journal of Transportation Research Part D: Transport 
and Environment. Earlier version of the paper is published at the 
proceedings of the 95th Annual Transportation Research Board meeting, 
Washington D.C. from January 10 – 14, 2016. 
In addition to the dissertation, I worked during my spare time on my 
previous master’s thesis to get it published.  
5. Fetene, Gebeyehu M., Søren B. Olsen, and Ole Bonnichsen (2014). 
"Disentangling the pure time effect from site and preference 
heterogeneity effects in benefit transfer: an empirical 
investigation of transferability." Environmental and Resource 
Economics 59.4 (2014): 583-611. 
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Abstract 
To overcome the range-anxiety problem and further shortcomings 
associated with electric vehicles, workplace recharging (WPC) is gaining 
increasing attention. We propose a microeconomic model of WPC and use 
the approach to shed light on the incentives and barriers employees and 
employers face when deciding on demand for and supply of WPC. 
Calibration results using Germany data shown that, under the current 
market conditions, there is no WPC contract in that an employer is willing 
to offer and at the same time the majority of employees is willing to 
accept. To overcome the lack of demand or under provision of WPC, we 
discuss various `remedies' involving subsidies to recharging facility costs 
and adjustments in electricity tariffs for various types of customers or 
loading technologies. We find that direct subsidies to WPC facilities or 
subsidies combined with specific energy price policies could be a way to 
foster WPC provision. In contrast, measures on the employee side that 
may help to stimulate the demand for WPC turn out to be less feasible. 
Hence, our results suggest that in order to promote WPC it is more 
promising to support employers in offering WPC contracts than to 
provide employees an incentive to accept WPC contracts. The study 
therefore gives a rationale for public initiatives being undertaken to boost 
WPC provision, as e.g. in the case of the US. 
Keywords: Electric Vehicle; Workplace Recharging; Fringe Benefit 
JEL classification: I31; R40; R41; R48 
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2.1. Introduction  
The market penetration rates of electric vehicles (EVs)5 are still rather 
low (Rezvani et al., 2015) despite the number of public programs 
launched to promote their use (e.g., Mazur et al., 2015; Tanaka et al., 
2014). Among the most important reasons are low battery performance 
and lack of recharging infrastructure implying limited and uncertain 
driving ranges – the so-called range-anxiety (Chéron and Zins, 1997; 
Dimitropoulos, A. et al., 2011; Franke and Krems, 2013a, 2013b; Kihm and 
Trommer, 2014; Rezvani et al., 2015). While residential recharging is the 
foreseen primary option even though limitations can exist in large 
apartment buildings with shared parking areas, workplace recharging 
(WPC henceforth) opportunities are gaining increasing attention as the 
major secondary option (Huang and Zhou, 2015; Neubauer and Wood, 
2014). For example, more than 600,000 employees have had WPC access 
at more than 300 workplace sites in 2016 in the U.S. alone (U.S. 
Department of Energy, 2014a). 
There are various reasons why WPC may be economically rational for 
employees as well as for employers and even socially desirable. From the 
perspective of the employee, analogous to workplace parking and other 
non-monetary advantages at the workplace, WPC might generate a fringe 
benefit if its net benefit to the employee exceeds net benefits from 
recharging elsewhere. For example, firms usually pay lower energy prices 
than households. If this cost advantage is (at least partly) forwarded to 
employees, they can charge at lower cost at the workplace than at home. 
This fringe benefit can also be considered as some kind of non-monetary 
income that is not subject to income taxation.  Furthermore, by extending 
driving range of BEVs (Neubauer and Wood, 2014; Pearre et al., 2011), 
WPC opens up options drivers might not otherwise have, making it easier 
to manage special circumstances and, in the end, reducing the risk of not 
being able to perform additional unexpected trips (to the doctor, to the 
kindergarten etc.). WPC may also provide BEV users who live in multi-
                                                          
5 In the present study, the acronym ‘EV’ generally refers to pure (plug-in) battery electric 
vehicles (EV). For simplicity, we only use ‘EV’ henceforth. 
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unit buildings recharging opportunities and, thus, may support BEV 
diffusion. 
From the employer perspective, offering WPC might reduce costs if 
workers receiving fringe benefits are willing to accept lower wages 
and/or to pay recharging fees higher than the firm pays to the electricity 
supplier (Leibowitz, 1983). The provision of WPC could also reduce the 
operational costs of the firm’s own car fleet once conventional fuel-
powered cars are replaced by BEVs which e.g. could be charged overnight 
(Huang and Zhou, 2015). Despite cost issues, WPC can be a recruitment 
and retention tool (U.S. Department of Energy, 2014b). When the share of 
BEV commuters increase, employers that provide WPC may attract more 
productive employees.  
Further, WPC provision may be a strategy for green corporate branding, 
thereby attracting new customers.6  Last but not least, when the share of 
BEV commuters gets large, the provision of WPC could be necessary for 
firms located at places relatively far from residential areas and where 
recharging facilities are inaccessible. 
In addition to potential benefits for employees and employers, social 
benefits may arise too. To the extent that WPC provision affects mode 
choice in favor of BEVs (Sierzchula, 2014), a reduction of adverse impacts 
such as noise, local pollution, and greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) can be 
expected (Thiel et al., 2010), even though in particular the latter is 
debated since the GHG reduction potential depends on the share of 
sources (e.g. coal vs. wind) for energy production (Buekers et al., 2014; 
                                                          
6 Corporate social responsibility from a more general perspective has indeed been found to 
induce employees to accept lower wages and work more unpaid hours (Boeri, 2008; Burbano, 
2014). Similarly, green companies were shown to have more potential to recruit workers at 
lower wages than non- green ﬁrms (Brekke and Nyborg, 2008; Grolleau et al., 2012), to 
increase sales and proﬁts (Grolleau et al., 2013) as  well as  job satisfaction and creativity 
(Spanjol et al., 2014). Higher labor productivity was observed in  case of employers that 
adopted high environmental standards because employees increased their efforts when 
working for  companies  that  are socially responsible (Delmas and Pekovic, 2013; Lanfranchi 
and Pekovic, 2014). 
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Proost and Van Dender, 2011, 2012). However, there might also be social 
costs because employer-provided fringe benefits favoring car use may 
increase travel demand and so traffic congestion (De Borger and Wuyts, 
2009, 2011; Gutiérrez-i-Puigarnau and Van Ommeren, 2011; Potter et al., 
2006; Shiftan et al., 2012; Shoup, 1997; Wilson, 1992). Moreover, as 
range-anxiety is getting less important in the presence of WPC, residential 
location of employees could be affected, thereby contributing to urban 
sprawl. Eventually, by increasing electricity consumption during peak-
periods the electricity overload problem could be aggravated. Investment 
in peak load capacities paired with low electricity demand elasticities 
could then result in increasing electricity prices (Lyon et al., 2012). 
Even when accounting for the potential disadvantages, it seems that the 
benefits of WPC dominate. To exploit the expected benefits, government 
and other state or city initiatives have begun to support WPC provision 
by offering subsidies to employers who launch workplace recharging 
programs (see e.g., CALSTART, 2013 for the US; OLEV, 2014 for the UK).7 
From an economic point of view, public interventions to boost WPC 
should be taken only if private actions are expected to be insufficient to 
generate WPC demand and supply.  However, WPC related research is 
still in its infancy and to the best of our knowledge there is currently no 
systematic assessment of the economic rationale of WPC demand and 
supply. 
Against this background, in this paper we propose an economic model of 
recharging BEVs at workplace and use the approach to shed light on the 
incentives and barriers employees and employers face when deciding on 
demand for and supply of WPC. It is shown that under market conditions 
and uncertainty regarding WPC’s potential to foster a firm’s 
attractiveness for environmentally orientated workers and customers, 
there is no WPC contract – defined as a package of wage and recharging 
                                                          
7 However, some of the programs have already expired, such as the ‘Alternative Fuel 
Infrastructure Tax Credit’ offered by the US federal government.  It allowed employers to 
deduct up to 30% (but not to exceed $30,000) of the cost of the recharging equipment and 
installation (CALSTART, 2013). 
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fee offered by the employer – having the chance to be provided by the 
employer and, at the same time, to be accepted by the majority of 
employees.8 We ﬁnd that direct public subsidies to WPC facilities or  
subsidies combined with speciﬁc energy price policies could be a way to 
foster WPC provision. A pure (non-distortionary) redistribution from 
employees to the employer may also help to overcome WPC 
underprovision since WPC generates private net-beneﬁts in those cases 
where employees beneﬁt from WPC but the employer does not. In 
contrast measures on the employee side that may help to stimulate the 
demand for WPC turn out to be less feasible. Consequently, our results 
suggest that in order to promote WPC, it is more promising to support 
employers in offering WPC contracts than to provide employees an 
incentive to accept WPC contracts. The study therefore gives a rationale 
for public initiatives being undertaken to boost WPC provision, as e.g. in 
the case of the US.  
The model focuses on cost issues driving the supply of WPC on the 
employer side and user (net) benefits on the employee side. The 
employer offers a cost-minimizing WPC contract encompassing a 
potential discount on wages earned by WPC using employees and/or a 
recharging fee to be paid by the workers in order to compensate the 
outlays of WPC provision. The employees in turn evaluate the contract 
offered and decide whether to accept this contract (i.e. whether to use the 
WPC option), taking into account energy prices, time costs for recharging 
and restrictions regarding the potential that non-home recharging can 
effectively be used. 
                                                          
8 We state ‘majority of the employees’ rather than ‘all employees’ because we do not know 
the ‘true’ distribution of the preferences with respect to WPC. We do the analyzes on the 
bases of pure economic reasons assuming uniform distribution of preferences (see below). If 
the average worker accepts WPC our ﬁnding is independent from the distribution. The ﬁrm 
will always provide WPC (respectively offer a speciﬁc contract) so long as it is beneﬁcial for it 
and employees are interested in  (even it is  only a  minority). 
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Our approach inherits from De Borger and Wuyts (2009, 2011), but there 
are important differences traced back to specific characteristics of BEV 
recharging in contrast to employer-provided parking or the provision of 
company cars: First, recharging can be split between home, workplace 
and public recharging implying also quantity decisions on the share of 
recharging at home and other places. In contrast parking is either at home 
when using transit or at the workplace/on-street when using a car. 
Second, range-anxiety in case of e.g. additional trips, battery power run-
out due to bad driving environment (cold temperature), cost issues, and 
further aspects may force employees to charge their vehicles at places 
other than at home. This causes the generalized travel (commuting) cost 
to be expected values over the degree of range-anxiety, price dispersion 
etc. and so daily driving dependent on WPC features (availability in 
general and performance in relation to home and public recharging). 
We proceed as follows: First, in Section 2 we suggest the theoretical 
model of employee’s recharging choice and a cost minimization approach 
of employer’s recharging supply. Subsequently we perform a 
comparative statics analysis showing how decisions on WPC interact with 
each other and respond to potential private and public actions. Since the 
comparative statics results are ambiguous in most cases in Section 3 we 
calibrate the model to German data and perform simulations. They show 
that WPC may raise the sum of consumer and producer rents but there is 
no way to achieve a Pareto improvement through private decisions. 
Therefore, we examine various ‘remedies’ that may help to overcome 
either the lack of demand or underprovision of WPC. The ‘remedies’ 
involve subsidies granted to employers to cover the facility and running 
costs of recharging stations, rebates on the electricity tariff paid by 
employer, variations in standard home and public recharging tariffs paid 
by the employees, and adjustments in labor income taxes. Section 4 
presents conclusions and outlines directions for further research. 
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2.2. Analytical Framework  
The model considers representative employees and employers as the two 
main types of agents. We assume that the employees generally made a car 
choice decision in advance in favor of BEVs and have full access to an EV.9 
The BEV can be charged at home (home place recharging –HPC),10 at 
workplace (workplace recharging –WPC) and/or at commercial and 
public recharging stations (commercial/public recharging –CPC). In case 
that WPC is generally available and sufficiently attractive to be used, 
employees are assumed to recharge at the workplace rather than at 
public/commercial stations. Except for the case of employer-paid 
recharging, the employee has to pay for WPC provision and usage, either 
by a reduction of gross salary, through a recharging fee, or by 
combination of both. The concrete arrangement of the wage discount and 
the recharging fee forms the WPC contract offered by the employer (see 
below). 
2.2.1. The employee’s perspective: the demand for 
WPC 
The employees maximize expected utility by choosing daily consumption 
of general goods, traveling, the usage pattern of recharging locations and, 
in the end, by deciding whether to demand WPC. Workers are 
heterogeneous with respect to their preference for WPC and, without loss 
of generality, earn only labor income. On each working day, the employee 
faces the requirement to recharge the BEV to accomplish aggregate daily 
travel distance, D. The recharging decision may involve a trade-off 
                                                          
9 This assumption implies that we do not consider the effect that WPC provision might make 
electric mobility in general more attractive such that total demand for BEVs increases. Even 
though this does hardly affect the present analyzes, it can be crucial when WPC is evaluated 
under an economic efficiency point of view. We will discuss this point in more detail in the 
concluding section. 
10 Note that HPC includes recharging access at multi-unit buildings, e.g. coordinated recharging 
access at off-street parking lots or garages that do not take time to search for unoccupied 
chargers. 
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between recharging locations based on economic (cost minimizing) 
reasons but can also be restricted to recharging at home regardless of 
whether recharging at non-home locations is preferable for cost reasons. 
For example, the worker might be forced to recharge at home (without 
looking at the recharging cost e.g. at work) to keep a minimum state of 
charge of the battery to ensure its functionality and efficiency (Neubauer 
et al., 2013), or to make sure that the battery load is sufficient to reach the 
next recharging station (chosen in the economic recharging decision) 
taking into account some risks for energy consumption arising from 
adverse weather conditions (EC Power, 2014). Let γ be the share of daily 
travel distance charged on the basis of the cost trade-off between 
recharging stations,11   0 1d D  then is the basic amount of energy 
(in terms of daily travel distance) charged at home. The three-stage 
decision of a typical worker is as follows: 
1. In the absence of WPC, workers decide on how to allocate the 
recharging of the required energy that is not covered by the 
minimum load d0 between HPC and CPC such that it minimizes 
expected recharging expenditure. It is assumed that individual 
workers face an idiosyncratic daily shock on recharging costs at 
public stations with a zero expected value. Therefore, there is no 
discrete zero-one allocation between HPC and CPC but workers 
charge at both stations.12 The share of HPC, denoted by   ,H H Cp p  
                                                          
11 Put differently, γ can also be interpreted as the probability the employee expects to be forced 
to recharge the car during the day. Considering a full year, γ can be seen as the share of days 
with a shock to standard travel demand. It can also be interpreted as an indicator for the 
attractiveness of non-home recharging stations in general. If γ is low the employee will hardly 
ever consider the option of recharging elsewhere (non-home) even if there are price 
differentials. 
12 One can think of situations where the employee is forced to recharge at stations where he has 
to pay a price higher than expected because his primary station is closed, or because a traffic 
jam upfront or limited battery performance due to low temperature hampers reaching a cheaper 
station, or because range-anxiety forces the worker to charge during the day (non-home) despite 
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with  0 1H , depends on relative expected loading prices with 
Hp  and Cp  as the electricity tariffs [expressed in monetary units 
per BEV km traveled]13 related to recharging at home and at public 
stations,14 respectively.  We assume that 



0
H
Hp
 and 



0
H
Cp
. In 
the presence of WPC an equivalent decision is made where the HPC 
share now is  W H Wp , p  with    

0 1, 0
W
W
Hp
 and 
W
W
0
p



, and 
Wp as the recharging fee the employer may decide to 
levy.15 These relationships imply that in order to charge the daily 
travel distance not covered by 0d , BEV users are willing 
(respectively are forced) to charge outside home with shares 
1 H  and 1 W  (see above) even if the expected prices of CPC, 
Cp , and WPC, Wp , exceed the price of HPC, Hp . Both shares, 
                                                          
potentially higher cost. One can also think of energy price volatility during the day. These 
shocks may include idiosyncratic differences in the range-anxiety problem. 
13 We consider a representative BEV with average energy intensity measured by kilowatt hours 
required to travel one kilometer [kwh/km]. Multiplying energy intensity with the price per unit 
of energy (which is typically expressed in monetary unit per kwh) then gives the energy price 
on a per km basis. For convenience, all energy prices (electricity tariffs) are therefore expressed 
in monetary unit per km throughout the paper. Note further that because the numerical analysis 
is related to the case of Germany, we use ‘Euro (€)’ as currency hereafter. 
14 Note that 
Cp could include parking fees in case the employee has to pay for parking while 
recharging the BEV at commercial/public recharging stations. 
15 Concerning workplace recharging idiosyncratic daily shocks on recharging costs with a zero 
expected value are assumed too. 
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however, decline as a response to higher non-home tariffs 
H W
C W
0, 0
p p
   
     
.16 
2. Given this allocation the expected recharging costs are 
determined. By considering these costs, the worker maximizes 
expected utility by choosing daily consumption of general goods and 
traveling in the case that WPC is not available or not used (implying 
the recharging package   ,H HPC CPC and in the case that it is 
available (recharging package  W HPC,WPC ,17 yielding 
indirect utilities 
HV  and WV , respectively.  
3. In the last stage, the worker compares indirect utility achievable 
from recharging package H , 
HV , and W, WV , taking into account 
worker-specific idiosyncratic preference ε (assumed to have mean 
zero (E(ε) = 0)) he attaches to e.g. WPC in general and the contract 
the employer offers to him in particular (see below).     
                                                          
16 Drivers will put more effort in avoiding non-home recharging and so potential shocks at 
non-home stations or will plan their trips more carefully to reduce range-anxiety and so 
recharging at non-home stations. 
17 Another interesting recharging package is CW = {CPC, WPC} as it involves the trade-off 
between both main non-home recharging opportunities. For convenience in the main part of 
the present study we focus on those packages involving HPC because (at least in the medium-
term) individuals with access to HPC are most likely to buy a BEV at all (Hackbarth and 
Madlener, 2013). Nonetheless interested readers are referred to (Appendix 1 (A)) where we 
provide a comparative statics analysis regarding the package CW (in the same fashion as we 
will do it below). 
 33 
 
In the following, we assume that the first stage decision is already made 
and consider only its outcome  H  and W .  
In the absence of WPC (H = {HPC, CPC}), the expected daily recharging 
price per km is then given by 
   
 1 (1 )
(1 ) ,
 H H H H H C
H H H C
c p p p
d p d p
         
  
  (0.1) 
where   1 1H Hd      and  1 1H Hd      is the expected share of 
energy charged at 
commercial/public stations. Recharging at home only has share 1   and 
(per km) energy cost Hp . In contrast, with share γ recharging may also 
take place at non-home stations and recharging now also involves energy 
cost Cp associated with recharging at public stations.  
When WPC is available (W = {HPC, WPC}) , the expected daily recharging 
price per km can be written 
          
   
 
 1 1
1 ,
W H W H W W
W H W W
c p p p
d p d p
        
 
  
  (0.2) 
where  1 1W Wd      and  1 1W Wd     . Note that by (0.2), as 
mentioned before, we assume for simplicity that if γ > 0 the employee 
meets his travel demand by recharging both at home and at the workplace 
without the need for recharging at public stations, i.e. once WPC is 
available, it fully replaces CPC.  
In addition to the monetary cost, traveling involves time for driving and 
for recharging the battery of the EV. HPC and WPC are assumed to entail 
a cost-free time since the employee can basically do other things while 
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the car is being recharged.18 In contrast, CPC implies additional time use 
due to queuing at recharging stations19 and for recharging itself. 
Denote by td the driving time per km, and by tc the recharging time 
referring to the time the employee could not work while recharging, the 
total travel time per unit of distance Di traveled is 
  
 1 if 
,
if 
H
d ci
D
d
t t d i H
t
t i W
   
 

  (0.3) 
Where (1 )
H H
ct d D  is the time saving due to the provision of WPC. 
2.2.2. Second-stage decision: traveling 
The employee derives utility from consumption of general goods and 
services, x, leisure, l , and travel, D.20 His well- behaved utility function is 
                                                          
18 This implies the assumption that there will be efficient coordination of recharging at home 
and at the workplace without affecting the employee’s time ( see e.g. the study of Huang and 
Zhou (2015) on WPC coordination). 
19 One can also think of situations where other (conventional internal combustion engine 
vehicle) drivers just block the public parking lot next to a public recharging stations. Of course 
even at the workplace congestion at recharging stations and so queuing cannot be ruled out 
but it is probably a minor problem compared with public recharging stations (Nichols and Tal, 
2013). 
20 Note that, following standard approaches in transportation economics, we consider travel 
distance as component of utility since it increases the opportunity space (see, e.g., Bento et 
al., 2009; De Borger, B and Rouwendal, J, 2014; Golob et al., 1981; Parry and Small, 2005). The 
amount of travel does not (conventionally) increase utility by itself, though it could under 
certain conditions (Mokhtarian and Salomon, 2001), but it increases utility by raising the 
number of options one has for consumption, leisure activities, visits of friends/relatives, etc. 
(Anas, 2007; Rietveld and van Woudenberg, 2003), after controlling for the generalized cost 
of traveling. For example, for someone to eat dinner outside home, traveling one more km 
allows the individual to satisfy his taste for variety by increasing the number of restaurants to 
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( , , ), ,i i i i iU U x l D i H W    (0.4) 
 
The (daily) monetary budget and time constraints, respectively, are, 
    
 1 ,         ,i i i i wx c D t i H W       (0.5) 
 
,     ,i i iw Dl t t D T i H W      (0.6) 
where tw is fixed daily working time and T is the daily total time 
endowment. The price of goods/services (x) is normalized to unity. The 
hourly gross wage is either 
H   or W  , where   is the market 
wage rate and 
i  is the wage rate paid by an employer not providing 
( )i H  and providing ( )i W  WPC, respectively. The inequality with 
respect to 
W  indicates one part of the employer--employee WPC 
negotiation. 
Substituting (0.5) and (0.6) into (0.4) yields 
    1 , % , ,    , .i i i i i i iw w DU t c D T t t D D i H W        (0.7) 
Differentiating (0.7) with respect to Di gives the first-order condition 
                                                          
choose from, ceteris paribus. It has also been found empirically that an increase in commuting 
distance induces wage increase (Mulalic et al., 2014). The implicit assumption we made here 
is that the positive utility traveling gives by increasing options is proportional to distance 
traveled. 
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,          ,
i
iD
i
U
i H W

    (0.8) 
where 
i i
xU   is the marginal utility of income (MUI) and 
i  represents 
the generalized travel cost per km: 
  ,         ,i i i iDc t i H W       (0.9) 
with / ,
i i i i
lU     as the value of time. Indirect utility then is 
  , , ,1 , , ,    , .i i i i i i iw w DV V t c D T t t D D i H W            (0.10) 
2.2.3. Third-stage decision: location of recharging place 
In the third stage the employee chooses the recharging option H or W that 
maximizes expected utility. For an employee, it is beneficial to charge the 
vehicle at the workplace if 
.W HV V     (0.11) 
Assuming that  , the preference for WPC, is distributed uniformly over 
the interval [ , ]a a  , the probability of WPC (respectively the share of 
employees preferring WPC) is given by  
1
.
2 2
H WV V
a


    (0.12) 
As can be seen from (0.12), a reservation utility level of 
H WV V V   
0  is needed to induce the (average) employee to use the WPC option 
provided by the employer through offering a certain WPC contract. 
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2.2.4. Comparative statics: Determinants of   
In the following we present some of the comparative statics results 
concerning the impact a public authority, an employer and an electricity 
supplier might have in order to influence the probability of WPC. The 
comparative statics analysis is performed in the following order: (1): ;  
(2): ;Hp  (3): ;
Cp  (4): ;Wp  (5): ;ct  (6): .
W  While the labor tax   is 
only in the sphere of the government, electricity tariffs Hp  and 
Cp  can 
be influenced by the electricity supplier as well as by the government 
(through energy taxes levied on top).21 In contrast, the fee for recharging 
at the workplace pW and a wage discount as part of a WPC contract 
(through offering a wage such that 
W  ) are set by the employer. The 
recharging time at commercial stations can be influenced from several 
directions, e.g. private investment in more powerful (faster) 
public/commercial recharging stations, potentially stimulated by 
subsidies granted by the government; improvements in battery 
performance of the EV; all measures contributing to reduce or even avoid 
queueing at recharging stations such as expansion of parking space at 
stations. Let us now establish several lemmas illustrating the 
determinants of θ one after another, supported by a brief discussion. The 
analysis can be started by noting that for any exogenous variable α in 
(0.10): 
sign sign .
W HV V
  
    
   
     
  (0.13) 
                                                          
21 If third parties were involved in providing commercial recharging stations, e.g. the carriers 
of conventional gas stations, they could also influence p C by levying a mark-up to cover their 
costs. 
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Lemma 1. A higher labor tax increases the probability of WPC if differences 
in MUIs across the recharging regimes do not over- compensate wage 
differences: 
0.





  (0.14) 
Proof. By applying the envelope theorem to (0.10) and using Roy’s 
identity we have 
  ,
W H
H W W
w
V V
t   
 
 
  
 
  (0.15) 
which implies that if   0H W W      
or 1 where 1
W W W
H
  
  
 
  
 
 an increase in   increases .  
The result is intuitive and relates to the fringe benefit character of WPC. 
If the employer offers a WPC contract with wage discount, i.e. 
W  , a 
higher labor tax causes a larger tax burden when choosing recharging 
package H  and thus, a combination of HPC and CPC, implying a higher 
probability of WPC by favoring recharging package W .  
The effects of the electricity tariff for HPC are ambiguous. However, under 
certain assumption we can get some insights. 
Lemma 2. An increase in the electricity tariff for HPC increases the 
probability of WPC if generalized unit costs of CPC exceed those of WPC and 
vice versa (assuming 
H W   and W W H HD D   with symmetry of the 
functions 
H  and W ): 
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% ,
0 if 
.
0 if W H W W H H
C H W
c
H C H W
cD D
p t p
p p t p
   


 
   

   
  (0.16) 
Proof. Applying the envelope theorem to (0.10) and using Roy’s identity 
gives 
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W H
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D D
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D D D D
D D
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D D
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 
 
  
       
      

      
      
     
       
    
 
  
   
  
 
  
If ,H W   W W H HD D  , and if there is symmetry of the functions 
H  and W  implying identical price elasticities of   with respect to Hp
, i.e.  
H H
H W
p p
 
  , this is equivalent to 
                          
0
.
H
H
C H WW H
pc
H H H
p t pV V
p p p 



 
      
     
     
 
  (0.17) 
Since the own-price elasticity of the expected share of HPC, 
H
H
p

 , is 
negative, an increase in 
Hp  increases   if .
C H W
cp t p   
An increase in the price of HPC shifts demand towards CPC and WPC. 
Since the former causes additional time costs in comparison to WPC the 
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probability of choosing WPC instead of CPC goes up. However, this does 
not hold if the fee for recharging at the workplace exceeds the generalized 
cost of CPC. Clearly, in this case CPC has a relative advantage over WPC, 
and an increase in the home recharging tariff (which decreases the share 
of home loading βH) causes the probability of WPC to decrease. 
Lemma 3. If the generalized cost of CPC does not exceed the electricity 
tariff of HPC by more than 
 
1
C
H
H
H
p
Cp





, the probability of WPC increases 
with an increase in the recharging fee for CPC: 
                  
 
 
1
0 if 
.
0 otherwise
C
H
H
C H H
c H
p
CC
p t p
pp 




 
   
 
 
 

  (0.18) 
Proof. By applying the envelope theorem and using Roy’s identity when 
partially differentiating (0.10) with respect to p C we have 
 
00
1 .
C
H
H C HW H
H H H H pc
C C C
p p tV V
D
p p p 

   

 
    
     
    
  
  (0.19) 
Since the cross-price elasticity of the expected share of HPC, 
C
H
p

 , is 
positive, an increase in 
Cp  increases   if the generalized costs of CPC are 
not much higher than the price of HPC, exactly speaking if 
 
 
1
C
H
H
C H
c H H
p
C
p t p
p





   .  
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The implication is that by manipulating pC through changing taxes or 
energy tariffs for CPC, the probability of WPC can be affected. According 
to (0.19) there are several effects. First, a change in pC does not affect VW 
because pC is not an option under recharging package W. Hence, all effects 
of pC on θ are channeled through its effects on VH. Here two countervailing 
effects are relevant. First, an increase in pC lowers VH directly due to 
higher CPC costs (the first term in (0.19) where 1 –βH is the share of CPC). 
Ceteris paribus, this causes the probability of WPC to increase. Second, pC 
also affects the net benefits from HPC (the second term in (0.19) with 
share βH of HPC). An increase in pC shifts demand towards HPC, resulting 
in a decrease in demand for non-HPC recharging. If the cost of HPC is 
lower than the generalized cost of CPC, utility associated with recharging 
package H increases. This lowers the probability of WPC, ceteris paribus. 
The second effect is the stronger the larger the generalized cost 
advantage of HPC compared with CPC and the larger the elasticity of 
recharging at home with respect to pC. As a result, the overall impact of pC 
on θ depends on the relative strength of both effects, except in the case 
that recharging fee at HPC is higher than the generated cost of CPC in that 
an increase in pC always increases the probability of WPC, ceteris paribus. 
Lemma 4. The probability of WPC declines with an increase of the fee for 
recharging at the workplace if the fee is sufficiently small in comparison 
to the electricity tariff for HPC, ceteris paribus: 
                              
 
 
1
0 if 
.
0 otherwise
W
W
W
W H
W
p
WW
p p
pp 



 
  
 
 
 

  (0.20) 
Proof. Partially differentiating (0.10) with respect to pW, applying the 
envelope theorem and using Roy’s identity yields 
 
0
0
1 .
W
W
W H H W
W W W W p
W W W
V V p p
D
p p p 
   


 
    
      
    
 
  (0.21) 
 42 
 
Since the cross-price elasticity of the expected share of HPC when WPC is 
available, ,
W  is positive, i.e. 0,
W
W
p

   an increase in 
Wp  reduces   if 
.W Hp p  
Intuitively, the employer can provide an incentive for workers to 
strengthen demand for WPC by lowering the recharging fee given that it 
is not too high initially (see evidence provided by Nichols and Tal, 2013; 
U.S. Department of Energy, 2014b). Again, two countervailing effects 
emerge. An increase in pW directly reduces the probability for WPC (the 
first term in (0.21) where 1 −βW is the share of WPC). However, it also 
affects the net benefits from HPC (the second term in (0.21) with share 
βW of HPC). An increase in pW shifts demand towards HPC. If the cost of 
HPC is lower than the recharging fee at the workplace, utility associated 
with recharging package H increases. This raises the probability of WPC, 
ceteris paribus. The second effect is the stronger the larger the 
generalized cost advantage of HPC compared with WPC and the larger the 
elasticity of recharging at home with respect to pW. Hence, as in the 
previous case, the overall impact of pW on θ depends on the relative 
strength of both effects.   
 
Lemma 5. Measures that reduce the recharging time (at public stations) 
decrease the probability of recharging at workplace, ceteris paribus. That 
is  
0.
ct



  (0.22) 
Proof. By applying the envelope theorem to (0.10) and using Roy’s 
identity we have 
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 1 .
W H
H H H H
c c
V V
D d
t t
 
 
  
 
  (0.23) 
Hence, presuming that 1Hd   (which usually holds), a reduction in ct  
reduces .    
Obviously, the lower the time needed to recharge the BEV at 
public/commercial recharging stations, the lower the probability of WPC, 
ceteris paribus. This implies that a technological progress towards ‘fast 
recharging’ (respectively a larger share of public funds in favor of a more 
powerful public recharging infrastructure) will have a negative effect on 
the demand for WPC. 
Lemma 6. A wage discount adopted by the employer as part of a WPC 
contract offer decreases the probability of WPC (put differently a raise of 
the wage 
W  raises the probability of recharging at the workplace, 
ceteris paribus): 
0.
W





  (0.24) 
Proof. From applying the envelope theorem to (0.10) and using Roy’s 
identity one obtains  
  1 .
W H
W
wW W
V V
t 
 
 
  
 
  (0.25) 
Because 1,   an increase in W  increases .   
The comparative statics analysis clearly reveals that the probability of 
recharging at the workplace can be influenced by the employers, 
governments and electricity suppliers, and recharging facility providers 
through different channels. However, the employer's direct margin of 
influence is basically limited to the recharging fee 
Wp  and the wage 
discount applied to a WPC using employee (discount on  ). The crucial 
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point now is that a certain combination of 
Wp  and ,
W  being 
sufficiently attractive for the majority of BEV driving employees to accept 
WPC, may not necessarily be offered by the employer. We therefore now 
focus on the employer side and the link between both, the employer and 
the employee. 
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2.3. The employer’s perspective: the provision of WPC 
We consider a representative firm which has to decide whether to 
provide BEV using employees the opportunity to charge their vehicle at 
the workplace. We assume that WPC provision only affects (per 
employee) production cost but not productivity, the firm’s aggregate 
labor stock or the number of sales in general.22 Labor is the only input 
actually required for a given level of production of goods/services23 and 
employees are generally paid their marginal product and so earn the 
hourly market wage rate  24. Employers, however, may make use of a 
                                                          
22 WPC is such a young ‘phenomenon’ so that evidence regarding its impact on e.g. labor 
productivity, recruitment, and firm sales is to the best of our knowledge not yet available. It is 
therefore debatable whether the impacts of the ‘traditional’ measures dignifying a company 
with an ecofriendly branding found in the literature (e.g. the firm’s participation in the fair 
trade program, organic labeling, ISO 14001 standard; see the studies cited in the introduction) 
can be transferred on a one-to-one basis to the case of WPC provision. In fact, the green image 
of BEVs is not undisputed since their environmental performance heavily depends on factors 
such as battery production/recycling and sources (non-renewable vs. renewable energy) of 
power generation (see Buekers et al., 2014; Hawkins et al., 2013; Notter et al., 2010; Tessum 
et al., 2014; Thomas, 2009; Tscharaktschiew, 2015). Furthermore, abstracting from uncertain 
productivity or sales effects is actually even the more interesting case to consider because due 
the uncertainty involved it keeps firms on the safe side when deciding on WPC provision and 
the concrete arrangement of the contract. In the light of these facts we use some kind of 
‘backward induction’ in the numerical part instead, assuming that a risk-averse employer 
abstracts from potential productivity effects when deciding on WPC provision. We can then 
calculate the ‘critical’ WPC productivity increment that would be needed to make the 
provision of WPC beneficial for the employer in a situation in which WPC otherwise would not 
have been provided. 
23 Broader capital costs (e.g. buildings, interior furnishings, machines, computer hard- and 
software), could easily be included as well but except for the capital cost of the recharging 
facility in the case of WPC (see below) they would add no significant further insights to the 
present analysis so that we solely focus on labor as the only primary input. 
24 We assume that provision of recharging facility at workplace is a result of a negotiation 
between individual workers and employers, not part of a labor compensation bargaining 
agreement between labor-unions and firms, in that the market wage rate will not be affected 
in the sense of, e.g., De Borger and Wuyts (2009, 2011) and Hashimoto and Zhao (2000).   
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wage discount such that W   or may levy a recharging fee in case that 
employees receive a fringe benefit in the form of WPC. The combination 
of both then forms the contract  ,W Wp  the employer offers an 
employee who is interested in using WPC. For example, the employer 
could offer the contract  , 0  which is obviously the special case of 
‘employer-paid recharging’.25 In case that a positive recharging fee pW 
based on usage is levied,26 the firm is able cover a certain fraction of its 
own electricity cost, i.e. the tariff the employer pays to the electricity 
supplier, denoted by .p  The employer’s net unit electricity cost 
associated with WPC (again expressed as cost per km) then is  .Wp p  
Note that if ,
Wp p  WPC even generates revenue. Besides the 
employer's control variables captured by the contract  , ,W Wp  WPC, 
once provided, has average annual capital costs c  involving e.g. the pure 
facility cost of recharging infrastructure, installation cost, maintenance 
and administrative costs, land rent of the parking lots around the 
recharging stations27. Taking into account potential government 
programs which aim at supporting WPC provision through granting 
subsidies   to recharging infrastructure expenditure, net capital costs 
are  rc  , where 1r i   denotes the unit capital cost ( i  is the 
                                                          
25 For the US the Workplace Recharging Challenge annual survey reports that 80 % (as of 2014) 
of employees get employer-paid recharging access (U.S. Department of Energy, 2014a). 
26 Instead of linking payments for recharging with actual usage one can also think of flat (fixed) 
recharging fees paid e.g. on a per month basis. However, the 2014 US Workplace Recharging 
Challenge annual survey reports that in those cases where recharging is not for free employees 
usually pay a fee based on usage (U.S. Department of Energy, 2014a). 
27 Average capital cost means that c   crucially depends on the performance and capacity of 
the recharging station considered. The more powerful the recharging station (e.g. Level 1 vs. 
Level 2 charger) the larger the number of employees whose vehicle can be charged ultimately 
during a full workday (Huang and Zhou, 2015). 
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interest rate). The employer's daily cost per BEV using employee in case 
of WPC provision then is 
   
1
,W W ewc t p p d rc
k
        (0.26) 
where k  is a positive integer used to convert annual net capital costs into 
a comparable per day basis,28 and  
 1  e W Wd d D    (0.27) 
is energy demand (again expressed in km) the firm expects each user to 
consume under WPC, with  
 
 
 
 
e W 2 e 2 W
e W e W
2 2W W
W W
d D d D
d = 1-d 0,   d = 1-d 0, 
   
   
   
   
  (0.28) 
 
 
e W W 2 e
e W W e
p pp 2W W W
W
d D d
d = 1-d - D 0,      d 0.
p p p p


   
   
   
  (0.29) 
However, on account of the employee's idiosyncratic preferences for WPC 
in general or a specific contract in particular, the employer cannot be 
completely sure that the contract will be accepted by the employee. 
Consequently, the firm constructs the contract based on expectations on 
the probability that the contract will be accepted (and fulfilled over a 
certain period of time and on the expected amount of recharging). The 
                                                          
28 In this sense, k could correspond to the number of working days in the contract period 
regarding the usage of the recharging facility. 
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employer's expected daily cost associated with WPC contract  ,W Wp  
then is 
        
labor compensation for non-WPC users
labor compensation for WPC users
1
, 1W W W W ew wC p t t p p d rc
k
     
 
       
 
 
 (0.30) 
From (0.20) and (0.24) (assuming that the respective conditions are 
fulfilled) we know that 
 
 
2
2
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0,     0,
W W
W
W
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 
  
 
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  (0.31) 
 
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W W
p W
p
p
  
 
 
  
 
α
  (0.32) 
where α  denotes a vector of all other parameters being exogenous to the 
firm. 
Based on the determinants of the employee's and employer's behavior we 
are now able to study the determinants of WPC provision and demand 
under various contract schemes  , .W Wp  We start with analytical 
expositions and subsequently, use numerical simulations to verify our 
findings and to shed light on ambiguous theoretical effects. 
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2.4. The joint perspective: WPC contracts 
2.4.1. Employer-paid recharging 
                                           1 , 0W WWPC p     
The most obvious contract to consider is the case of employer-paid 
recharging, i.e. the employer neither makes a discount on wages offered 
to an employee being interested in WPC nor does he levy a recharging fee. 
The per-day expected labor cost incurred by an employer providing WPC 
with the contract offer  , 0  then simplifies to 
   max max
1
,0 ,wC t pd rc
k
   
 
    
 
  (0.33) 
where max ( ,0)    and max ( ,0)ed d   represent the maximum 
share of employees choosing WPC and the maximum amount of energy 
charged under WPC if recharging is free of any costs to the employee. Not 
surprisingly it is the worst contract scheme for the employer because he 
is neither able to be compensated through lower wages nor through a 
contribution to the energy costs when employees charge their vehicle at 
the workplace. Hence, a cost-minimizing employer will offer this WPC 
contract only if the subsidy is high enough to finance fixed and variable 
costs of WPC, i.e. if 
max .rc kpd    
2.4.2. Wage discount only 
                                            2 , 0W WWPC p     
Now we examine the case where the employer offers a contract that 
comprising a wage discount and a predetermined zero recharging fee. 
The contract  , 0W  leads to the cost function 
 50 
 
     
1
1 .W W ew wC t t pd rc
k
     
 
      
 
  (0.34) 
Differentiating (0.34) with respect to the employer's choice variable W  
yields the corresponding first-order condition (FOC) and second-order 
condition (SOC): 
     
1
FOC: 0W e ew wC t pd rc t pd
k
      
 
         
 
  (0.35)
     
1
SOC: 2 ,W e e ew wC t pd rc t pd pd
k
         
 
         
 
 
 (0.36) 
where subscripts   and   denote the first and second derivative, 
respectively.  
Solving the FOC for 
W  and substituting (0.35) into (0.36) yields 
 2 .e ewC t pd pd    


  

 
    
 
  (0.37) 
The condition for cost minimization 0C   is fulfilled if 
ed  is not too 
large in magnitude. 
The cost minimizing value of 
W  is then given by 
   
1 1 1
,W e d
w w
pd rc
t kt
 

 
 
 
  
 
  
     
 
  (0.38) 
where 
1 1
0 and 0
e
dW W e
d
d
 


 
  
 
   
 
 are, when multiplied by 
W , the elasticities of   and ed  with respect to the wage rate, 
respectively.  
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The compensation for offering WPC (the wage discount) then is: 
   
1 1 1
.W e d
w w
pd rc
t kt
 

 
 
 
  
 
  
     
 
  (0.39) 
It is inversely related to the wage elasticity of the expected share of 
employees demanding WPC and proportionally related to the wage 
elasticity of energy demand when recharging. Note that by paying for 
WPC via a reduction of gross salary, the employer and the employee save 
 W ww w t   per day at the expense of government revenue. 
By applying the implicit function theorem to the first-order condition 
(0.35), we can also find the effects of the other parameters on  W

: 
   
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   
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W W
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 


   
 
    
   
 
 

   
     

  
  (0.40) 
The cost minimizing wage rate set by the employer  W

 increases with 
the market wage rate and the subsidy granted by the government to cover 
the capital costs of the recharging facility. However, it decreases with the 
recharging facility costs, and with employer's electricity costs. Moreover, 
in general one can see that the lower the wage elasticities of the expected 
share of WPC users and the electricity demand for WPC, the smaller the 
impact on the cost-minimizing value of   .W

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2.4.3. Recharging fee only 
                               3 , 0W WWPC p     
Next we consider a contract where the employer cannot make use of a 
wage discount, e.g., due to collective wage bargaining, instead levying a 
recharging fee Wp . In this case, the contract is  3 , WWPC p  and the 
cost function of the employer becomes 
     
1
.W W ewC p t p p d rc
k
  
 
     
 
  (0.41) 
The corresponding first- and second- order conditions are given by 
    
1
: - - - 0e W e ep p p pFOC C qd p p qd d q q rc d
k
       (0.42)
      
1
: -2 - 2 - .e e W e e epp p p p p pp pp ppSOC C d d p p d d
k
d rc             
 (0.43) 
Under reasonable parameter constellations and functional forms, it can 
be shown that the SOC is fulfilled so that the cost minimizing recharging 
fee set by the employer is: 
  
 
 
if 
 
if .
W
W W
p e
W
e p p
d
p rcrc kd
p p
p rckd


 
 
    
  
 
 
 (0.44) 
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where 
1 1
0 and 0
W W
e
p p
dW W e
d
p p d


 

 
   
 
 are, when multiplied by 
Wp , the elasticities of   and ed  with respect to the recharging fee, 
respectively.  
The implication of (0.44) is that when choosing the recharging fee as part 
of a WPC contract while not making use of a wage discount, the employer 
will always levy a mark-up on own electricity cost if the capital costs of 
the recharging facility cannot be completely financed by a subsidy 
granted by the government. The mark-up will be the larger the smaller 
the subsidy. 
By applying the implicit function theorem to the first-order condition in 
(0.42) we find the effects of the relevant parameters on  Wp

 as follows: 
 
     
   
0,         0,
0,                         0.
W W
W
W W
e p pW W p
d
pp pp
W Wp p
pp pp
dd p d p r
dp C dc kC
d p d pc
dr kC d kC


 
    
  

 
 

     
    
 
 (0.45) 
As can be seen, the higher the employer's costs associated with WPC 
provision (encompassing ,p  ,c  r ), the higher the recharging fee levied 
by the employer will be. In contract, a higher subsidy induces the 
employer to levy a lower recharging fee. In each case the elasticities of the 
expected share of WPC users and their amount of electricity demand for 
recharging play an important role in setting the recharging fee. For 
example, the more elastic the employees respond to a higher recharging 
fee by avoiding WPC, the stronger the employer will increase the 
recharging fee as a response to higher capital costs of the recharging 
facility. 
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2.4.4. Fully flexible contract 
                                              4 , 0W WWPC p     
Eventually, the most flexible case is that the employer offers a contract 
 4 , .W WWPC p  To cover the high cost of the recharging facility, the 
employer may exploit both instruments, a wage discount and the 
recharging fee, simultaneously. The first-order conditions with respect 
to the employer's decision variables 
W  and Wp  are
         
1
0W W e ew wC t t p p d d rc
k
                     
 (0.46) 
      
1
0. W W e e ep w p p p pC t p p d d rc d
k
                                             
(0.47) 
The sufficient conditions for cost minimization are 
 
2
0,          0,         pp pp pC C C C C                                                   (0.48) 
Where  
    2 2 ( ),W W e e ew wC t t p p d d d rc
k

      

                     
                           (0.49) 
      2 ( ) 2 ,ppW W e e e e epp pp w p p pp pp p pC t p p d d d rc d d
k

                        
           (0.50) 
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        
1
.W W e e e e e ep p w w p p p p p pC t t p p d d d d d d rc
k
                                    
                          (0.51) 
Under the conditions given in (0.46) - (0.48), the cost minimizing values 
of W  and Wp , denoted  Wc

 and  Wcp

with subscript c indicating the 
contract form that combines W  and Wp , are obtained by solving the 
FOCs in (0.46) and (0.47) simultaneously for W  and Wp  (Appendix 1 
(B)), implying 
 
 
 
,
W
W W
p e
w
W
c
e p p
d d
t d
p p
d

 
 
 
 
   
 
 
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                                                    (0.52) 
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wd d w
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 
 
 
    
 
   
    
  

                   (0.53)                                                               
By applying the implicit function theorem for simultaneous equations on 
the FOCs given in (0.46) and (0.47), we have (for 0pC  ) the following 
results (for derivation, see Appendix 1 (C)): 
       
2 2
0 ,          0. 
( ) ( )
W Wp pW W
w pp p w pc c
pp p pp p
t C C t C Cp
C C C C C C
 
      
   
     
 
 
  
   
   
  
Intuitively, the above result shows that an increase in the market wage 
rate results in an increase in wage rate that WPC users receive and a 
reduction in the fee they have to pay for recharging the EV, where the 
magnitude of the effect depends on the elasticities of the share of 
employees using WPC with respect to gross salary and fee for recharging, 
both of which are expected to be small. 
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On the other hand, an increase in the electricity tariff that the employer 
pays to the electricity supplier reduces the wage rate the employer pays 
to the WPC users, but increases the fee the former collects from WPC 
users. 
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  
   
  
  
The impacts of recharging facility installation/administration cost c  and 
subsidies   on the employer's decision variables have the expected sign 
but, intuitively, the price and wage elasticities of electricity demand do 
not play any role in the effect. Noteworthy in these comparative statics 
results is that, unlike the comparative statics analyzes we saw before 
when the employer uses only one of the two decision variables, the 
employer can exploit elasticities of both,   and ed  (with respect to Wp  
and 
Ww ) simultaneously. 
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2.5. Simulation result 
We have shown that the demand for and the supply of WPC are influenced 
through various channels but most effects depend on concrete parameter 
constellations. In the following we apply numerical simulations and 
examine the impacts of the different WPC contracts previously discussed 
on employees and employers. This allows us to evaluate the ‘chances’ of 
different contract schemes to be provided by employers and at the same 
time to be accepted by the majority of employees and, in the end, enables 
us to discuss what kinds of measures could help to overcome potential 
lack of WPC demand and supply. 
2.5.1. Functional forms and data 
To represent preferences of employees we adopt a Cobb-Douglas utility 
function 
       , , log log logi i i i i iX l DU X l D X l D         (0.54) 
with parameters , ,X l D    reflecting preference weights (full income 
shares) of general consumption, leisure, and mobility (captured by daily 
distance traveled). 
The relative recharging shares were chosen such that they fulfill the 
required relationships between prices and recharging location 
distribution: 
 
 
 
 
   
1 1
, , , .
1 exp 1 exp
H H C W H W
H C H W
p p p p
p p p p
  
   
 
 (0.55) 
The employee’s benefit from WPC access in general and the contract 
schemes in particular is evaluated by the equivalent variation (ev) 
measuring the amount of income necessary to compensate an employee 
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without access to WPC in order to reach equality with the utility level 
achievable when having access under a certain contract scheme, i.e. 
     )1 ( , 1 , , .H H H W W W Ww wV t ev V t             (0.56) 
The employer's (producer's) surplus of providing recharging at the 
workplace, denoted ps, is given by 
     , .W W W W ew w
rc
ps t C p t p p d
k

      

         (0.57) 
The model is calibrated to Germany. The corresponding parameters are 
listed in Table 2.5.1. 
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Table 2.5.1. Parameterization 
 
We assume that the employees under consideration use a representative 
BEV (car segment: ‘compact’)29 with a nominal battery capacity of 24 kwh, 
nominal energy intensity (electricity consumption) of 14 kwh/100 km 
(Loisel et al., 2014)30 and actual (on-the-road) energy intensity of 18 
                                                          
29 According to (Loisel et al., 2014) the ‘compact’ car segment has the highest share within the 
BEV car fleet (≈36% as of 2011). 
30 This corresponds to a Nissan Leaf according to the study of (Donateo et al., 2015). 
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kwh/100 km.31 Assuming that the car is charged once and the battery is 
full, and taken into account that usable energy is lower than the battery’s 
nominal capacity32 this implies an average on-the-road daily driving 
range of around 100–110 km. The preference parameters in the utility 
function were then chosen such that a hypothetical scenario with fully 
recharging the vehicle at home (thereby avoiding potential idiosyncratic 
daily shocks on non- home recharging costs, i.e. γ= 0) results in an 
expected total daily travel distance of 60 km (25 km one-way commuting 
+10 km from further trips).33 According to Donateo et al. (2015) and EC 
Power (2014), under a combination of certain adverse conditions, e.g. 
heavy traffic congestion in winter season (cold temperature), driving 
range can easily be only a fraction (around one-third to one-half) of the 
on-the-road driving range. In our case this would correspond to a daily 
driving range of less than 50 km. Importantly, even when the battery 
were fully charged in the morning34 this would cause a considerable 
                                                          
31 Donateo et al. (2015) report that actual electricity consumption on the road can deviate 
considerably compared to that measured by the New European Driving Cycle (NEDC) and 
declared by the car manufacturers (actual energy consumption can be more than twice as 
high). Main reasons for the variations are traffic conditions, weather, average speed and 
acceleration, the usage of auxiliaries such as air conditioning. For example, all cars (EVs 
registered in Italy in 2013) listed in the study of Donateo et al. (2015) have nominal, i.e. as 
declared by the car manufacturers, energy electricity consumption below 17 kwh/100 km. 
32 A fraction of 80% is usually reported (see Lyon et al., 2012; Neubauer et al., 2013). 
33 Average one-way commuting distance (urban + rural areas) in Germany in 2009 amounted 
to about 17 km (BMVBS, 2013) where around two-thirds of the commuters traveled more than 
18 km (BBSR, 2012). Meanwhile non-commuting related trips constitute a significant share on 
total trips (see Anas, 2007; MID (Mobilit¨at in Deutschland), 2008; Pearre et al., 2011) so that 
the assumption of 10 km is relatively conservative. 
34 Assuming a standard Level 1 home charger with voltage 120, amperage 12, and recharging 
power of 1.6 kw, it would take more than 12 hours to fully recharge the vehicle. Hence, 
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degree of uncertainty (range-anxiety) which might force a driver to 
charge his vehicle during the day at non-home locations, implying γ > 0. 
(e.g., see Rezvani et al., 2015). Besides, it is assumed that workers choose 
recharging places primarily by comparing costs at stations while limiting 
the fixed home recharging share to a moderate level of 30 %. We 
therefore set γ= 0 .7 meaning that employees distribute 70% of the 
required energy between HPC and WPC or between HPC and CPC taking 
into account the tariffs at these recharging places. 
Table 2.5.2: Contract schemes 
 
Assuming average driving speed of 40 km/h, travel time then is td = 0.025 
h/km. The recharging time at public/commercial recharging stations 
needed to expand the driving range by one kilometer is taken to be tc = 
0.022 hour implying a recharging time of around 130 min for a range 
                                                          
assuming no power blackout, the employee would have to start recharging not later than let’s 
say 7 p.m. to have a fully loaded battery available in the morning. 
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extension of 100 km.35 Daily working time tw is set at 8 hours and the daily 
time endowment T at 18 hours (24 −6 hours for recreation). 
The electricity prices/tariffs , ,H Cp p p  paid by 
households/workers/firms (including taxes and further fees) refer to the 
year 2013 and were taken from BDEW (2013). In line with current 
practice in Germany, we set electricity prices such that Hp p  meaning 
that the price paid by households exceeds the tariff paid by firms (the 
firm’s rebate is around 48% compared with the private household tariff). 
The recharging tariff levied at public/commercial recharging stations in 
turn is assumed to be higher than the private household tariff. Pricing 
schemes at public stations are quite heterogeneous and mark-ups to 
standard home tariffs are observed to be considerable. Here we assume 
an excess over home tariffs in the order of three-quarters. The market 
wage rate is set at 19.65 €/h (average hourly gross earning of non-
marginally employed persons working in the manufacturing industry and 
the service sector in Germany (Federal Statistical Office, 2014). 
The recharging facility costs are very hard to pin down because they 
heavily depend on, in particular, the type of the recharging station. But 
even for the same type of recharging station, different brands lead to 
considerable price/cost dispersion. Moreover, a significant share of the 
total cost of more powerful stations can be attributed to installation cost 
(often 60–80%, according to (CALSTART, 2013; RMI, 2014) which in turn 
may differ regionally (e.g. electrician labor). We follow Huang and Zhou 
(2015) and assume a medium power Level 2 outlet as the most plausible 
charger for WPC. Based on an evaluation of several studies reporting cost 
                                                          
35 This bases upon the assumption that public recharging station are (on average) more 
powerful than those usually available at home. The per km recharging time of 1.3 min is 
derived by assuming a Level 2 charger with voltage 240, amperage 30, and recharging power 
of 8 kw (18 kwh/100 km BEV energy intensity divided by 8 kw recharging power). 
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estimates (Dong et al., 2014; Huang and Zhou, 2015; RMI, 2014; 
Schroeder and Traber, 2012), the cost of the recharging station hardware 
is taken to be 3000 € and all other costs associated with installation are 
assumed to amount to 4500 €.36 Total facility cost then amount to 7500 
€.37 When additionally account is taken of the fact that the performance 
of a powerful Level 2 charger allows to serve 2–3 employees during an 
eight hours working day depending on their individual recharging 
demand38 and that station lifetime can be assumed to be approximately 
10 years (Schroeder and Traber, 2012), one obtains annual average 
facility cost of 375 € per WPC using employee. Adding regular 
maintenance and repair cost in the order of 300 €/per year (Schroeder 
and Traber, 2012) we arrive at c = 675 €/(employee ∗year). Eventually, 
because the employer’s expected cost of WPC is given on a per day basis 
(see (0.30)) we use k = 225 (number of contract days at which WPC is 
                                                          
36 Following the categorization of RMI (2014) aggregate installation cost breaks down as 
follows: 1000 € other hardware and materials; 3000 € electrician and other labor cost; 400 € 
mobilization (time for the electrician and others to get to the worksite and for preparation, 
including an initial on-site consultation); 100 € permitting. 
37 We assume that the firm provides parking space generally, i.e. regardless of whether it 
provides WPC. Consequently, rental costs of the parking lot are not imputed to the provision 
of WPC as additional cost and so not added to the facility costs. Aggregate installation cost 
then accounts for a share of 67% on total facility station cost which is line with usual 
‘installation cost/total cost’ ratios reported by RMI (2014) . 
38 On the one hand a Level 2 charger with 8 kw power can in fact serve more than 2-3 
employees because they will probably not arrive at workplace with an empty battery. On the 
other hand, some degree of coordination (of the firm and the worker) will probably be 
required to allow one charger to serve multiple employees (see the study of Huang and Zhou 
(2015) on workplace recharging facility coordination). Here we assume a conservative number 
of two employees being served by one charger considering that it could be most suitable for 
many workers to plug (the uncharged EV) and to unplug (the charged EV) during e.g. lunch 
time with minimum effect on working hours. 
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being used during the year) and r = 1.30 to convert annual facility cost c
into a daily facility capital cost. 
2.5.2. Results 
2.5.2.1. Benchmark  
In this subsection, we report the numerical results for the four contract 
schemes presented in the theoretical part (
1WPC  4WPC ) relying on 
parameter values derived above. Table 2.5.2 summarizes the contract 
schemes and their main features. 
The main results of the simulations are presented in Table 2.5.3. We 
display demand quantities X, l, and D; unit travel cost c, ρ; the endogenous 
value of time, ξ;39 utility level U; the probability of WPC resulting from the 
employee’s optimization, θ; the characteristic of the employer’s cost 
minimizing contract offer,  ,W Wp ; the employee’s and employer’s 
benefit from access and provision of WPC, ev and sp , respectively; and 
finally WPC induced aggregate (private) benefit. 
 
                                                          
39 Note that in all cases the endogenous value of time obtained is in line with empirical 
evidence suggesting that it is about half the hourly gross market wage rate (Small, 2012; Small 
and Verhoef, 2007; Wolff, 2014) and also reflects recent estimates regarding the valuation of 
travel time of German commuters (Obermeyer et al., 2013). 
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Table 2.5.3: Benchmark results of the different WPC contracts 
 
In the case of employer-paid recharging (
1WPC ), implying the WPC 
contract    
1
, 19.65,0 ,W Wp  employees are better off (ev = +7.88 € 
per day) compared to a situation without WPC opportunities whereas 
employers are worse off, i.e. their expected net costs increase (ps = −4.02 
€ per BEV using employee per day). On the one hand, a zero recharging 
fee causes the employer a net electricity cost burden and, in addition, 
increases the expected share of employees being interested in WPC which 
in turn imposes additional WPC capital facility costs. On the other hand, a 
zero recharging fee allows BEV users to charge their vehicle at work for 
free, thereby saving time and money at (more expensive) public 
recharging stations. Both, pure out- of-pocket travel costs as well as 
generalized travel costs decline despite a slight increase in the value of 
time. All in all the probability of WPC to be accepted by employees is θ = 
0.82 which is, not surprisingly, the highest number in comparison to all 
further contract schemes offered (see below). However, importantly, the 
contract won’t be offered by a cost-minimizing employer facing 
uncertainty about WPC’s potential to foster a firm’s attractiveness for 
workers and customers. This outcome is even more important when 
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account is taken of the fact that the contract’s overall net benefit is 
positive. 
In the second contract scheme WPC2 the employer makes a discount on 
wages while the recharging fee is assumed to be out of his control. On the 
one hand, reducing the wage saves the employer costs. On the other hand, 
the lower the employee’s wage under WPC the less people will choose the 
WPC contract and work under higher wages thereby increasing the 
employer’s cost. The cost minimizing discount was found to be 1.43 €/h 
implying a wage offer in the order of 18.22 €/h. The WPC contract offered 
by the employer is { ωW , pW}2 = (18.22, 0) with a low probability (θ= 0.30) 
of acceptance by the employees. Under this WPC contract, employees are 
now worse off while employers benefit. However, most importantly, the 
net effect is negative.40  
Assume now that there is collective individual wage bargaining so that 
wages in the firm cannot deviate from outside wages. In that case, the 
employer can only use a recharging fee pW to reduce the net costs of WPC 
provision. The cost minimizing recharging fee is found to be pW = 0.081 
and therefore the contract offered by the employer is {ωW, pW}3 = {19.65, 
0.081}. The recharging fee of 0.081 €/km is higher than the electricity 
tariff the employee has to pay at home but slightly lower than what he 
                                                          
40 Note that with 
Hp p  (the electricity tariff the firm pays exceeds the private 
household tariff) rather than 
Hp p  as assumed here for the case of Germany, 
the cost minimizing wage discount will be even larger and, as a consequence, the 
probability of WPC to become accepted by the average employee even lower (see 
(0.40) along with (0.24)). For example, assuming 0.077p   (instead of 
0.027p  ) results in a wage discount of 1.55 €/h (implying the contract offer 
   
2
, 18.10,0W Wp   and a probability of acceptance of only θ = 0.26. 
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would have to pay at CPC where significant time costs accrue on top. 
Despite the recharging fee levied, the employees benefit from WPC3 
though they are worse off compared to employer-paid recharging 
(WPC1). The recharging fee discourages WPC usage, reflected by a lower 
probability of WPC. In contrast the employer is now better off compared 
with WPC1 mainly because of a net electricity revenue gain (the tariff he 
gets is higher that the tariff he pays to the electricity provider). However, 
in total the employer is worse off here too because the revenue gain is not 
sufficient to cover the WPC capital facility costs41. In the end this contract 
won‘t be offered by the employer though 65% of the employees would 
accept WPC3.  
Contract scheme WPC4 is obviously the most flexible one. It allows the 
employer to make a discount on wages and to levy a recharging fee 
simultaneously. Surprisingly, the employer will not exploit this flexibility. 
More specifically the simulations suggest that once the employer applies 
a wage discount, there is no incentive to levy an additional recharging fee, 
thereby making WPC4 fully equivalent to WPC2. The cost minimizing 
contract offered by the employer is {ωW, pW}4 = {18.22, 0}. Obviously, in 
the present case the positive revenue effect of imposing a recharging fee 
on top is more than offset by the adverse effect on expected labor cost. 
The latter arises since a larger share of employees earning lower wages 
                                                          
41 Recall that we abstract from potential queuing at recharging stations (congestion) that may 
arise if demand for recharging at the workplace exceeds capacity. This might induce the 
employer to levy another fee on top (a ‘congestion premium’) to account for the queuing 
problem. This would shift some share of the employee’s benefit towards the employer, 
thereby reducing the worker’s willingness to accept WPC. The overall effect, however, 
depends on the level of queuing and the response of employees to potential recharging 
congestion fees. The more effective the coordination regarding the usage of chargers is, as 
assumed in the present study, the weaker will the queuing problem probably be (given 
demand and capacity). 
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due to the wage discount will reject the contract when a recharging fee is 
levied on top. 
To sum up: the simulations of the different contract schemes reveal that 
under the plausible parameter constellations assumed and in the absence 
of interventions of whatever nature, WPC is likely to take place only in 
some cases at all with a minority of employees who have a high 
idiosyncratic preference for WPC. On the one side, in situations where 
WPC is beneficial from the (average) employee’s perspective, there is no 
sufficient incentive for the employer to provide WPC (WPC1, WPC3). On 
the other side, in situations where WPC is beneficial from the employer’s 
standpoint, there is no sufficient incentive for the majority of employees 
to use it, respectively to accept the corresponding contract offer (WPC2, 
WPC4).42 This raises the question how to overcome the WPC 
underprovision or the lack of WPC demand such that supply of WPC and 
market demand coincides. 
                                                          
42 We considered another two contracts not reported here in detail. The contracts 
are extensions of WPC3 and WPC4 and entail the opportunity to deduct recharging 
expenses at the workplace from the income tax base (changing the monetary 
budget constraint (0.5) to     1 1W W H W W W W Wwx d p D t d p D       
in case of access to WPC). Tax deduction of commuting expenses reduces the 
employee’s income tax burden and is common practice in many countries (Hirte and 
Tscharaktschiew, 2013a; Wrede, 2009). One can easily see from Table 2.5.3 that the 
opportunity of tax deduction generates no further impacts as extension of WPC4 
where the recharging fee is set to zero by the employer. As regards WPC3 it has been 
found that tax deduction on top has slightly beneficial effects from the employee’s 
perspective but does not change the main finding that the employer does not have an 
incentive to offer this contract. 
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2.5.3. Remedies  
Let us first consider the situations where the employer has been found to 
have no incentive to offer a WPC contract (WPC1, WPC3). Both contracts 
are characterized by the fact that wages are outside the employer’s 
control which makes them the most likely WPC contract in a country with 
collective wage bargaining such as Germany. On the employer side, there 
are three obvious ‘remedies’ that may help to overcome the 
underprovision of WPC: (i) subsidizing facility capital cost; (ii) reducing 
the recharging tariff the employer has to pay to the electricity supplier; 
(iii) redistribution. 
Clearly, both (i) and (ii) reduce the expected net cost of WPC provision 
and thus may support a contract offer. However, as Table 2.5.4 and Table 
2.5.5 reveal (column ‘Remedy (a)’ entails the case of an increase in the 
subsidy only whereas column ‘Remedy (b)’ considers a subsidy 
accompanied by a reduction of the employer’s energy tariff), measures 
must be strong to balance the employer’s deficit associated with WPC 
provision. 
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Table 2.5.4: WPC1 remedies 
 
Table 2.5.5.  WPC3 remedies 
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In the case of employer-paid recharging (WPC1) a subsidy of 1110 € per 
worker per year (a) or a subsidy of 878 € plus a reduction of the 
electricity (used for BEV recharging) tariff p  to zero (b) is needed to 
achieve a supply of WPC that will be accepted by the average employee. 
Given costs of 675 € per worker per year of the recharging facility, this 
means that the subsidy must exceed facility costs to cover electricity cost 
used for recharging BEVs. Only in case of WPC3 a subsidy less than the 
facility cost is sufficient because here the employer also generates net 
recharging fee revenue. All in all the requirement of a relatively high 
subsidy highlights the importance of improving the coordination of 
recharging facility usage for making WPC sufficiently attractive for both, 
the employer and the employee. 
Beside these policy instruments, a pure (non-distortionary) 
redistribution may help to overcome WPC underprovision. As our 
simulations suggest both contract schemes generate a private net benefit 
so that (Kaldor-Hicks) redistribution of some share of the employee’s 
benefit in favor of the employer could in the end solve the underprovision 
problem, even without public initiatives such as public recharging 
infrastructure funding.43  
Interestingly all in all it seems that some of the ‘remedies’ discussed have 
already proved effective. For example, even though experiences with 
WPC are still quite limited, the U.S. Department of Energy (2014b) reports 
that 80 % of employers who responded to its 2014 ‘Workplace 
Recharging Challenge’ annual survey provided free recharging access.44 
Without (a mixture of) effective ‘remedies’ as discussed, our analyzes 
suggest that employer-paid recharging were unlikely to have been 
                                                          
43One can think of e.g. widely spread information campaigns promoting the advantages of 
WPC for employees as this has happened recently on the employer side with the ‘Employer 
BEV Initiative (EEVI)’ in the US or various workshops organized in Germany. This might help to 
create some kind of a ‘willingness-to-pay’ awareness on the employee side.  
44 The share is reported to be 65% based on a statewide survey in spring 2013 of 79 public and 
private employers located in California (CPEVC, 2013). 
 72 
 
created. However, another explanation for the dominance of employer-
paid recharging could be that employers indeed have positive 
expectations on the potential spillover effects of WPC on labor 
productivity, worker recruitment and the number of sales.45 
Now let us focus on situations in which the majority of the employees 
refuse to accept the employer’s contract offer (WPC2, WPC4).  
Table 2.5.6: WPC2, WPC4 remedies 
 
As can be seen from Table 2.5.6, increasing the recharging fee at home 
(‘Remedy (a)’), increasing the recharging time at CPC, e.g. by installing 
non-fast recharging facilities (‘Remedy (b)’), increasing the labor tax 
(‘Remedy (c)’) and reducing the recharging fee at public/commercial 
recharging stations (‘Remedy (d)’)46 achieve WPC provision as well as 
                                                          
45 For example, the employer could be intended to offer the contract despite its initially 
negative evaluation if WPC allows recruiting workers being sufficiently productive to offset 
the expected loss of WPC provision (about 4 € per employee per day or roughly 2% of the 
employee’s hourly gross wage in our numerical example). 
46Concerning the price of CPC, pC, the extreme case discussed in Lemma 3 arises. As pC 
declines, e.g. overcoming the range-anxiety problem by recharging at (expensive) CPC stations 
becomes less expensive so that a (slightly) larger share than before will be charged there. 
According to the data, the cost gap between HPC and CPC is so high that this indirect effect 
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acceptance by the majority of workers while generating an overall 
benefit. However, the changes must be very drastic in comparison to 
current levels, questioning their capability to be accepted not only by the 
majority of employees but also by the majority of the society in general. 
For example, raising prices for electricity at home does also affect energy 
demand for other purposes such as cooking, warm water or heating and 
thus also affects non-EV users. The same applies to a higher labor tax 
which affects non-WPC employees as well and will exacerbate the 
distortions in the labor market, thereby inducing negative tax interaction 
effects. 
2.5.4. Sensitivity Analysis 
The previous analysis has discussed various ‘remedies’ to either 
overcome WPC underprovision or the lack of WPC demand resulting from 
the different benchmark WPC contracts offered and evaluated by 
representative employees and employers. In this subsection, we examine 
how robust the benchmark findings of Table 2.5.3 are with respect to 
variations in the employee’s travel and energy consumption behavior 
and, thus, how general the potential ‘remedies’ discussed above are. The 
travel and the energy consumption behavior influence the extent to which 
WPC is demanded and the degree to which employees respond to 
differences in recharging tariffs. Both, therefore, may affect the 
implications of the WPC contracts in various ways.47 To capture both 
margins of influence, in what follows we consider different assumptions 
on D, the employee’s daily distance traveled, and γ, i.e. the degree to which 
the worker bases his recharging behavior on economic incentives. 
                                                          
(the shift towards more expensive CPC) outweighs the direct effect (the reduction in the price 
of CPC in general). This decreases the relative attractiveness in relation to WPC (respectively 
the recharging package W which is not directly affected by pC but may also help to overcome 
range-anxiety).  
47 We focus on the employee (demand) side for the sensitivity analysis because in this case the 
implications of parameter variations are most uncertain in advance. The previous analyzes 
have made clear that in particular lower recharging facility costs on the employer (supply) side 
are crucial to foster WPC provision. 
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Figure 2.5.1 shows the impacts of variations in daily travel distance 
(horizontal axis)48 for the WPC contracts under consideration. The left 
panels illustrate the employee’s (ev) and employer’s (ps) surplus (straight 
lines) as well as the aggregate effect (bars). The panels on the right-hand 
side depict the probability for WPC (left vertical axis) and, if applicable, a 
certain feature of the contracts (wage ωW or recharging fee pW on the right 
vertical axis). Because it turns out again that contracts WPC2 and WPC4 
are equivalent, the figure shows three panels in the vertical direction. In 
each panel, the vertical dashed line indicates the benchmark situation 
(see Table 2.5.3). 
                                                          
48 Recall that travel distance D is in fact endogenous. We generated different levels of D by 
adjusting the preference weights (income shares) in the worker’s utility function in such a way 
that the relative proportions between general consumption and leisure remain unaltered. 
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Figure 2.5.1: Sensitivity analysis of the different WPC contracts (daily 
travel distance) 
Three noteworthy results stand out: First, at least in the distance range 
considered here, which we think is most plausible for traveling at 
workdays, ev and ps do not change their signs or graphically, the curves 
indicating ev and ps in the left panels do not intersect the center line (0 
€). That is, if the employers/employees benefit or suffer from WPC, they 
do so regardless of the employee’s daily travel distance (which in turn is 
proportional to the amount of recharging). This also implies that the main 
conclusion derived from Table 2.5.3 holds true, i.e. there is no WPC 
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contract an employer is willing to offer and at the same time the majority 
of employees is willing to accept. Second, travel distance does not affect 
the direction of the overall benefit from WPC (ev + ps) in the case of WPC1, 
but in regard to WPC2/4 and WPC3 in case of very high (WPC2/4 ) or very 
low daily travel distances (WPC3). For example, as regards WPC2/4, this 
implies that redistribution from the employer to the employee becomes 
an option to stimulate WPC demand when daily travel distance and, 
associated with it, recharging demand is high. Both, the employee and the 
employer benefit the more, the larger the travel distance. The former 
because he gets a larger recharging amount for free (recall that WPC2/4 
entails a zero recharging fee) and the latter because, as compensation for 
free recharging, he applies a stronger wage discount (respectively offers 
a lower wage, see the right panel related to WPC2/4). Third, even though 
there is intuitively a positive relationship between travel distance and the 
probability of WPC (see the right panels), it is too weak to fundamentally 
change the employees’ overall evaluation of WPC, put differently to turn 
a minority of employees accepting WPC into a majority and vice versa. As 
the right panels reveal, the curves indicating the probability of WPC are 
either below or above the vertical center line (θ = 0.5) in the relevant 
distance range considered. 
Now let us consider the case of a lower γ (0.2 compared to 0.7 of the 
benchmark case) meaning that the choice of the employees to charge at 
non-home locations is more restricted.  
Table 2.5.7: Sensitivity analysis of the different WPC contracts (𝛾 = 0.2) 
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Due to the fact that in this case employees can hardy exploit potential 
benefits of WPC, it is not surprising that they are worse off compared to 
the benchmark (see Table 2.5.7 in comparison to Table 2.5.3). However, 
in line with variations in travel distance, the direction of the effect 
remains unaltered for each WPC contract. That is, the employer benefits 
from WPC2/4 whereas WPC1 and WPC3 make the employees better off. As 
regards the latter two contracts, it is still a majority that is supposed to 
accept WPC, even though the share is now smaller. However, there is also 
one major difference compared with the benchmark. While the overall 
benefit of WPC was positive for WPC1 and WPC3 in the benchmark, it is 
now negative in each of the contracts. Consequently, redistribution 
disappears as an option to ensure WPC provision when employers are 
worse off. 
To sum up, the sensitivity analyzes suggest that our benchmark results 
summarized in Table 2.5.3 are quite robust with respect to the WPC 
contract induced distribution of gains and losses between employees and 
the employer. More precisely, we found that neither variations in D nor γ 
caused deviations from our main finding that each WPC contract is to the 
disadvantage for at least one party. As a consequence, the various 
‘remedies’ discussed above are still needed to either overcome WPC 
underprovision or the lack of WPC demand. However, the overall private 
welfare effect of WPC may become negative if γ or D are sufficiently low.49 
This raises questions about the social desirability of WPC (see the 
discussion below). 
 
 
                                                          
49 Additional calculations reveal that the overall negative WPC benefit is about  −0.22 €/EE 
∗day in case of WPC 1 (see Table 2.5.7) and becomes positive again for γ > 0.23. 
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2.6. Discussion and Conclusion 
In this paper, we proposed an economic approach to study incentives and 
barriers employees and employers face when deciding on demand for 
and supply of recharging BEVs at the workplace. We have shown that in 
the absence of public initiatives to support WPC provision and under 
uncertainty regarding WPC’s potential to foster a firm’s attractiveness for 
workers and customers, WPC contracts being sufficiently attractive to 
become accepted by the majority of employees won’t be offered by an 
employer. On the other side, under these circumstances contracts offered 
by employers will only be accepted by a minority of employees, namely 
those who have a strong (idiosyncratic) preference for WPC. To overcome 
the lack of demand or underprovision of WPC we discussed various 
‘remedies’, involving e.g. subsidies to recharging facility costs or 
adjustments in electricity tariffs. Our results suggest that is more 
promising to support employers, e.g. through subsidizing recharging 
facilities, in offering WPC contracts than to offer employees incentives to 
demand WPC. The study therefore gives a rationale for public initiatives 
being undertaken to boost WPC provision, as e.g. in the case of the US.  
In case of proper adjustments, the basic structure of the model also allows 
an application to further issues such as the usage of an employer’s 
resources for private purposes. The links to recharging cell phones, using 
the firm’s web or IT resources or even corruption issues are 
straightforward. Adopting the terminology of the present paper, CPC can 
be seen as the purchase/consumption of a resource outside home, HPC as 
‘home production’ or buying services that are only offered at home (e.g. 
WLAN) whereas using the employer’s resources would be equivalent to 
WPC. The firm might offer two explicit or implicit contracts:  , 0  if 
there is no legal or illegal usage of its resources and  ,W Wp  otherwise, 
i.e. usage costs or sanctions are either a reduced wage (e.g. due to a layoff) 
and/or an additional fee or other sanction costs. The worker then decides 
which of the contracts he prefers, or put differently, whether he makes 
legal or illegal use of the firm’s resource or whether he will not use firm’s 
resources at all. In the end the approach then allows to analyze how the 
costs and benefits of legal/illegal behavior on the one side and respective 
compensations/countermeasures captured by the contract offered on the 
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other side are distributed among workers and companies and which 
measures could be taken to enhance outcomes for both agents. 
The present analysis has focused on employee’s and employer’s costs and 
benefits while leaving aside any wider social effects of the 
implementation of WPC. Consequently, the paper cannot answer whether 
WPC per se, respectively measures taken to overcome the lack of demand 
or WPC underprovision, are also warranted on efficiency grounds. As 
outlined in the introduction, WPC may not only generate social benefits 
but may also cause adverse effects. The latter not only involves WPC’s 
potential to increase traffic congestion or electricity demand at peak 
periods (peak-load problem), but also includes broader fiscal effects 
associated with WPC. For example, if subsidies to WPC facility costs are 
financed by distortionary taxes or if WPC provision boosts the demand 
for lower-taxed BEVs in general, WPC could in the end exacerbate the 
efficiency cost of the overall tax system.50 Furthermore, the overall 
environmental impact of WPC needs to be analyzed in future research. At 
the extensive margin, the provision of WPC may induce individuals to use 
private car instead of (more environmentally friendly) public transit for 
commuting. At the intensive margin, WPC may provide incentives to 
replace conventional fuel powered cars by BEVs. The net environmental 
impact of WPC then depends on, among other things, the characteristics 
of the public transit system, fuel efficiency of the conventional fuel 
powered car replaced, social life-cycle costs of car types, sources of 
electric power generation (renewable vs. non-renewable). All in all, it is 
therefore not unequivocally clear whether a positive private net benefit 
                                                          
50 Estimates regarding the marginal welfare cost of raising public funds by labor taxation are 
usually reported to take values from 0.1 to 1.0 (see, e.g., Parry, 2002). Conditional on marginal 
welfare cost of taxation of 0.4 € per 1 € of revenue raised, a recharging facility subsidy of 
roughly 1100 €/year needed for WPC provision in case of ‘Remedy (1)’ would cause an excess 
burden of around 440 €/year. When divided by k = 225 to make it comparable to the numbers 
in Table 2.5.4, the daily welfare cost of taxation is around 2 € per employee using WPC. 
Moreover, even though not directly concerned with WPC, (Hirte and Tscharaktschiew, 2013b) 
and (Jenn et al., 2015) point to adverse fiscal effects in case of stronger BEV diffusion. 
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of WPC as we have found in some cases (see benchmark contracts WPC1 
and WPC3) is accompanied by positive impacts on the society as a whole. 
In the light of our findings WPC might also affect the welfare implications 
of general congestion pricing policies. According to the analyzes of De 
Borger and Wuyts (2009), congestion tolls may generate an extra 
efficiency gain when parking at the workplace is paid by the employer 
and public transport is available as an alternative to commuting by car. In 
case that public transport is subsidized, a higher congestion toll implies a 
side-welfare loss to the extent that it induces more (subsidized) public 
transport demand. This welfare loss, however, can be reduced if the 
change in travel mode choice in favor of transit lowers the demand for 
parking space at the workplace, provided that the distortion from 
employer-paid parking exceeds the distortive effect of transit subsidies. 
If, however, the positive net benefit of WPC (see e.g. contract WPC1 ) in 
turn exceeds the adverse effect of providing parking space at the 
workplace for free, and taking into account that parking and recharging 
at the workplace are strongly complementary, the extra efficiency effect 
of the congestion toll through discouraging parking (and so WPC) could 
become even negative. Combining key elements of the present study with 
the approach of De Borger and Wuyts (2009) could give new insights into 
how to efficiently price a congestion externality under an increasing 
importance of electric mobility in general and recharging BEVs at the 
workplace in particular. 
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Appendix 1 
Appendix A. The demand for WPC when HPC is not available 
Individuals may not generally have private parking spaces at home to 
install their own private charger, e.g. at large apartment buildings where 
residents share parking areas. In this case, they have to share the 
recharging space with other individuals including non-EV users. This 
makes recharging at the place of residence costly since it may take time 
to search for an unoccupied recharging spot unless there is efficient 
coordination among individuals sharing the parking area. 
In this section, we consider the demand for WPC when workers do not 
have own (or efficiently coordinated shared) recharging access at the 
place of residence. 
In the absence of WPC, workers have to charge for the daily travel solely 
at CPC stations. In contrast, in the presence of WPC, they decide on 
allocating the required energy for the daily travel between CPC and WPC 
such that the recharging expenditure is minimized. As a consequence, 
workers have two options: { }C CPC and { , }CW CPC WPC . The 
share of recharging at CPC, denoted by ( , )C C Wp p  with 0 1C   
depends on the relative electricity tariffs for recharging at CPC and WPC, 
respectively, where 0
C
Cp



 and 0
C
Wp



. As above it is assumed that 
there is a basic load  0 1d D   that is to loaded near home, i.e. at CPC 
(regardless of relative prices between CPC and WPC).  
Accordingly, the expected daily recharging price per unit of distance, 
denoted 
jc  is given by  
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   
if          
.
1 ( , ) 1 ( , ) if     
 
  
C
j
C C C W C C C W W
p j C
c
p p p p p p p j CW   
 
 
       
 
 (A.1) 
The corresponding total travel time per unit of distance, Dj , (i.e., travel 
time plus recharging time including the time for searching an unoccupied 
recharging spot), is given by (recall that WPC takes place without 
affecting the employee’s time since he can work while the BEV is being 
charged) 
if        
1 ( , )       if             j=CW
d cj
D C C W
d c
t t j C
t
t t p p 
 
 
     
  (A.2) 
Following similar procedures for the utility maximization problem that 
we saw in (0.4)–(0.10) , after replacing ci by cj and tiD by tjD, we compute 
comparative statics concerning the effects a public authority, an 
electricity supplier and the employer could have on the demand for WPC. 
It is beneficial for the employee to charge at the workplace if  
 .CW CV V    (A.3) 
where ε is the (unobserved) idiosyncratic preference for WPC 
representing several factors affecting the incentives to charge at the 
workplace, and 
  , , ,1 ,  , ,CW CW CW CW CW CW CWw w DV V t c D T t t D D           (A.4) 
  , , ,1 , ,  .C C C C C C Cw w DV V t c D T t t D D           (A.5) 
With the equivalent assumption that ε is distributed uniformly over the 
interval [−a, + a] , the probability of WPC (respectively the share of 
employees preferring WPC) is given by 
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2
 
1
2
C CWV V
a


    (A.6) 
Thus, a reservation utility level of C CWV V V   0  is needed to induce 
the average employee to use the WPC option provided by the employer 
through offering a certain WPC contract. 
The analysis of the effects of parameters and variables on the probability 
of WPC can be started by noting that for any exogenous variable α: 
 sign sign .
CW CV V
  
     
    
    
  (A.7) 
Lemma 7. A higher labor tax increases the probability of WPC if differences 
in MUIs across the recharging regimes do not over- compensate wage 
differences: 
 0  .





  (A.8) 
The proof and intuition is similar to the effect of τ on θ that we saw in case 
of the recharging packages H and W (i = H is replaced by j = C and i = W 
by j = CW). 
Lemma 8. Assume 
C C CW CWD D  . In this case, if the fee the employer 
levies on WPC exceeds the generalized costs of CPC by less than
   1 /
C
C
C
C p
Cp

   , the probability of WPC increases with an increase 
in the tariff for CPC: 
 
1
0 if 
.
0 otherwise
 
C
C
C
W C CW
c C
p
CC
p p t
pp 




 
   
 
 
 

  (A.9) 
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Proof.  
 
0
1
CWCW C C CW
C C CW CW CW D
C C C C C
C
C C CW CW C C CW W
cC
tV V c c
D D
p p p p p
D D p t p
p
  

     

      
     
       
 
 
       
 
 
 
  
If 
C C CW CWD D   this is equivalent to 
   
0 0
1   
C
C
CW C C
C C C C CW W p
cC C C
V V
D p t p
p p p 

   
 
 
   
       
    
  
  (A.10) 
Some algebra shows that this expression is positive if 
 
1
.
C
C
C
W C CW
c C
p
C
p p t
p





  

 
The implication is that by manipulating pC e.g. through changing taxes 
(the government) or energy tariffs (the electricity supplier and the CPC 
station owners) for CPC, the probability of WPC can be affected. If pC 
increases, recharging package C = {CPC } becomes more expensive so that 
the probability for WPC goes up (the direct effect (1 −βC ) > 0 ). This effect 
strengthens (the more the larger 
C
C
p

 ) if WPC is relatively more 
attractive than CPC, put differently if the generalized price of CPC exceeds 
the recharging fee at the workplace. 
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Lemma 9. The probability of choosing WPC declines with an increase in the 
recharging fee at the workplace if the fee does not exceed the generalized 
costs of CPC by more than 
 
1
W
C
C
C
p
Wp




:  
 
1
0 if 
.
0 otherwise
 
W
C
C
W C CW
c C
p
WW
p p t
pp 




 
   
 
 
 

  (A.11) 
Proof.  
   1
CWCW C C CW
C C CW CW CW D
W W W W W
C
CW CW C C CW W
c W
tV V c c
D D
p p p p p
D p t p
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  

   
      
     
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 
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 
  
which is equivalent to 
    
00
1   
W
C
CW C C
CW CW C C CW W p
cW W W
V V
D p t p
p p p

    

 
   
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 (A.12) 
Some algebra shows that this expression is negative if 
 
 
1
.
W
C
C
W C CW
c C
p
W
p p t
p





    
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Note first that a change in pW does not affect VC because pW is not an option 
under recharging package C. Hence, all effects of pW on   are channeled 
through its effects on VCW. Here two countervailing effects occur. First, an 
increase in pW clearly reduces the probability of WPC since it makes the 
recharging package CW = {CPC, WPC} more expensive (the direct effect 
(−(1 −βC )) < 0 ). However, an increase in the recharging fee at the 
workplace also induces the worker to switch (to some extent) to CPC 
within the recharging package CW (the more the larger 
W
C
p

 ). If the 
generalized price of CPC is sufficiently low (relative to pW), utility 
associated with recharging package CW raises (compared to C) and this 
ceteris paribus increases the probability of WPC. The overall effect then 
depends on the strength of both countervailing effects. 
Appendix B. Derivation for Equations (0.52) and (0.53) 
For the fully flexible contract 4WPC  the first-order conditions with 
respect to the employer's decision variables 
W  and Wp  are 
 
        
1
 0 W W e ew wW
C
C t t p p d d rc
k
           


         

 
 (B.1) 
 
      
1
0 W W e e ep w p p p pW
C
C t p p d d rc d
p k
       

          

 
 (B.2) 
Solving (B.1) for pW gives  
 
 
1
( )
 
W
w w
W
e e
t t rc
kp p
d d
 
 
     
 
   
 

  (B.3) 
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Substituting (B.3) in (B.2), we have  
 
 
 
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( )
(  
1
) 0
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kd d
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 
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     
           
   
   
 
 (B.4) 
Canceling terms and regrouping gives  
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    
        
        
 
 (B.5) 
Dividing the left-hand side and right-hand side of (B.5) by θ and collecting 
terms, we have 
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(  ) 0
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 (B.6) 
Multiplying both sides of (B.6) by 
e ed d   gives  
 
        
1
( )  0W e e e e e e e e ew p p w p p p pt d d t d d rc d d d d d
k
                          
 (B.7) 
Solving (B.7) for 
W , we have 
   
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Dividing the numerator and denominator of the second term on the right-
hand side of (B.8) by ed  gives 
( )
ee
p pe
we e
W
e e
wp p
w e e
dd
d t
d d rc
ktd d
t
d d
 
 
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 
  (B.9) 
After redefining terms, we arrive at (0.53).  Now, substituting (0.53) for 
ωW in (B.9) and simplifying gives (0.52). 
 
Appendix C. Comparative statics for (𝛚W)* and (PW)*  
In case of the fully flexible contract, WPC4, the second-order conditions 
are given by 
     2  2 ( )W W e e ew wC t t p p d d d rc
k

      

                 
 (C.1) 
 
      2 ( ) 2ppW W e e e e epp pp w p p pp pp p pC t p p d d d rc d d
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
                    
 (C.2) 
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1W W e e e e e e
p p w w p p p p p pC t t p p d d d d d d rc
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                                
(C.3) 
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Using Cramer's rule, the effect of   on  W

 when  W

 is an interior 
solution is (where C  and pC   are derived from (0.46) and (0.47), 
respectively): 
   
p w p
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p pp p w pp
p p
p pp p pp
C C t C
C C t C
C C C C
C C C C
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 
   

                                          (C.4) 
Assuming that the conditions for cost minimization are fulfilled (interior 
solution), we have (recall that 0  , 0p   
 
2
0 if 0 or if 
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pp p p
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 
   
 
  (C.5) 
Similarly, we have  
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  (C.7) 
The effect of p  on  W

 when  W

 is an interior solution is (where 
pC  and ppC  are derived from (0.46) and (0.47), respectively): 
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Abstract 
Upward expectations of future electric vehicle (EV) growth pose the 
question about the future load on the electric grid system. While existing 
literature on BEV recharging demand management has focused on 
technical aspects and considered EV-owners as utility maximizers, this 
study proposes a behavioral model incorporating psychological aspects 
relevant to EV-owners facing recharging decisions and interacting with 
the supplier. The behavioral model represents utility maximization under 
myopic loss aversion (MLA) behavior in an ultimatum game (UG) 
framework with two players:  EV-owner and the electricity supplier. We 
test the validity of the behavioral model by designing 3x2 economics 
laboratory experiment where a potential EV-owner faces either of three 
decisions: (i) rescheduling recharging time to be eligible for a given 
discount proposed by the supplier, (ii) proposing the amount of discount 
to request for recharging at hours set by the supplier, and (iii) proposing 
the amount of discount to request for supplier-controlled recharging, 
under two contract durations: daily versus weekly. Each of the three 
treatments were incentive compatible in that every participant was 
expected to reveal her true preference to the supplier since the amount 
of threshold that the supplier accepted was concealed. The main objective 
of the laboratory experiment is to investigate whether lessening the MLA 
behavior by providing contracts under UG framework and in long-term 
contract bases helps individuals to make better choices. Findings from the 
experiment show that individuals indeed reveal myopic behavior when 
taking BEV recharging decisions. Thus, presenting long-term BEV 
recharging contracts under UG framework may curtail myopic behavior 
and help BEV owners to choose cost-minimizing recharging time by 
participating in discounted off-peak recharging hours.  
Key words: electric vehicles; recharging decisions; smart grid recharging; 
utility maximization; myopic loss aversion; ultimatum two-player game. 
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3.1. Introduction 
While the market penetration of electric vehicles (EVs) has been 
negligible so far because of high unit costs and limited driving range, 
upward expectations exist for a future rapid BEV growth following the 
driving range improvements, purchase price reductions and government 
incentives (e.g., Andersen et al., 2009; Bonges and Lusk, 2016; Brady and 
O’Mahony, 2011; Dagsvik et al., 2009; Valeri and Danielis, 2015). Recent 
demand assessment studies predict reasonable market shares at around 
4-10% for BEVs by 2020 (e.g., Brady and O’Mahony, 2011; Lebeau et al., 
2012; Mendes et al., 2014), and suggest dominant market shares for BEVs 
by 2030-2050 in both Europe and the U.S. (e.g., Lebeau et al., 2012; Mabit 
and Fosgerau, 2011; Traut et al., 2013).  
This expected BEV growth is expected to load significantly the electric 
power grid system. Recharging times are expected to coincide with peak 
hours of electricity demand for household consumption and industrial 
use (Axsen and Kurani, 2010), and even modest BEV shares (20-25% of 
the total vehicle fleet) are expected to increase the electricity load by 
roughly 30% in US (Amoroso and Cappuccino, 2012). Demand side 
management (DSM) of BEV recharging (i.e. encouraging EV-owners to 
change their recharging patterns in response to changes in electricity 
prices) is viewed as a possible solution to reduce grid overload at peak 
hours and to reduce investments in grid capacity expansion (Finn et al., 
2012; Flath et al., 2014). Economic evaluations have shown that DSM of 
BEV recharging has positive welfare effects. For example, smart 
recharging BEVs in Finland could produce benefits of 227 EUR per vehicle 
per year (Kiviluoma and Meibom, 2011). Shifting recharging from peak to 
off-peak hours in the U.S. could generate savings ranging from $1.1 billion 
to $5.1 billion per year (Lyon et al., 2012); price-responsive recharging 
strategies in Singapore could turn estimated losses of 1000 SGD per 
vehicle per year into estimated profits of 21-130 SGD (Pelzer et al., 2014). 
Simulation-based feasibility evaluations have shown that DSM of BEV 
recharging helps to improve the grid system (Dallinger and Wietschel, 
2012). Waraich et al. (2013) propose micro-simulation analyzes of 
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electricity demand considering price schemes. Optimization algorithms 
propose efficient BEV recharging scheduling under system optimization 
(e.g., Di Giorgio et al., 2014; Iversen et al., 2014); business models 
illustrated the efficiency of the optimization algorithms and the benefits 
of changing BEV recharging times (e.g., Kley et al., 2011).  
While investigating the relevance and feasibility of smart integration of 
BEVs in to the grid system, previous studies assumed, explicitly or 
implicitly, that BEV users will be willing to postpone recharging and/or 
will accept their BEV recharging activity controlled by electricity 
suppliers in return for discounted fee for recharging. For example, in real-
time and dynamic pricing, BEV owners are assumed to routinely seek 
information regarding the periodic price and adjust recharging time 
accordingly. However, empirical studies show that consumers generally 
prefer simple price schemes to dynamic and complex once (Dütschke, E., 
& Paetz, A. G., 2013). Moreover, postponing recharging hour could involve 
psychological or real driving-range anxiety concerning unforeseen trips 
occurrence during the postponement period (Bakker, 2011) that 
previous studies about recharging time do not account for.  
When considering these aspects, and reflecting on the extensive evidence 
that individuals are bounded rational (see, e.g., Holt and Laury, 2002; 
Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Thaler et al., 1997), the need to consider 
psychological aspects of EV-owners becomes evident. The issue of 
considering psychological aspects has received very limited attention in 
the literature, as the only considered psychological and behavioral 
aspects concern social etiquette (Franke and Krems, 2013) and resource 
replenishing behavior (Caperello et al., 2013).  
This study contributes to the body-of-knowledge concerning BEV 
recharging by challenging the assumption that EV-owners are rational 
utility maximizers in their recharging decisions and hence examining the 
psychological aspects that are relevant to DSM contract selection and the 
development of realistic agent-based and optimization models otherwise 
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affected by the neglect of these psychological aspects. Specifically, this 
study proposes a novel behavioral model that presents utility 
maximization under myopic loss aversion (MLA) behavior in the context 
of an ultimatum game (UG) framework. The model represents the 
behavior of individuals (EV-owners) trading-off between the amount of 
the discount on fee for recharging, the risk of being eligible to the discount 
and the risk of not recharging the BEV on time for unforeseen trips. 
Moreover, the model considers MLA leading individuals to be risk averse 
in short-term decisions and differentiates itself from the ‘deadline 
differentiated pricing’ model (e.g., Bitar and Low, 2012; Bitar and Xu, 
2013; Salah and Flath, 2014) where the supplier proposes a menu of 
deferral options and the consumer plays a role in specifying the menu 
that the supplier bargains with.  
This study contributes to the MLA literature as well by considering MLA 
under UG framework that may have application in other areas such as 
trade and investment. We also extended the UG framework in situations 
where accepting the proposal entails risk for the responder. Moreover, 
while previous studies on MLA considered a single individual, this is the 
first model exploring MLA within a two-player UG framework and hence 
investigating MLA as related not only to the individual’s gains or losses, 
but also to the individual’s cautiousness in the proposal because of the 
need to consider the responder’s strategy (Driesen et al., 2010). While 
previous studies on MLA considered only monetary decisions, this is the 
first model representing MLA for time-based decisions and hence looking 
into mental accounting for time as possibly similar to the one for money 
(Rajagopal and Rha, 2009). Instead of choosing the amount to invest in a 
risky asset for a given level of risk that previous MLA studies consider, we 
also consider choosing the level of risk to accept, like choosing among 
various stocks with varying return and risk level, for a given amount to 
invest.  
The behavioral model is validated by an experimental economic 
laboratory setting that covers three decisions within two contract 
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durations. The three decisions concern (i) to postpone recharging time to 
off-peak periods for a discount proposed by the supplier, (ii) the amount 
of discount to request for off-peak recharging at times decided by the 
supplier, and (iii) the amount of discount to request for supplier-
controlled recharging involving ambiguity concerning the recharging 
time. The two contract durations entail (i) a short-term (daily) framing 
and (ii) a long-term (weekly) framing. The three experiments tested 
whether the long-term contract framing lessens MLA behavior while 
controlling for possible confounding factors. In the first experiment, 
participants were requested to what extent they are willing to postpone 
recharging to be eligible to the discounted fee. In the second experiment, 
participants were requested to propose a discount for postponing the 
recharging while still facing the possible rejection by the supplier, the 
occurrence of unforeseen events and the aforementioned mobility 
constraints. In the third experiment, participants were requested to 
propose a discount to concede that the electricity supplier assumes the 
decision about the recharging time.  
Findings from the experiment show that individuals indeed reveal MLA 
behavior when taking BEV recharging decisions. Thus, presenting long-
term BEV recharging contracts, instead of merely presenting time-of-use 
pricing of electricity, may curtail MLA behavior and help BEV owners to 
choose cost-minimizing recharging time by participating in discounted 
off-peak recharging hours. 
The paper is structured as follows. The next section presents the 
proposed behavioral model. The following sections introduce the 
experimental design and illustrate the results of the three experiments on 
BEV recharging decisions. The last section draws conclusions and 
suggests policy implications.  
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3.2. Behavioral model  
3.2.1. A brief Overview of MLA and UG 
MLA combines the two concepts of loss aversion and mental accounting, 
where loss aversion is the tendency of individuals to be more sensitive to 
losses than to gains and mental accounting is the activity that individuals 
perform to evaluate alternatives and take decisions (Benartzi and Thaler, 
1995). In the literature, MLA refers typically to the way individuals 
evaluate a sequence of long-term risky investments that can also be 
evaluated in the short-term basis (Benartzi and Thaler, 1995; Thaler et 
al., 1997). Myopic individuals evaluate the transactions independently 
and reject them if each risky investment is separately unattractive, while 
non-myopic individuals evaluate the sequence in its entirety and reject 
the investments only if the aggregated net return is unattractive (Thaler 
et al., 1997). Accordingly, MLA implies that individuals reach different 
decisions according to the problem framing. Lessening MLA requires 
limiting evaluation frequency (i.e., the time horizon for transaction 
evaluation) for MLA individuals to perceive less the disutility of short-
term losses, and/or decreasing decision flexibility (i.e., the individual has 
less ability to adjust the decision) for MLA individuals to tend towards the 
evaluation of a sequence of decisions as aggregate rather than as singular 
ones (e.g., see Gneezy and Potters, 1997; Thaler et al., 1997; Gneezy et al., 
2003; Langer and Weber, 2008; Fellner and Sutter, 2009; Benzion et al., 
2012; Kaufmann and Weber, 2013).  
In the context of BEVs recharging, the way time-of-use pricing of 
electricity used for BEV recharging may affect BEV owners’ response. The 
electricity tariff could be presented as self-selection daily choice problem, 
i.e., the electricity supplier simply announces the time-of-day tariff 
without requiring any formal contract, and the BEV owners choose the 
recharging time on daily bases. Alternatively, the tariff could be presented 
in long-term contract forms requiring the BEV owners to recharging at 
only the specified hours within the contract period to be eligible for the 
contract. Thus, according to the MLA hypothesis, presenting the tariff in 
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long-term bases may lessen MLA behavior, ceteris paribus. Lessening 
MLA may help BEV owners to choose the expected cost-minimizing 
recharging time/discount by trading-off between the aggregated cost 
saving from the discounted fee and the expected cost of not having the 
BEV charged on time.    
On the other hand, an UG is a sequential bargaining, zero-sum game 
where the proposer and the responder are two players who passively 
bargain on sharing a sum of money. The proposer decides how the money 
is to be shared between the two players, and the responder decides to 
accept/reject the proposed shares (Kagel et al., 1996). Accepting implies 
that each player earns the agreed share, while rejecting entails no 
earnings for both players. The classical game theory prediction for the 
bargaining equilibrium solution is that the responder accepts any 
positive share, regardless of its amount, since this positive share is better 
than the zero earning associated to the rejection (ceteris paribus). 
Expecting this, the proposer offers the smallest positive unit, which is the 
equilibrium solution. The actual observation of empirical evidence 
suggests that the amounts proposed and rejected are affected by 
additional factors such as emotions, feeling of fairness, sense of 
punishment, sense of reciprocity, and to a lesser extent by demographic 
and cultural variables (e.g., Camerer and Thaler, 1995; Van’t Wout et al., 
2006).   
A similar framework exists between BEV owners and electricity 
suppliers. Active (or passive) agreement between electricity suppliers 
and BEV owners concerning the discounted fee for scheduling recharging 
at times convenient for the grid system benefits both, though, unlike the 
classical UG framework, postponing recharging involves risk for BEV 
owners. In the model we present below, the BEV owner is the proposer 
about the amount of discount to request for postponing recharging. S/he 
trades-off between, on the one hand, claiming large share of the benefit 
from the discount and the corresponding high risk of the proposal being 
rejected by the supplier and, on the other hand, getting the small claim 
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proposal being accepted by the supplier, but risking that the discount 
claim is too small to cover the expected costs of unforeseen trip occurring 
during the postponement period.51    
3.2.2.   The Proposed Model 
Consider an individual facing a choice between (i) a consumption option 
having cost c at time t and (ii) a consumption option having cost (c – g) at 
time (t + Δt), where 0 ≤ g ≤ c and Δt > 0, but Δt is not too large to bear 
interest rate. The individual is the proposer (the BEV owner in our 
context) who offers a value g for choosing the second option to the 
responder (the electricity supplier) who decides whether to accept or 
reject the proposal. From the proposer’s perspective, acceptance implies 
a potential gain, g, and rejection entails no gain. From the responder 
perspective, acceptance implies lower revenue by the amount g for an 
exogenous benefit, e.g. from smoothing electricity consumption that 
reduces average cost of supplying electricity. The responder accepts if g 
entails no less gain than the status-quo condition.  
The proposer has two contrasting motivations towards deciding the size 
of g. On the one hand, a higher g implies a higher gain, but it entails also a 
lower acceptance probability, θ(g), of g, where θ is inversely related with 
g. On the other hand, a lower g implies a higher θ(g). However, extending 
the UG framework, in the case the responder accepts and the proposer 
postpones the consumption by Δt, a probability, α≥0, exists that an 
unforeseen event occurs at an extra cost, e, and, thus, lower g may not be 
                                                          
51 The EV-owner proposing the discount amount bases on value-based pricing 
(Christopher M., 1982; Grewal et al, 2012) in that the discount amount depends on 
how much BEV owners value rescheduling recharging time. The electricity supplier, 
then, offers the discount for eligible BEV owners.    
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enough to cover the expected cost, αe. Thus, the expected cost of 
consumption at time (t + Δt) equals (c - g + αe) for the proposer.  
Accordingly, there are four possible outcomes for the proposer as also 
illustrated in figure 1:  
 the proposer does not present the proposal, and hence 
experiences cost c at time t; 
 the proposer proposes g that is rejected by the responder 
and, hence, experiences cost c at time t; 
 the proposer proposes g that is accepted by the responder 
and no unforeseen event occurs and, hence, experiences cost (c – 
g) and gain g at time (t + Δt); 
 the proposer proposes an amount g that is accepted by the 
responder, but an unforeseen event occurs and, hence, 
experiences cost (c – g + e = c + s) at time (t + Δt), where s is the 
net loss of the unforeseen event. 
 110 
 
 
Figure 3.2.1. Choice of consumption time, discount proposal and the 
corresponded expected costs 
The proposer faces a cost minimization problem that involves a decision 
whether to postpone consumption and, if so, to determine the amount of 
g, given the risk of the net loss, s. In the problem always exists a value of 
g that makes the cost at time (t + Δt) at most equal to the cost c at time t, 
and this assumption is realistic as risk averse proposers who prefer not 
to postpone consumption will propose a high value of g that will be 
rejected by the responder. 
Thus, the proposer’s expected cost as a function of the decision-making 
variable g, C(g), is given by: 
            1 1C g g c g g c s g c                     (3.1) 
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where the first term in the closed bracket represents the cost at time (t + 
Δt) diminished by the gain g given the responder acceptance of the 
proposal and the non-occurrence of the unforeseen event. The second 
term in the closed bracket represents the cost at time (t + Δt) given the 
responder acceptance of the proposal and the extra cost for the 
occurrence of the unforeseen event. The last term represents the cost at 
time t given the responder rejection of the proposal. The expression of 
the cost C(g) may be rewritten to show the trade-off for the proposer 
between the incentive to demand a higher amount g in order to minimize 
the cost and the disincentive of a higher chance of rejection: 
  
        C g g 1 g gc s 1 c                                      (3.2)                                                                  
We assume for computational simplicity that (1- θ(g)) has a uniform 
distribution with support (0, b), where b>0 is the maximum value that the 
proposer expects the responder to accept.  
     
 
0, 0
1 0
b g
      for  g b
g b
            for g


 
 
 
                                             (3.3) 
The introduced UG framework (i.e., the higher the g, the higher the 
rejection of the proposal) may trigger aversion β of the discount 
proposal rejection, g, (and paying c). Thus, β and λ counteract each 
other. The proposer minimizes then the expected cost, c(g), given by 
          1 1C g g g sc g c           
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There exist at least three solutions for the value of g minimizing the 
expected cost depending on the framing of the choice problem and on the 
risk preference of the proposer: (i) a solution for a risk neutral proposer; 
(ii) a solution for a MLA proposer when the choice problem is presented 
without trying to lessen the MLA behavior; (iii) a solution for a MLA 
proposer when the choice problem is presented while trying to lessen the 
MLA behavior by framing the N decisions as aggregate. 
For the risk neutral proposer ( 1), the expected cost function 
Cn(g) (where the superscript n denotes risk neutrality) corresponds to 
        1 1nC g gcg s g c             (3.4)                                                                          
The minimum amount, denoted by gn, that a risk neutral proposer will 
propose is the amount that makes the expected cost Cn(g) equal to the 
consumption cost, c, at time t, namely gn = sα/(1-α). Intuitively, gn is 
independent of θ(g) but is dependent on the occurrence probability, α, of 
an unforeseen event. On the other hand, the expected cost minimizing 
value of g, denoted by g*n, that a risk neutral proposer will propose is the 
amount that minimizes the expected cost function given in equation (3.4) 
and is given by52:  
 2 2 1
n bg s


 

 (3.5)
Intuitively, gn is higher for higher values of b that the proposer expects 
the responder to accept, and it increases with s due to unforeseen events, 
since higher values of g are required to compensate for higher expected 
                                                          
52 We are skipping the derivation and the second order condition since it is 
straightforward. 
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losses. It should be noted that the framing of the choice problem does not 
affect the choices of a risk-neutral responder.  
For the MLA and rejection (of g) aversion proposer, the framing of the 
choice problem affects the amount g to be proposed. When the contract 
is presented without lessening the MLA behavior, i.e., the N decisions are 
presented as independent ones, the proposer weighs the expected loss, s, 
according to the degree λ of loss aversion and the expected cost of paying 
c by a degree β of aversion for the proposal rejection. The proposer 
minimizes then the expected cost, Cm(g), given by 
        1 1m cC g g g s g c                (3.6)  
Minimization of equation (3.6) with respect to g and solving for g, denoted 
by gm, gives:  
 
  
1
1
2 2 1
m bg s c  

   

 (3.7)
   
There are worthy considering implications from the above result. First, 
for λ=1 and β=1, the cost-minimizing value converges to the value for the 
risk neutral proposer, i.e., m ng g . Second, the degree of aversion 
towards rejection of the proposal discourages from proposing higher 
values of g. On the other hand, the degree λ of loss aversion increases gm. 
It can be shown that mg is either m ng g  and is more likely to be 
rejected (by the responder) or is less * *m ng g , overall resulting in at 
least as high expected cost of consumption as the risk-neutral proposer. 
Thus, β and λ counteracts each other on their effect on gm inducing the 
proposer to reveal his true preference, which can be shown as: 
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   
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d d
dg dg
as c
d d
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 
 
 (3.8)
   
An expected loss (αs) higher than cost c implies that gm increases for 
increasing values of λ since loss aversion makes the postponement more 
expensive than the cost of rejection and hence drives the proposer 
towards a higher amount g to compensate higher expected losses. If (as < 
c), then loss aversion with respect to s will be dominated by an aversion 
to rejection of the proposal. When αs = s, the UG framework is expected to 
cancel out the loss aversion behavior that otherwise favors safer 
alternatives. The result is summarized as follows.  
Hypothesis 1. An MLA proposer proposes an amount g higher than the 
optimal value when (αs > c) with the result being a higher probability of 
rejection of the proposal by the responder and, hence, a higher expected cost 
of consumption with respect to a risk neutral propose. Vice versa, an MLA 
proposer proposes an amount g lower than the optimal value when (αs < c) 
with the result being a higher probability of acceptance of the proposal by 
the responder and, hence, a higher expected cost of consumption (due to the 
loss) with respect to a risk neutral propose. 
For the MLA proposer with MLA lessening treatment, the N decisions 
are presented as aggregate in the form of a long-term contract. The 
proposer minimizes then the cost function Ct(g):  
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 
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    (3.9)  
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where γ corresponds to the degree λ of loss aversion if (N-v)g – vs < 0, and 
1 otherwise. Equation (3.9) is obtained by following the probability rule. 
That is, out of N round, there is a chance with probability (1 )
Na  that 
unforeseen event will not occur at all and, hence, the expected cost will 
be Nc – Ng, there are N – 1 rounds with probability  
11 1
N
a 

  that 
there will be only one occurrence of unforeseen event and, hence, the 
expected cost will be Nc – (N – 1)g + s, and so on. If the proposal is 
rejected, then the expected cost is Nc multiplied by the psychological 
value to the rejection.   
Solving for the cost minimizing value of g requires specific values for N 
and s. By taking example, however, we can observe that the effect of λ on 
g decreases with N. For example, for N = 2, the expected cost of proposing 
g amount, assuming that g > s, is given by  
           
22
2 1 2 1 2 1tC g g c g s s g g c                
 
 
After solving for the expected cost minimizing value, gt, and computing 
comparative statics, we have 
   
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s
, 0; 1
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And we can observe that  
, ; 1,
t m t mdg dg dg dg
d d d d

   
    
where gm is as given before in equation (3.8) when N =1. Thus, presenting 
the price discount in aggregates in terms of long-term contracts 
lessens both MLA behavior and the aversion to rejection of the 
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proposed amount behavior and, thus, behavioral hypothesis 2 
follows.   
Hypothesis 2. Proposing N decisions as aggregate curtails MLA and 
aversion to proposal rejection behavior and implies higher gains g to the 
proposer with respect to the prospect of proposing N decisions as separate 
ones.  
Figure 2 summarizes the relationships between the amounts g proposed 
by the three proposers, i.e., the risk-neutral, MLA and MLA-treated, 
discussed above. The vertical axes represent the λ and β, and the 
horizontal axis presents g.  
 
Figure 3.2.2. The role of lessening MLA under UG framework.  
While a risk neutral proposer proposes an optimal amount gn, an MLA 
proposer proposes an amounts gm higher than gn when αs > c and lower 
than gn when αs < c, and an MLA proposer with MLA lessening treatment 
proposes an amount gt that is between gn and gm. 
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To sum up, we propose a model that may be of practical use in situations 
where there are gains from trade between two economic agents that 
occurs repeatedly and where the trade involves risk of loss to one of the 
agents. The UG framework, i.e., the threat of rejection of the proposal, 
discourages the proposer from claiming much higher shares of the gains 
from trade than the required amount to compensate expected losses that 
otherwise undermines the realization of the trade.  
The model is also flexible in that it can be used to ask the maximum 
amount of risk that proposers are willing to take on to be eligible for a 
discount. For example, electricity suppliers could set c and g, as they 
usually do, and ask BEV users the maximum duration of time that they are 
willing to push recharging hours towards off-peak periods of electricity 
consumption to be eligible for a discount. The trade-off for the BEV users 
is between the incentive of deferring recharging for longer time towards 
the off-peak period to be eligible for the discount, and the disincentive of 
higher risk of not being able to use the BEV for unforeseen event in the 
cases that unforeseen trip (that requires recharging) occurs during the 
deferred period. The electricity supplier could then frame the contract in 
UG framework on long-term contract bases.  
In the following section, we present results from a laboratory experiment 
with three treatments that we designed and conducted to test the claims 
of the results from the proposed model. In experiment 1, participants 
were asked to propose g for a given values of c, s and 𝛼, and where the 
distribution of θ is known to participants. In experiment 2, participants 
were presented the values of c, g and s and asked to propose (Δt) and, 
hence, α , to be eligible for the discount. A higher (Δt) implies a higher θ 
and higher α, creating the trade-off between both a higher acceptance 
probability of the proposed recharging time and the risk of losing s. In 
experiment 3, participants were asked to propose g for a given values of 
c and s to let the electricity supplier schedule recharging hour. However, 
unlike in Experiment 1, 𝛼 is unknown in Experiment 3 so that the 
decision-making involves ambiguity.     
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3.3. Experimental Analysis 
The main objective of the experiment is to investigate if enforcing long-
term contracts curtain MLA behavior and a myopic-aversion to rejection 
behavior under the UG framework by inducing individuals to choose close 
to optimal risk level when compared with contracts designed without 
taking these behaviors in to account. The selection of an experimental 
economic setting is motivated by the aim of verifying the validity of the 
proposed behavioral model by isolating the effect of the treatment of 
interest (Falk and Heckman, 2009). A treatment group and a control 
group are defined to isolate the effect of the treatment while controlling 
for possible confounding factors that could influence the decision-making 
(Falk and Heckman, 2009). Arguably, the results from the experimental 
setting might be difficult to generalize to the general population (see, e.g., 
Levitt and List, 2007). However, there is no concern about the internal 
validity of the sample and about bias often prevalent in a field experiment 
because results tend to be associated with factors other than the 
treatment (see, e.g., Brookshire et al., 1987; Andersen et al., 2010; 
Camerer, 2011).  
3.3.1. Experimental design  
The experiment was conducted with the Z-tree statistical program 
(Fischbacher, 2007) at the Centre for Experimental Economics (CEE) of 
the University of Copenhagen under the standard laboratory economic 
settings for controlled experiments. The sample consisted of 147 
individuals recruited within the CEE registered panel: the gender 
distribution was 57.8 % of men, age varied between 20 and 44 years old 
with mean age of 26.7 years old. Participants’ mean self-reported income 
was 1430 USD, the employment distribution was between unemployed 
(21.1%), students (38.1%), students with also part-time job (29.9%), and 
employees (10.9%). The education level distribution had high 
percentages of Master (66.7%) and Bachelor (25.9%) degrees. The 
participants had previously participated in 2.8 experiments on average.  
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Participants were instructed to assume to be EV-owners with home BEV 
recharging availability. The treatment and control groups were given the 
same disposable income (110 tokens per day – per decision round) and 
the same mobility pattern in order to avoid biases from confounding 
factors. They were informed that the car battery empties every day at 6 
pm when they return home from their daily activities, and requires 
recharging before the next planned trip the following day assumed to be 
at 9 am.  
In the three experiments, participants faced the decision about whether 
to pay the amount c for recharging their BEV at time t (6 pm) and have it 
ready for unplanned trips, or to postpone recharging to time (t+Δt) for a 
discount g. The UG was set up by allowing for the probability θ(g) that the 
supplier (represented by the computer) offers the discount g for 
postponing BEV recharging with reference to a threshold value. 
Participants were informed that, in the cases that the supplier agrees with 
postponing the BEV recharging, there is a probability, α, that an 
unplanned trip will occur before the recharging is completed and, hence, 
they will have to pay an extra cost, e, associated to the disutility of not 
travelling with their BEV at unforeseen trip occurrence time and 
experience a net loss s. Participants were also informed about general 
conditions: α does not depend on the amount g; α is not influenced by the 
supplier; daily earnings are independent; recharging days are 
independent and hence both θ and α do not depend from previous 
decisions of the same participant as well as decisions of other 
participants; decisions are taken individually with participants unaware 
of the decisions of their peers.   
Each participant took part in one of six treatment conditions resulting 
from the combinations of the three decisions and the two contract 
durations (daily recharging decision for the control group and weekly 
recharging time decision for the treatment group), with completely 
randomized assignment to the treatments. In the daily contract duration, 
the participants performed 24 decisions representing 24 recharging days. 
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In the weekly contract duration, the participants performed only 3 
decisions over the 24 recharging days (i.e., on days 1, 9 and 17) and each 
decision was valid for the next 8 recharging days. The two contract 
durations were deemed suitable to elicit myopic versus non-myopic 
behavior because habitually MLA is tested for 1-round versus 3-rounds 
(see, e.g., Hardin and Looney, 2012). It should be noted that alternative 
contract durations (e.g., daily versus monthly) is not expected to affect 
the sign of the results if not it strengthens as MLA testing is robust to 
different stakes and different return amounts (see, e.g., Camerer and 
Hogarth, 1999; Langer and Weber, 2005). Before starting the experiment, 
participants answered four control questions to make sure that they 
understand the decisions they are going to make, and clarifications were 
given to the small minority not answering correctly to these questions. 
At the completion of the experiments, participants received cash 
corresponding to the tokens accumulated with their decisions. The cash 
payments removed the incentive compatibility bias associated to 
respondents not bearing the consequences of their choices in stated 
preference (SP) experiments (Wang et al., 2007). Participants were 
informed that the compensation would vary between 10 USD, 
representing a show up fee, and 87 USD, representing the total possible 
earnings from optimal choices: the actual earning varied between 17 and 
51 USD with an average of 28 USD over an average duration of 50 
minutes. Moreover, the cash payments at the end of the experiments 
removed the temporal discounting bias that might lead to choosing the 
immediate reward (Read, 2004).  
3.3.2. Experiment 1: Acceptable discount for postponing the 
recharging time 
3.3.2.1. Procedure 
Experiment 1 was designed to test both Hypotheses 1 and 2 by asking 
participants to propose an amount g for given values of c, s, Δt and 𝛼, and 
a known distribution of θ(g). Recharging at peak hour t costed c = 100 
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tokens, which recalled the 99 Danish kroner charged by Clever A/S, one 
of the BEV recharging facility suppliers in Denmark. The cost c implied a 
default surplus, s= 10 tokens (i.e., the status qua gain from consumption), 
and it was risk-free because the supplier always accepts its maximum 
revenue and the EV-owner always charges the BEV upon arrival at home. 
Participants were asked to postpone recharging from 6 pm at which they 
arrive at home to 11 pm. The probability α of occurrence of an unplanned 
trip between he time period 6 pm and 11 pm is set at 66.67 % adopted 
from Thaler et al. (1997) in MLA inquiry that entails cost e = g + s, and 
hence a net loss of s = 10. Thus, for accepted proposals, participants have 
33 % of saving the amount they proposed, g, and 66.67% chance of losing 
s = 10 tokens per round. A random number was drawn from a uniform 
distribution to simulate the acceptance or rejection of the proposed 
discount g. For accepted proposals, another random number, 
independent from the previous one, was drawn to simulate the 
occurrence (if lower than 0.6667) or the non-occurrence (if higher than 
0.6667) of the unplanned trip. Accordingly, for accepted proposals 
participants had 33.33% probability of saving the amount g proposed and 
66.67% probability of losing s= 10 for each day (decision round). This 
experiment was administered to two groups with daily and weekly 
contract conditions. The instructions used in the experiment are enclosed 
in the Appendix.  
3.3.2.2. Results 
Table 3.3.1 presents the results of the experiment in terms of average 
discount proposed as well as the share of risk-free choices and the 
corresponding cost savings for the two groups with daily and weekly 
contract. Overall, results show willingness to postpone the BEV 
recharging to 11 pm in exchange for a monetary gain while risking losses 
because of a 66.67% probability of occurrence of an unplanned trip 
before the BEV was recharged. Peak hour recharging was chosen only in 
145 days (11.0% of the total recharging days), although guaranteeing a 
saving of 10 tokens and no risk of unplanned trip. 
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The results display a clear treatment effect. Except in the first-round 
decision, average proposals by the Weekly Group is closer to the optimal 
amount that a risk-neutral participant would take than the proposals by 
the control group (i.e., the daily Group). Compared to participants in 
weekly contracts, participants in daily contracts reflect “cautious player” 
behavior in choosing the risk-free option in a higher share of days and 
being risk averse to the possibility that the supplier might reject their 
proposal. Namely, participants tried to be eligible for discount by 
requesting lower amounts for postponing their recharging while 
assuming a 66.67% risk of an unplanned trip. The total average gain of 
the daily contract is 264.50 tokens, compared to 304.50 tokens for the 
weekly contract and 425.50 tokens for the risk-neutral proposer, 
suggesting a much larger extent of the myopia leading to sub-optimal 
decision.  
To observe the significance of the differences, we use the non-parametric 
Mann-Whitney test. The   fourth   column reports z- values, which are a 
transformation of the Mann-Whitney U-value corrected for the presence 
of ties. The results indicate that the difference is statistically significant 
except on the very first decision round.  
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Table 3.3.1: Acceptable discount for postponing the recharging time to 
11 pm 
 Average discount requested in 
tokens 
(including the risk-free option) 
Percentage of chosen 
risk free recharging 
days (i.e., recharging 
at 6 pm for a fee of 
100 tokens) (%) 
Money earned 
Decision 
round 
Daily 
contract 
Weekly 
Contract 
Mann-
Whitney 
test  
(z-value) 
Daily 
contract 
Weekly 
Contract 
Daily 
contract 
Weekly 
Contract 
1-8 36.6 38.5  -0.130 9.3 17.9 10.2 12.2 
9-16 34.6 39.7  -2.139** 17.6 0.0 10.7 13.2 
17-24 34.7 41.0  -2.640*** 18.1 3.6 12.2 13.9 
all 35.3 39.7  -2.788*** 15.0 7.1 11.1 13.1 
The symbols *, **, *** denotes 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level of significance.  
Figure 3.3.1 illustrates the effect of the MLA treatment as a comparison 
between the proposals of the two groups versus the optimal one.  
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Figure 3.3.1. MLA treatment effect on the amount proposed to postpone the 
recharging time 
Note. On the vertical y-axis is the proposed amount (g), the horizontal x-axis presents the 
decision rounds, the horizontal dotted line at g =40 denotes the cost-minimizing value that 
a risk-neutral participant would choose, the upward slopping ‘weekly contract’ line denotes 
the mean proposed value by the Weekly Group (the treatment group) and the remaining line 
denotes the mean proposed values over the 24 rounds of decisions by the daily Group (the 
control  group). The difference between the two lines denotes the effect of the treatment. 
The horizontal line at g = 40 denotes the cost minimizing value of the 
discount request, i.e., the proposal by a risk neutral individual. Framing 
the contract in long-terms bases has a visible effect on g, and the effect 
becomes stronger as both groups get experience. The participants in the 
daily group exhibited clear myopia behavior. 
The effect of the treatment is clearly visible on Figure 3.3.1. Interestingly, 
the difference between participants in the daily and weekly contracts 
diverges as the participants get experience. While participants in the 
weekly contract gradually approximate the optimal value, g =40, 
participants from the daily contract myopically diverged away from it. 
Consistently with Hypothesis 1, participants were more averse to the 
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rejection of proposals as (c >αs) and more myopic in decision-making 
while, consistently with Hypothesis 2, enforcing the treatment by 
presenting aggregate decisions lessened the myopic behavior. It should 
be noted that the participants in the weekly contracts had higher than 
optimal discount proposal in the last decision round, likely because of 
misjudgment of trends from the two previous decisions where they 
observed earnings increasing with the discount proposal increasing.  
3.3.3. Experiment 2: Willingness to postpone the 
recharging time 
3.3.3.1. Procedure  
Participants were requested to choose between recharging upon arrival 
at home at the peak hour t (6 pm) or postponing the recharging to off-
peak hour (t + Δt). As in Experiment 1, each participant received 110 
tokens per recharging day to save for himself /herself after paying costs 
associated with BEV recharging. They were informed that recharging at 
peak hour, t = 6 pm, costed c = 100 tokens, implies a default surplus equal 
to 10 tokens, and it is risk-free because the supplier always accepts its 
maximum revenue and the EV-owner never faces mobility constraints 
because of the BEV being charged upon arrival at home. Postponing the 
recharging to off-peak hour (t + Δt) earns a discount g =25 tokens 
regardless of the time Δt. Two contrasting risks are associated with the 
magnitude of Δt. First, the risk of the proposed recharging hour being 
rejected by the supplier when Δt is not far from the peak hour, t, where 
the further the proposed recharging hour from t, the higher is θ. Second, 
if Δt is accepted, there is the occurrence probability α of an unplanned trip 
existed, with α increasing linearly by 2% for every 15 minutes 
postponement. Occurrence of unplanned trip means they have to pay for 
tax that costs 35 tokens, meaning the risk of losing s = 10 tokens they 
could earn by recharging at 6 pm at free of risk. Participants were fully 
informed about the occurrence probability α of an unplanned trip prior 
to making the decision (the risk level is displayed on the computer screen 
along with the recharging time participants chose).   
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As in Experiment 1, random number was drawn from a uniform 
distribution to simulate the acceptance or rejection by the supplier. If the 
postponement of the recharging was accepted, another random number 
was drawn to simulate the occurrence of an unforeseen trip and 
compared with the level of risk they choose to accept. Unplanned trip 
occurs (does not occur) and the participant earns nothing (35 tokens) if 
the drawn number is less than α. Accordingly, the longer the participants 
postponed the recharging hour, the more likely they were going to obtain 
the discount g, but also the more likely they were incurring the extra cost 
e for the unforeseen trip. It should be noted that eq. (1) through (10) were 
expressed as a function of the decision variable Δt for the given g. 
3.3.3.2. Results 
Table 3.3.2 presents the results of the experiment in terms of average 
proposed recharging hours, the corresponding risk level that the 
proposers decided to take and the corresponding cost savings for the two 
groups with daily and weekly contract.  
Overall, results illustrate willingness to postpone the BEV recharging in 
order to obtain the proposed discount of 25 % while risking losses 
because of a possible unplanned trip before the recharging was 
completed. Peak hour recharging, corresponding to a sure earning of 10 
tokens and zero probability of an unplanned trip, was chosen only in 63 
days (5.7% of the recharging days). Cost minimization disregarding 
myopia and the “cautious player” property (i.e., the risk neutral proposer) 
would lead to postponing the recharging to 10.30 pm, corresponding to a 
36.0 % risk of an unplanned trip and a 36.0% supplier’s acceptance 
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probability53. Participants tried to be eligible for discount by postponing 
BEV recharging to a later hour while assuming higher risk of an 
unplanned trip.  
Compared to participants in weekly contracts, the participants in daily 
contracts showed myopia in taking higher risk aversion towards supplier 
rejection by both postponing more trips to off-peak hours and selecting 
later hours for BEV recharging. 
Table 3.3.2. Postponing recharging time to be eligible for discount 
 
Average recharging hour including 
the risk-free option  
(Average accepted level of risk of 
an unplanned trip occurrence in 
parenthesis (in %)) 
Percentage of risk 
free choice (i.e., 
recharging at 6 pm 
for a fee of 100 
tokens) (%)  
Money earned 
Decision 
rounds 
Daily 
contract 
Weekly 
Contract 
Mann-
Whitney 
test  
(z-value) 
Daily 
contract 
Weekly 
Contract 
Daily 
contract 
Weekly 
Contract 
1-8 11:42 
pm 
(46.2) 
10:07 
pm 
(33.8) 
6.452*** 5.1 8.3 13.0 14.5 
9-16 11:56 
pm 
(47.5) 
11:10 
pm 
(41.4) 
2.382** 1.7 8.3 13.0 14.0 
17-24 11:54 
pm 
(47.2) 
11:32 
pm 
(44.3) 
0.456 1.7 8.3 11.7 11.7 
all 11:50 
pm 
(47.0) 
10:56 
pm 
(40.0) 
Z=5.670*** 3.0 8.3 12.5 13.3 
                                                          
53 The values c = 100, g =25, s = 35 – 25 =10 were inserted in the equations (3.4), and θ and α are as 
functions of Δt to solve for the cost minimizing time of recharging for redefined a risk neutral proposer. 
That is, C(g) is redefined as C(Δt) since time (of recharging) is a decision variable in this experiment. 
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Note: The symbols *, ** & *** respectively denote 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level of significance.   
The effect of the treatment is clearly visible in Table 3.3.2. Except in the 
last round (from 17 to 24), there is a statistically significant (by Mann-
Whitney rank test) difference between the proposals of the two groups 
where the WG proposals were relatively close to optimal solutions. 
We also present the difference in Figure 3.3.2. The dot and smooth curves 
are the proposal by the WG and the DG respectively while the horizontal 
dotted line at α = 36 % represents the optimal solution. The vertical axis 
presents the probability of unplanned trip occurrence and the acceptance 
probability of the proposed value (%), i.e., α that participants proposed 
to take on when they choose recharging time, and the horizontal axis 
presents the decision periods (days/rounds) that participants made.       
 
Figure 3.3.2. MLA treatment effect on the proposal of postponing the 
recharging time 
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Presenting recharging contract forms in terms of long term bases (weekly 
contract) lessens MLA behavior under UG framework, resulting in relatively 
close to optimal choice of time of recharging by participants who decided 
recharging time for a week than whose chose recharging time on daily 
bases 
At least three notes worth considering on the Figure 3.3.2. First, 
Throughout the 24 rounds of decision, the proposed values by the WG 
participants are close to the optimal solution when compared with the 
proposals made by the DG participants indicating that the treatment of 
MLA behavior under UG framework helped participants to make better 
decision. Second, the DG participants where more averse to rejection of 
the proposals than to the risk of loss throughout the decision period 
whereas the WG were more averse to losses than to rejection of proposals 
in their very first decision, after which they showed more averseness to 
rejection of proposals than to losses. Third, the effect of the treatment 
decreases over repeated decisions as we can observe from the gradual 
convergence of the proposals by the WG towards the proposals by DG.  
3.3.4. Experiment 3: Acceptable discount for 
supplier-controlled recharging 
3.3.4.1. Procedure  
Experiment 3 was designed to test Hypotheses 1 and 2 while having 
ambiguous decisions. Participants were requested to choose the amount 
g for given values of c and s upon agreeing to supplier-controlled 
recharging in which the supplier decides the recharging hour with the 
aim of optimizing the grid load. They were informed that the supplier 
could charge their vehicle at 6 pm, 11 pm, or 3 am, and that they could opt 
for recharging at peak hour t at the full cost c equal to 100 tokens and 
hence not experience any risk. Letting the supplier decide implied 
inconvenience due to the lack of behavioral control and ambiguity 
associated with the supplier-controlled recharging in that the participant 
did not know when the BEV will be ready for use (but the recharging is 
guaranteed for planned trips).  
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The second option of agreeing to supplier-controlled recharging bears 
two risks, namely the rejection of the proposal because the supplier 
considers it unprofitable and the risk of an unforeseen trip in the case that 
the amount g is accepted and the supplier schedules recharging hours at 
3 pm or 11 pm. The acceptance probability of the amount g was set like 
in experiment 2. However, unlike the previous two experiments though, 
the magnitude of the probability α was unknown. Concerning α, they only 
know that α increases with postponement duration, and they do not have 
control over when to charge.  Two random numbers were drawn 
independently from uniform distributions: the first to simulate the 
schedule time, and the second to simulate the occurrence of the 
unforeseen trip. Throughout the 24 rounds, they were not informed 
about the size of α, we simply informed them the scheduled recharging 
time and whether unplanned trip occurs.  This experiment was 
administered to two groups with daily and weekly contract conditions. 
3.3.4.2. Results  
Table 3.3.3 presents the results of the third experiment for the two 
contract conditions. Results illustrate the willingness to concede control 
to the supplier over the scheduling of BEV recharging in exchange for a 
monetary amount g and, hence, to agree not to know about the recharging 
hour and the probability of an unplanned trip. Peak hour recharging was 
chosen only in 60 days (5.4% of the total recharging days) regardless of 
the sure saving s of 10 tokens and the risk-free conditions. Practically, the 
participants were willing to wave their perceived behavioral control and 
deal with an ambiguous and ill-defined BEV recharging environment 
where the supplier has complete control over recharging time after 
guarantying timely recharging for planned trips. Interestingly, the share 
of risk-free recharging days was like the second experiment and lower 
than the first one, reflecting the possibility that the participants 
hypothesized the risk of an unplanned trip being lower than 50 %. 
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Table 3.3.3. Acceptable discount for supplier-controlled recharging 
 Average discount requested  Percentage of chosen 
risk free recharging 
days 
 Money earned 
Decision 
round 
Daily 
contract 
Weekly 
Contract 
Mann-
Whitney 
test 
 (z-value) 
Daily 
contract 
Weekly 
Contract 
Daily 
contract 
Weekly 
Contract 
1-8 34.4 32.9  0.267 5.0 19.2 16.9 16.0 
9-16 38.2 38.0 0.152 5.6 0.0 14.5 17.2 
17-24 44.6 39.2  3.350*** 2.0 0.0 19.4 15.1 
All 39.1 36.7  2.141** 4.2 6.4 16.9 16.1 
Note: The symbols *, ** & *** respectively denote 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level of significance.   
Compared with the participants in weekly contracts, participants in daily 
contracts reflected higher “ambiguity aversion” in that they had a higher 
share of risk-free days in the decision-rounds from 9 to 24 and demanded 
higher amounts g for being willing to accept an ambiguous supplier-
controlled recharging environment, and saved slightly more than the 
ones in weekly contract. It should be noted that presenting the decisions 
as aggregate in contexts where the participants are unaware of the risk 
level results in poor performance in comparison to contexts where the 
participants have a learning period about the risk level.  
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3.4. Discussion and Conclusions 
This study proposes a novel behavioral model representing utility 
maximization under MLA in the context of a two-player UG and presents 
an experimental economic application to validate the model. The 
application simulates EV-owners’ recharging choice behavior for three 
stipulated decisions and two contract duration. The findings from the 
experiment show that framing decisions as aggregate and under UG 
framework contributes to lessening myopic behavior and implies higher 
recharging cost savings, except in the treatment where the risk of 
postponing recharging is ambiguous. Participants in the weekly contracts 
approximate cost minimization, while the myopia of the participants in 
the daily contracts leads to sub-optimal behavior from the EV-owner 
perspective.     
While the primary objective of the three treatments we consider is to test 
the model prediction (i.e., lessening MLA under UG framework) under 
different scenarios, we believe that the proposed scenarios may also have 
practical application. The main point here is whether to merely announce 
time-of-use recharging fees (and to let the BEV users decide either 
postponing recharging for the discounted fee) or to present the 
discounted fees in long-term contract bases by inducing BEV users to 
reveal their true preference by framing the contracts under UG 
framework. Both the theoretical and experimental results favor the latter 
though there is a risk of less number of customers to choose not to 
postpone recharging time as we also saw in the result (the percentage of 
participants who chose to recharge at peak hours is higher in the weekly 
contract in Treatments 2 & 3). One solution for reducing the problem of 
getting less number of BEV users subscribing to the long-terms contract 
due to its less flexibility could be to allow for few exception days for the 
BEV users to recharging at any needy time.     
Concerning the three contracts scenario, the first scenario in which the 
electricity supplier proposes the discounted recharging hours and the 
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BEV owners decide whether to postpone recharging is already in practice, 
except we consider the BEV drivers proposing the discount amount so 
that, at least in principle, all BEV drivers will participate in off-peak 
recharging. The electricity supplier can then select proposals that are not 
higher than its cost saving from smoothing electricity consumption. Its 
applicability could, however, be challenging since it is uncommon for 
consumers to propose prices and since price of energy is volatile in that 
BEV drivers may have to propose the discount amount regularly, which is 
tedious and time consuming. 
The second scenario in that the electricity supplier asks BEV users to 
choose the recharging time to be eligible for the discounted fee seems 
more viable for application than the first scenario. The electricity supplier 
needs to announce the amount of the discount and the range of the period 
that makes eligible for the discount under the ultimatum game 
framework to induce BEV users to provide as long deferred recharging 
time as possible. Then, the supplier could provide the recharging service 
for selective number of BEV users depending on the electricity supply-
demand balance at each point of time. For example, if electricity 
consumption begins to decline at 8 pm and continues decreasing until 6 
am the following day, then the electricity supplier can start providing the 
recharging service for few of the BEV users starting from 8 pm, where the 
number of BEVs to be recharged continues increasing as demand falls. To 
do this, the supplier asks each BEV driver to postpone BEV recharging 
towards the late hours by stating that if the postponement is not long 
enough, the BEV user will not receive the discounted fee. Not specifying 
the time when the discount stars has advantage of reducing peak 
electricity consumption for recharging at the time the discount begins 
since, as discussed before, postponing further earns for BEV users 
nothing but the risk of unforeseen trip occurrence. The contract form 
enables the electricity supplier also to better predict the electricity 
demand at each point in time. The contract could be presented in long-
term bases (with some flexibility) to reduce the MLA behavior in that BEV 
drivers; otherwise it could also be tedious for BEV users to daily think of 
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when to recharging, which could discourage them from participating at 
all. Its implementation would be straightforward in a future where EV-
owners will access on-line management systems helping them in 
planning their recharging patterns taking their trip patterns and 
recharging fees in to account. This contract form has similarity with 
deadline differentiated pricing (Bitar and Xu, 2012) in that customers let 
the supplier know their deferred consumption period along with the 
deadline they need the product in return for discounted tariffs in that the 
supplier has flexibility to deliver the product. 
The third scenario we consider is the supplier directly scheduling 
recharging hours is similar to “centralized control model” (see, e.g., Liu, C 
et al., 2012), except that we propose the BEV drivers to propose the 
discount amount. As the results revealed, presenting long terms contracts 
may not be effective in this case since the contract form does not let the 
BEV users know when their BEVs will be ready.  
A word of caution is warranted for result interpretation as limitations to 
the study exist. Firstly, the experiment was conducted in a laboratory 
setting and the generalization of the results might be difficult even though 
a correspondence between laboratory   and field experiments has been 
verified for several similar experiments (Camerer, 2011). Secondly, the 
experiment controlled for incentive compatibility and temporal 
discounting biases, but the laboratory conditions might not reflect the 
actual electricity costs and mobility needs. Thirdly, the experiment was 
conducted with participants without prior experience as BEV-owners or 
users. However, the results have internal validity as the sample did not 
confound for experience and hence the MLA behavior emerges from an 
unbiased treatment. Lastly, the decisions in the experiment were taken 
individually and the participants were unaware of the decisions of their 
peers, while in reality word-of-mouth is a powerful market force. 
Accordingly, the results should be viewed as an indicative or diagnostic 
tool rather than a statistical analysis of the prevalence of the identified 
themes across the population of potential BEV-owners.  
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Bearing these limitations in mind, this study provides valuable insights 
for decision-makers and planners in the transportation and energy fields 
and these insights may be integrated into future agent-based and 
optimization models relying on more realistic behavioral rules 
representing BEV-owners’ recharging behavior. A future research 
development could design a field experiment able to evaluate the contract 
framing effect via the observation of BEV-owners’ behavior in terms of 
mobility and recharging patterns, while isolating the effect itself from the 
other factors playing a role in these patterns. 
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Appendix 2. Experimental Instructions  
Common instruction for all participants  
Welcome to this experiment about intelligent recharging of electric 
vehicles. The experiment will take about 1 hour and you will earn 50 DKK 
show up fee plus an additional sum that depends on your decisions in the 
experiment. 
Assume that you use an electric car with a battery recharging option at 
home. The battery becomes empty at 6 pm when you are back from 
work/school. The next planned trip to work/school is at 9 am. Recharging 
the battery takes two hours, and, therefore, the battery can be charged 
between 6 pm and 7 am to make the car ready for the planned trip.  
The electricity price depends on the hour in which you begin to charge. 
Postponing the time of recharging will give you a discount. However, 
there is a probability that you will have unplanned necessary trips before 
the car is charged. If such trips occur, you will pay taxi fee. 
There are 24 recharging days in total and you are given 2640 points as 
endowment, i.e., 110 points per day, to pay for recharging the car and to 
earning the remaining money for yourself. The conversion rate is that 3 
points = 1 Danish kroner (DKK). So, your earning from the experiment is  
Earning= (2640 - Fees)*1/3  + 50 DKK,  
where 'Fees' are the costs associated with recharging the car.  
The points you saved will be converted to DKK and paid to you in cash 
immediately after the experiment. Your earnings from a day of recharging 
will not be affected by outcomes from other days of recharging. Your 
outcomes are also independent of the decisions of other participants in 
the experiment. 
i. Experiment I Instruction: Request for Discount amount  
a) Only for the Control Group (Daily Contract) 
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There are 24 recharging days in total, and every day you can decide at 
which hour to charge your car. Recharging the car at 6 pm costs 100 
points and thus, you will earn 110 - 100 = 10 points per day for making 
the decision. 
The electricity supplier asks you to postpone the recharging time to 11 
pm for a discount. You can decide the discount that you are willing to 
accept for postponing the recharging hour to 11 pm. However, the 
electricity supplier sets a random maximum value to be eligible for a 
discount. If you decided for a discount for postponing the recharging hour 
that is lower or equal to the supplier's threshold, you will get the discount.  
If you do not postpone the time of recharging or if you decided for a 
discount for postponing the recharging hour that is greater than the 
supplier's threshold, you will not get the discount and you will pay 100 
points per day and save 10 points per day. 
If you get the discount after postponing the recharging hour from 6 pm to 
11 pm, you will have a 66.67% probability of an unplanned trip to occur 
before the car is charged. If an unplanned trip occurs, you will pay a taxi 
fee equal to 110 - X, where X is the discount you decided. Thus, your 
earning on the day will be zero and you will loss the 10 points you could 
save by recharging at 6 pm. If an unplanned trip does not occur, you will 
get the amount X of discount you decide plus 10 points per recharging 
day. 
The occurrence probability of an unplanned trip is always 66.67%. Every 
day, the computer randomly draws a number between 0 and 100, and the 
unplanned trip will occur if this drawn number is lower than 66.67%.  
The occurrence probability of an unplanned trip does not depend on the 
electricity supplier, on the size of your discount bid, or on the decisions 
of other participants. 
b) Only for the Treatment group (Weekly contract) 
There are 24 recharging days in total, and you will make 3 decisions on 
days 1, 9 and 17 about the hour you begin to charge for 24 days, so that 
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each decision will be effective for 8 days. Recharging the car at 6 pm costs 
100 points and thus, you will earn 110 - 100 = 10 points per day for 
making the decision. 
The electricity supplier asks you to postpone the recharging time to 11 
pm for a discount. You can decide the discount that you are willing to 
accept for postponing the recharging hour to 11 pm. However, the 
electricity supplier sets a random maximum value to be eligible for a 
discount. If you decided for a discount for postponing the recharging hour 
that is lower or equal to the supplier's threshold, you will get the discount 
for 8 consecutive days.  
If you do not postpone the time of recharging or if you decided for a 
discount for postponing the recharging hour that is greater than the 
supplier's threshold, you will not get the discount and you will pay 100 
points per day for 8 consecutive days. 
If you get the discount after postponing the recharging hour from 6 pm to 
11 pm, you will have a 66.67% probability of an unplanned trip to occur 
before the car is charged. If an unplanned trip occurs, you will pay a taxi 
fee equal to 110 - X, where X is the discount you decided. Thus, your 
earning on the day will be zero and you will loss the 10 points you could 
save by recharging at 6 pm.  If an unplanned trip does not occur, you will 
get the amount X of discount you decide plus 10 points per recharging 
day. 
The occurrence probability of an unplanned trip is always 66.67%. Every 
day, the computer randomly draws a number between 0 and 100, and the 
unplanned trip will occur if this drawn number is lower than 66.67%.  
The occurrence probability of an unplanned trip does not depend on the 
electricity supplier, the size of your discount bid, or the decisions of other 
participants. 
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ii.  Experiment II instruction: Choosing the recharging time  
a) Only for the Control Group (Daily Contract) 
There are 24 recharging days in total, and every day you can decide at 
which hour to charge your car. Recharging the car at 6 pm costs 100 
points and thus, you will earn 110 - 100 = 10 points per day for making 
the decision. 
The electricity supplier asks you to postpone recharging time for a 
discount fee. If you postpone the time of recharging to a later hour, you 
can get 25 points discount (i.e., you pay 75 points) and you will earn 110 
- 75 = 35 points per day. However, the discount is available only in certain 
hours randomly selected by the electricity supplier. If you postpone the 
time of recharging after the supplier's threshold, you will get the discount. 
If you do not postpone the time of recharging or you postpone it earlier 
than the supplier's threshold, you will pay 100 points and save 10 points 
per day. 
If you get the discount, you will earn 35 points per day only if there is no 
unplanned trip. However, an unplanned trip can occur before the car is 
charged, and you will pay 35 points for a taxi, and thus, you will loss the 
10 points you could save by recharging at 6 pm.  
The occurrence probability (out of 100 cases) of an unplanned trip 
depends on the recharging hour. A probability Y indicates that there is 
Y % chance of an unplanned trip to occur. For example, if you choose to 
charge at hour X where there is Y % chance of an unplanned trip to occur, 
then an unplanned trip will occur if the randomly drawn number is lower 
than Y. Every day, the computer randomly draws a number between 0 
and 100, and the unplanned trip will occur if this drawn number is lower 
than the risk you choose to take. 
The longer you postpone the recharging hour, the more likely you will get 
the discount, but also the higher is the chance of an unplanned trip to 
occur. 
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b) Only for the Treatment group (Weekly Contract) 
There are 24 recharging days in total, and you will make 3 decisions on 
days 1, 9 and 17 about the hour you begin to charge for 24 days, so that 
each decision will be effective for 8 days. Recharging the car at 6 pm costs 
100 points and thus, you will earn 110 - 100 = 10 points per day for 
making the decision.  
The electricity supplier asks you to postpone recharging time for a 
discount fee. If you postpone the recharging time to a later hour, you can 
get 25 points discount (i.e., you pay 75 points) and you will earn 110 - 75 
= 35 points per day. However, the discount is available only in certain 
hours randomly selected by the electricity supplier. If you postpone the 
time of recharging after the supplier's threshold, you will get the discount 
for 8 consecutive days.  
If you do not postpone the time of recharging or you postpone it earlier 
than the supplier's threshold, you will pay 100 points for 8 consecutive 
days and save only 10 points per day. For example, if you postpone 
recharging time to an hour earlier than the supplier's threshold on day 1, 
you will not get the discount for days 1 to 8 and you will pay 100 points 
per day. 
If you get the discount, you earn a potential 35 points per day only if there 
is no unplanned trip. However, an unplanned trip can occur before the car 
is charged, and you will pay 35 points for a taxi, and thus, you will loss the 
10 points you could save by recharging at 6 pm.  
The occurrence probability (out of 100 cases) of an unplanned trip 
depends on the recharging hour. A probability Y indicates that there is 
Y % chance of an unplanned trip to occur. For example, if you choose to 
charge at hour X where there is Y % chance of an unplanned trip to occur, 
then an unplanned trip will occur if the randomly drawn number is lower 
than Y. Every day, the computer randomly draws a number between 0 
and 100, and the unplanned trip will occur if this drawn number is lower 
than the risk you choose to take. 
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The longer you postpone the recharging hour, the more likely you will get 
the discount, but also the higher is the chance of an unplanned trip to 
occur.   
iii. Experiment III instruction: Letting the supplier control 
recharging hours 
a) Only for the Control Group (Daily Contract)  
There are 24 recharging days in total, and every day you can decide at 
which hour to charge your car. Recharging the car at 6 pm costs 100 
points and thus, you will earn 110 - 100 = 10 points per day for making 
the decision.  
The electricity supplier offers a discount if you are willing to allow the 
supplier to set the recharging hour for you on a daily basis. The supplier 
could set the recharging hour at 6 pm, 11 pm, or 3 am, and will notify you 
the selected. You can decide the discount that you are willing to accept for 
the supplier to set your recharging hour. 
However, the electricity supplier sets a random maximum value to be 
eligible for a discount. If you decide for a discount for letting the supplier 
schedule your recharging hour that is lower or equal to the supplier's 
threshold, you will get the discount. If you do not postpone the time of 
recharging or if you decided for a discount for letting the supplier 
schedule your recharging hour that is greater than the supplier's 
threshold, you will not get the discount and you will pay 100 points and 
save 10 points per day.   
If the supplier accepts your discount bid and postpones your recharging 
hour to 11 pm or 3 am, there will be a probability of an unplanned trip to 
occur before the car is charged. If an unplanned trip occurs, you will pay 
a taxi fee equal to 110 - X, where X is the discount you decided. Thus, your 
earning on the day will be zero, and you will loss the 10 points you could 
save by recharging at 6 pm. If an unplanned trip does not occur, you will 
get the amount X of discount you decide plus 10 points per recharging 
day.  
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The occurrence probability of an unplanned trip depends on the 
recharging hour (i.e., the later the recharging hour, the more likely an 
unplanned trip to occur). Every day, after your recharging hour is 
scheduled, the computer will assign to you a number that depends on the 
hour you are scheduled to charge. Then, the computer randomly draws a 
number between 0 and 100, and the unplanned trip will occur if this 
drawn number is lower than the number assigned to you.  
However, you will not know prior to your decision neither the hour 
scheduled by the supplier, nor the occurrence probability of an 
unplanned trip at 11 pm and at 3 am. The occurrence probability of an 
unplanned trip does not depend on the electricity supplier, on the size of 
your discount bid, or on the decisions of other participants.  
b) Only for the Treatment Group (Weekly Contract)  
There are 24 recharging days in total, and you will make 3 decisions on 
days 1, 9, 17 about the hour you begin to charge for 24 days, so that each 
decision will be effective for 8 days. Recharging the car at 6 pm costs 100 
points and thus, you will earn 110 - 100 = 10 points per day for making 
the decision. 
The electricity supplier offers a discount if you are willing to allow the 
supplier to set the recharging hour for you on a daily basis. The supplier 
could set the recharging hour at 6 pm, 11 pm, or 3 am, and will notify you 
the selected hour. You can decide the discount that you are willing to 
accept for the supplier to set your recharging hour.  
However, the electricity supplier sets a random maximum value to be 
eligible for a discount. If you decided for a discount for letting the supplier 
schedule your recharging hour that is lower than or equal to the 
supplier's threshold, you will get the discount for 8 consecutive days. If 
you do not postpone the time of recharging or if you decided for a 
discount for letting the supplier schedule your recharging hour that is 
greater than the supplier's threshold, you will not get the discount and 
you will pay 100 points per day for 8 consecutive days and save only 10 
points per day. 
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If the supplier accepts your discount bid and postpones your recharging 
hour to 11 pm or 3 am, there will be a probability of an unplanned trip to 
occur before the car is charged. If an unplanned trip occurs, you will pay 
a taxi fee equal to 110 - X, where X is the discount you decided. Thus, your 
earning on the day will be zero, and you will loss the 10 points you could 
save by recharging at 6 pm. If an unplanned trip does not occur, you will 
get the amount X of discount you decide plus 10 points per recharging 
day. 
The occurrence probability of an unplanned trip depends on the 
recharging hour (i.e., the later the recharging hour, the more likely an 
unplanned trip to occur). Every day, after your recharging hour is 
scheduled, the computer will assign to you a number that depends on the 
hour you are scheduled to charge. Then, the computer randomly draws a 
number between 0 and 100, and the unplanned trip will occur if this 
drawn number is lower than the number assigned to you.  
However, you will not know prior to your decision neither the hour 
scheduled by the supplier, nor the occurrence probability of an 
unplanned trip at 11 pm and at 3 am. The occurrence probability of an 
unplanned trip does not depend on the electricity supplier, on the size of 
your discount bid, or on the decisions of other participants. 
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Abstract 
This study investigates peer effect in risk-taking when observing the choices of 
peers does not convey new information and when there is no payoff 
commonality. We investigate whether individuals want to see the choices of 
others, if observing peers’ choices influences own choices and who (in terms of 
self-confidence and analytical ability) are being influenced by peers’ choices as 
well as the role the type of peer information plays on peer effects. We run a 
laboratory experiment tailoring peer information in five treatments. The result 
shows that most of the participants, 79 %, chose to see peers’ choices. We find 
peer effects in risk-taking in that about 28 % of the participants changed their 
intrinsic choices after observing the choices of peers. Overall of the 10 rounds of 
decisions, in about 12 % of the total decisions that the participants made, they 
changed their initial choices towards the observed peers’ choices every time they 
observed peers’ choices while about 21 % of the participants chose even not to 
see the choices of peers. Interestingly, about 79 % of the participants who were 
frequently influenced by peers’ choices were those who scored less than the 
mean score in the session in our math test and who were lacking self-confidence. 
The results reveal also that the type of peer information plays a significant role 
in peer effects. Thus, the use of peer effect in inducing individuals to choose one 
action or the other may depend largely on the analytical ability of the target 
population and on self-confidence that the individuals have on their analytical 
ability relatively to the analytical ability of the peer. 
Key words: Peer effect, risk-taking, peer type, analytical ability.   
JEL Classification:  C91. C92. D03.  D81. D83.  Q49 
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4.1. Introduction   
Individuals may change behavior and their choices when they observe the 
actions and choices of others (Bernheim and Exley, 2015; Festinger, 
1954). Some individuals need a reference for their action to reduce the 
distaste from not acting according to the established norm (Akerlof, 
1997; Jones, 1984). They may also adjust their behavior and choices to 
socialize with others and to avoid direct or indirect social sanctions 
(Akerlof, 1997; Kremer and Levy, 2008; Noussair and Tucker, 2005). 
Peers’ choices sometimes convey (perceived or real) new information 
about the choice alternatives that help individuals to update their beliefs 
(Bikhchandani et al., 1992; Ellison and Fudenberg, 1995; Eyster and 
Rabin, 2014). Joining others may also provide social utility and social 
learning (Bursztyn et al., 2014) and even may involve payoff 
complementarity (Fu, 2004; Hurkens and López, 2014). Lack of self-
confidence and low analytical ability in decision-making contribute also 
for people to seek reference for their decisions, to imitate the choices of 
others and to change behavior when they observe the choices and 
behavior of others (Eyster and Rabin, 2014; Offerman and Schotter, 
2009).  
Insights into the effects of peer information on choice and on behavior 
can be used to guide individuals to take one choice or another (Hoff and 
Stiglitz, 2016). The peer effects play significant and lasting role in 
societies political, socio-economic and demographic aspects (Akerlof, 
1997; Bardhan and Udry, 1999; Ellison and Fudenberg, 1995; Hoff and 
Stiglitz, 2016; Jones, 1984).54  
                                                          
54 Peer effects have been documented in various activities including labor 
productivity (Falk and Ichino, 2006; Jones, 1984), brand of products choice 
(Bearden and Etzel, 1982; Childers et al., 1992), recreational site choice 
(Olaussen, 2009; Stephen M. and Ditton, 1992), household energy consumption 
(Allcott, 2011; Schultz et al., 2007), public good contribution and donation 
(Bernheim and Exley, 2015; Chen et al., 2010; Zafar, 2011), financial investments 
(Bursztyn et al., 2014; Hong et al., 2005), criminal and unhealthy activities 
(Carrell et al., 2008; Clark and Lohéac, 2007; Duncan et al., 2005; Gaviria and 
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This study aims to shed light on whether and how peer effect may be used 
for policy-making in areas involving uncertainty in general and, in 
particular, about smooth integration of electric vehicles (EVs) in to the 
grid system. Sensitivity of the driving range of BEVs to the driving 
environment55 and the long recharging time of the relatively affordable 
BEVs induce uncertainty and anxiety about whether the available battery 
power is enough to cover both foreseen and unforeseen trips. This driving 
range uncertainty, added with the low price elasticity of fuel demand (Lin 
and Prince, 2013), may make discount recharging tariffs for postponing 
recharging towards off-peak electricity consumption hours less 
attractive. This will have alarming effect on the electricity grid system by 
increasing grid overload that could result in inefficiency and pollution, 
since peak electricity consumption hours usually coincide with the 
default recharging time. By providing for the current BEV users attractive 
incentives and tips that helps to reduce the psychological barrier of 
postponing recharging and then, by sharing the charging experience and 
cost of these customers to upcoming customers, electricity suppliers may 
induce smart integration of BEVs. For example, BEV users may consider 
postponing recharging if they find that they are paying higher cost than 
their peers while having similar BEV and not driving longer daily trips 
than their peers. Of course, the contract should not affect mobility; it 
should rather aim at reducing the psychological driving range anxiety. 
However, it is important to investigate how pervasive is the peer effect, 
who in terms of behavior are influenced by peers and how to present 
peers’ choices that this study aims at giving insight.   
We design a laboratory experiment mimicking the real-world situation 
where BEV users may tradeoff between the cost saving from postponing 
recharging towards off-peak electricity consumption hours, assumed to 
                                                          
Raphael, 2001), in transport (Arentze and Timmermans, 2008; Axhausen, 2008; 
Belgiawan et al., 2013; Den Braven et al., 2012; Dugundji et al., 2008; Ettema et 
al., 2011; Kim et al., 2014), on strategic games (Georg, 2008) and so on.  
55 Fetene et al. (2016) find as large as 65 % of BEV energy consumption difference 
between summer and winter.  
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be between 21:00 and 6:00, and the risk of the current battery power not 
being enough for unforeseen trip occurrence. We asked participants to 
choose the amount of kilometers to buy electricity for BEV recharging for 
unforeseen trips. The distance of the unforeseen trip, D, that they were 
informed to occur before 21:00 was assumed to be uniformly distributed 
between 0 and 60 km. The participants were informed that the electricity 
tariff that is needed to drive one km distance costs 10 cents for recharging 
the BEV before 21:00 and costs zero after 21:00. On the other hand, not 
buying enough electricity costs 15 cents for using taxi for each unit of 
travel distance that the amount of electricity they chose to buy falls short 
of D. They were informed to assume that the battery power currently 
available in the BEV is enough only for planned trips. Thus, recharging 
both less and more than the amount required to cover the posterior travel 
distance is costly. (The detailed instruction provided to the participants 
can be referred in Experimental Instructions).  
The standard economic theory prediction in this case is that individuals 
will make choices according to their risk preference without being 
influenced by peers’ choices. This is so because observing peers’ choices 
does not convey new information as the electricity tariff and the 
distribution of the unforeseen trip distance are common knowledge. 
Recent field and laboratory studies find, however, that the choices of 
individuals are affected by peers’ choices even when the peers’ choices do 
not convey new information and when there is no payoff commonality 
(see, e.g., Cooper and Rege, 2011; Chung et al., 2015; Gioia, 2016). The 
desire for reducing social regret in case individuals earn lower posterior 
payoffs than the peers’ earnings (Cooper and Rege, 2011), relative income 
concern and conformity preference (Lahno and Serra-Garcia, 2015) are 
attributed for the observed peer effects.  
We start by first asking an open question in the literature about whether 
individuals choose to see the choices of others at all. Two counteracting 
explanations could be provided for (not) choosing to see the choices of 
others. On the one hand, some may choose to see peers’ choices to have a 
reference against which they can evaluate their choices and they could 
correct any errors they may have done. Others may not know the best 
choice for themselves in that they seek the choices of others to make 
better choices. On the other hand, individuals with strong intrinsic 
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preference and having self-confidence on their choices may not choose to 
see peers’ choices to avoid the distaste in cases if they become unlucky 
while the peers with perceived inferior choice may become lucky. Other 
individuals may consider peers’ choice information as spam since seeing 
the choices of others does not convey new information. Provision of 
peers’ choice information without asking for their consent may annoy the 
latter types of individuals, and it may even result in boomerang effect 
when the peers information is shared between individuals with different 
social status, e.g., income (Beshears et al., 2015). Thus, asking for 
individuals consent whether they want to receive peers’ choice 
information could be better than providing the information without 
asking for their consent.  
We next examine whether those who choose to see peers’ choices actually 
use the peer information to revise their intrinsic choices, i.e., if the peer 
effect exists. The important question here is how large the percentage of 
individuals is using the peer information, which may help to examine how 
prevalent is the pure peer effect to worthy consideration in wide policy-
making and which is usually overlooked in the literature. Related to this, 
we investigate whether the analytical ability for the problem at hand and 
self-confidence are attributed for peer effect.  
We then investigate whether and to what extent (with reference to 
intrinsic choice) individuals adjust their intrinsic choices towards the 
choice of others. For example, how individuals do react to two levels of 
peer information that vary in magnitude with reference to their intrinsic 
choices? That is, do they continuously adjust their choice towards the 
choices of peers if own intrinsic choices differ from that of peers’ or is 
there a threshold level beyond which peer effects declines or even 
disappear perhaps because they are viewed as too costly to conform or as 
‘noise’? Knowing the extent individuals adjust their choices towards the 
choices of peers is relevant to be selective to the types of peers’ choices 
information to provide to individuals to direct their choices and behavior.   
To investigate this, we conducted two treatments. In the first treatment, 
called the Nonrandom-peer treatment, the most risk-averse and the most 
risk-seeker (with reference to the median choice) received each other’s 
choice, the second most risk-averse and the second most risk-seeker 
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received each other’s choice, etc. until the last two individuals with the 
closest choices from each side of the median choice were shown each 
other’s choice. In the second treatment, called the Population-as-a-peer 
treatment, each participant received the mean of the choices of all 
participants excluding own choice. However, the mean choice was 
presented as if it is a choice of a randomly matched peer. If individuals 
imitate peers’ choices, then the Population-as-a-peer treatment results in 
strong peer effect and the sample choices will have lower diversion (or 
even zero standard deviation in the case of complete imitation) than the 
Nonrandom-peer treatment, which results in a mere exchange of choices 
between paired participants. The implication would be that the choices of 
individuals can be diverted towards the intended outcome by selectively 
providing peers’ choices that is equivalent to the target level of choice. On 
the other hand, if individuals only partially and monotonically reduce 
their choice difference from the peers’ choice, then the Nonrandom-peer 
treatment may result in a stronger peer effect than the other treatment. 
We also conducted a third treatment, called the Two-peer treatment, 
which is similar to the Nonrandom-peer treatment except participants in 
the Two-peer treatment received the choices of two peers instead of a 
peer. We expect a higher peer effect in the Two-peer treatment than in the 
Nonrandom-peer treatment since seeing the choices of two peers may 
induce more participants who are around the margin in terms of self-
confidence when they observe the choice of a peer.  
Finally, we investigate if the types of peers play a role in peer effect. For 
this, we conduct a fourth treatment, called the Population treatment, in 
that participants received the same information as the participants in the 
Population-as-a-peer treatment, but by framing differently as ‘the mean 
choice of all participants excluding your choice’. The difference between 
the two treatments is only the framing of the peer information either as 
‘the mean choice of all participants’ or ‘the choice of a peer’. Thus, any 
difference between the two treatments is attributed to whether 
participants valued the ‘population representative’ and ‘a peer’ 
information differently. For example, while individuals lacking self-
confidence will be almost equally influenced by the two types of peer 
choice information, individual with marginally higher self-confidence 
than those influenced by peers’ choices may be influenced more by the 
average choice of all participants than by a peers’ choice.  
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The last treatment we have is a Random-peer treatment in that we match 
participants randomly. This treatment helps to examine whether 
tailoring of the peer information instead of matching randomly plays a 
role in the peer effect. Finally, we have a control group who made 
decisions without receiving peer information that we use it to investigate 
the overall peer effect. We run the experiment with 215 participants, and 
each participant made 10 rounds of decisions of the same type. 
We find that about 79 % of the participants chose to see others’ choices, 
where the figure drops to 58 % in the fourth round. In terms of using the 
peer information, about 28 % of the participants changed their intrinsic 
choices in the first round after observing the choices of peers, where the 
percentage drops to the lowest, 6.4 %, in the seventh round and to about 
12 % overall. Interestingly, most of the participants, 79 %, who 
persistently changed their initial choices whenever observing peers’ 
choices were among participants who scored less than the median score 
of the participants. Looking at the factors that may induce the peer effects, 
we find a statistically significant inverse effect of level of education, 
analytical ability, self-confidence and experience. Thus, though the peer 
effect exists, it affects a moderate percentage of individuals who lack self-
confidence and/or with relatively lower ability, implying that social 
learning is the main reason for peer effect. 
The peer effect observed in 12 % of the decisions increased the overall 
risk-taking by more than 1.6 units on average and reduced the overall 
standard deviation by about one unit when compared with the control 
group participants who did not observe peers’ choices. While 51 % of the 
participants increased risk-taking by, on average, 10 units, about 49 % of 
the participants reduced risk-taking by, on average, 12.3 units after 
observing peers’ choice. We find limited imitation, only about 10 % of the 
overall 12 % peer effects that we observed and was mostly by 
participants with relatively lower math scores (88.9 %) or by participants 
lacking self-confidence (72.2 %). In the remaining 90 % of the revisions 
that the participants made after seeing peers’ choices, they traded off 
between their intrinsic choices and conforming the choice of the peers, 
and they reduced each unit own choice difference from the peer’s choice 
by about 0.65 units, on average. A random effects Poisson regression 
shows that the peer’s choice difference from the intrinsic choice has a 
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non-linear effect on the amount of intrinsic choice that participants 
substitute for conforming the peers’ choice.  
Concerning the type of peer information role in peer effects, we find a 
higher mean risk-taking (in the direction of the risk-neutral choice) in the 
Population treatment than in the Population-as-a-peer treatment. The 
choices by the participants in the Population treatment is statistically 
different from that of the control group while we do not find a statistically 
significant difference between the choices by Population-as-a-peer 
treatment and by the control group. This may indicate that providing the 
choices of well-trusted peers plays a significant peer effect even though 
the choices of peers do not convey new information. We also find a clear 
difference between the Nonrandom-peer treatment and the Population-
as-a-peer treatment. Risk-taking was higher and the diversion within the 
treatment was lower in the Nonrandom-peer treatment than in the 
population-as-a-peer treatment.  
Organization of the remaining sections of the paper is as follows. Section 
4.2 presents a brief review of the related literature. A simple theoretical 
model of analytical under risk in the presence of the choices of peers is 
presented in section 4.3 to substantiate the experiment and to better 
understand the peer effects when peer information does not convey new 
information and nor there is any means of the choices of peers having 
effect on the outcome of the decision-maker. Section 4.4 presents the 
experimental design.  The results from the study are presented in section 
4.5 while section 4.6 concludes the paper along with discussion of the 
results. 
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4.2. Related literature  
Our paper contributes most directly to previous studies about peer effect 
in general and, in particular, to studies about peer effect in risk-taking 
when there is no social utility and when accessibility of the choices of 
peers does not convey new information related to the decision-making 
problem. There have been emerging studies from controlled laboratory, 
field and neuroscience experiments that mainly focus on disentangling 
the causes for peer effects in risky decisions in the presence of complete 
information in the sense that the peer choice information does not convey 
new information.  
Gioia (2016) investigated the role group identity plays on peer effect in 
risk-taking when there is no payoff commonality and when peers’ choice 
does not convey new information. By matching participants in groups of 
three through different matching protocols (randomly, allowing 
interaction by exchanging text messages and based on their painting 
preference), she find that participants took risker (safer) decisions when 
both of the two peers in the group made riskier (safer) decisions. She also 
finds that observing the choice of a peer with similar identity, painting 
preference, increases the magnitude of the peer effects.   
Using neuroscience controlled laboratory experiment, functional 
neuroimaging, participants chose between paired lotteries after 
observing the choices of two peers, Chung et al. (2015) find that 
participants chose safer (risker) lotteries when both of the peers in the 
group chose safer (risker) lotteries, but not when the choices of the two 
peers were mixed (one risker and one safer). They also find that the peer 
effects diminish as the difference between risk-taking preferences of the 
pairs gets larger. That is, risk-averse (risk-seeking) individuals conform 
more of risk-averse (risk-seeking) peers than they do to a risk-seeking 
(risk-averse) peers.  
Similarly, Lahno and Serra-Garcia (2015) find peer effects in risk-taking 
using controlled laboratory experiment in a panel of repeated lottery 
choices where they disentangle the peer effects as relative payoff concern 
(envy) and conformity preference. In one of their treatments, the 
‘Random treatment’, the participants were informed that the peers 
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choices were randomly assigned and in other treatment, the ‘Choice 
treatment’, the peers chose the lottery. They find about 15 % more 
switches between two lotteries towards the choices of peers in the 
‘Choice treatment’ than in the ‘Random treatment’. This result is 
comparable with our result in that we find peer influences in the 12 % of 
the decisions that participants made. They also find that imitation is more 
frequent in the direction of safer options. Unlike other related studies, the 
payoffs of the participants in the Lahno and Serra-Garcia (2015) study 
were correlated in that a single random draw determined the payoffs of 
both the observer and the peer.   
Similarly, in a series of lottery choices under risk and ambiguity, Cooper 
and Rege (2011) find that the likelihood of switching gambles towards 
the group members’ choices increased by 15 % when the lagged choice of 
the majority of the (six) group members’ disagreed with the individual’s 
lagged choice. They attribute the causes for the peer effects as the ‘social 
regret’ preference in that the regret of losing being less intense when 
being one of the losers than when being the only loser inducing 
participants to follow the group choice.  
Bougheas et al. (2013) find a lower variability among decisions taken by 
participants who consulted each other of the three group members they 
were randomly assigned to when compared with the decisions taken in 
isolation. They do not, however, find average risk-taking difference 
between the treated and the untreated groups of participants. Another 
interesting result they find is that average risk-taking was higher with the 
mentioning of the expected value during the group discussion in one of 
the treatments where participants within a group had to make identical 
decision with payoff commonality, which could give clue about the type 
of individuals having influence in group decision-making.  
Another notable example is a field experiment by Bursztyn et al. (2014) 
involving a large stake investment in a risky asset in that they disentangle 
the peer effect in to social learning (i.e., learning from others about the 
products’ quality) and social utility (i.e., ‘joint consumption’ of the 
product, e.g., chatting about the asset together). In one treatment that 
they used to disentangle the social learning effect from the social utility 
effect, participants were informed that a family member or a friend was 
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interested in investing on the asset but did not succeed in getting the 
chance to invest in, which signals the quality of the assets. In the other 
treatment, participants were informed that their family member or friend 
interested in and invested on the asset. They compared the results from 
the two treatments and with the control group treatment who were not 
informed about peers’ choices to disentangle the learning effect from the 
social utility effect. Another interesting result they find, which is 
consistent with our result, is that social learning had a statistically 
significant influence only among financially unsophisticated participants.          
Our study differs from and complements the above mentioned and other 
related studies in peer effect in risk-taking. Firstly, instead of providing 
the peer information without asking the participants’ consent that 
previous studies did, we asked 68 % of the participants in the treatments 
to make choices about whether they wanted to see peers’ choices and, we 
investigate the factors that influence the probability of wanting to see the 
choices of others. Secondly, we examine the extent that individuals adjust 
their intrinsic choices to reduce their choice gap from the peers’ choices. 
Thirdly, we investigate whether lack of self-confidence relative to the 
peer in decision-making and analytical ability are the behavioral reasons 
for the peer effect. Finally, by introducing different types of peers’ choice 
information through matching protocols (randomly, based on risk-
preference and framing), we investigate the role the peer type plays on in 
peer effects.  
The results from this study may give insights about whether and to whom 
to provide peer information and whether to be selective to the type of 
peer information to provide to the various categories of the society in 
investment, new technology adoption, in various contracts including in 
BEV recharging and de-charging and health-promotion behavior.  
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4.3. Theoretical Framework  
In this section, we propose a simple model about how individuals may 
update their intrinsic choices towards the choices of others depending on 
their self-confidence and on their social interaction preference. Our 
model follows standard models in conformity preference and the peer 
effects in general by Bernheim (1994), Hoff and Stiglitz (2016) and by 
Jones (1984).  
Consider a set of N individuals having heterogeneous risk preference and 
facing similar decision-making problem that involves uncertainty. 
Everyone chooses a normal good consumption x from a compact set of X 
to maximize utility. (In the context of our experiment, x denotes the 
amount of kilometers the participant buys electricity for and the utility 
could be the direct and the derived-utility from travelling (Anas, 2007)).  
Consider a utility function that allows ordering individuals according to 
their degree of risk preference based on their intrinsic choice, for example 
a power utility function. Let the intrinsic utility maximizing value of x be 
denoted by r1, r2, …, rn, rn+1, …, rN in ascending order of risk preference, 
where rn is the choice by a risk neutral individual, ri > rn for i = 1, 2, …, n-1 
are the choices of risk-averse individuals and rj < rn for j = n+1, n+2, …, N 
are the choices of risk-seeking individuals. Here the ‘r’s represent both 
type of individuals in terms of risk preference and their intrinsic utility-
maximizing values of x. Thus, the ri’s are the Intrinsic Blissing Points 
(IBP)56 that are based on intrinsic preference and that maximize utility in 
the absence of peer choice information. Accordingly, any value of x that 
differs from ri decreases the intrinsic utility of individual i. This 
preference is presented in a value function given by57  
                                                          
56 The term IBP is from (Bernheim, 1994). 
57 This formulation is similar to the one given by Bernheim (1994) except we 
categorize individuals in terms of risk-preference instead of by esteem (social status). 
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    ig x g rx    (4.1)  
where g(x) is assumed to be twice differentiable, concave, symmetry with 
reference to x = ri and achieves a maximum at x=ri (the IBP).  
Now let’s examine how the intrinsic choices of individuals are influenced 
by observing the choice, sj, of a peer type of j. Observing sj may induce the 
individual to compare own choice with the choice of the peer for reasons 
such as social interaction effect (Cooper and Rege, 2011) and lack of self-
confidence in decision-making (Bénabou and Tirole, 2002). The taste of 
conformity is summarized by a value function,  
    ij jR x R x , is j     (4.2) 
where R(x) is assumed to be twice differentiable, concave and symmetric 
with reference to x = si and achieves a maximum at x=si (the Social Blissing 
Point, SBP), sj is the observed choice of others and the parameter 0 ≤ βij 
≤1 is the relative weight that individual i attaches to the taste of 
conformity to peer information of type j (Zafar, 2011).  
Given the intrinsic and conformity preferences, the individual chooses x 
to maximize total indirect utility given by   
  j
X
i
x
V xma ,rx ,s

   
where  
     i i i i ij jjV x,r ,s  g x , j ir R x s       (4.3) 
Where λi, 0 ≤ λi ≤ 1, is the measure of how well-formed is the intrinsic 
preference, i.e., self-confidence in decision-making when the individual 
evaluates won choice relative to the choice of others.  
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Equation (4.3) states that the amount of intrinsic choice the individual is 
willing to give up to adjust his/her choice towards peer j’s choice depends 
on the strength of intrinsic preference mechanism relative to conformity 
preference (Jones, 1984), βij, on the individual’s self-confidence relative 
to the confidence s/he has on the decision-making ability of others 
(Offerman and Schotter, 2009), λi, on the type of the peer such as a 
stranger, a relative, a random person, or a representative of the 
community j (Zafar, 2011), and on the magnitude of the difference 
between ri and sj. V(.) attains its maximum value at V(0), i.e., when ri = sj, 
which is consistent with previous studies, e.g., by (Akerlof, 1997).  
If we assume βij and λi are exogenous, then the utility-maximizing choices 
would then be characterized by the following first order condition: 
   i i ij jg' x r R 0' x s     .  (4.4) 
Therefore, the optimal consumption amount is a function of ri, sj, βij and λ: 
  *0i i j ij ix h r , s , ,    (4.5) 
where x0i* is the solution for equation (4.4), i.e., the reaction function of 
individual i as a function of the peer’s choice, sj.     
The first order condition for indirect utility maximization intuitively 
states that the total utility is maximized when the consumer chooses x in 
such a way that the marginal disutility from choosing a different value 
than the IBP, x =ri, equals the marginal utility from conformity.  
The indirect utility maximization problem is also depicted in Figure 4.3.1, 
where i observes the choices of j. The indifference contours are circular 
and symmetric with respect to the blissing point at x = ri, point A, for 
intrinsic preference and at x = rj, point B, for conformity preference. The 
intrinsic preference maximizing value is *ix ; whereas, the social 
preference maximizing value is 
*
js , and thus, the individual trades-off 
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between *ix  and 
*
js  to maximize the joint preference. The dotted line AB  
depicts the utility-maximizing path, given in equation (4.5). It connects 
the IBP and the SBP along which the indifference curves from the two 
types of preferences are tangent of each other. The joint utility-
maximizing value can be at any point on the AB  depending on the values 
of i j ij i anr , s , d   . 
 
 
Figure 4.3.1. Utility maximization problem under conformity preference. 
Our primary interest in this framework is on the effect of the type and 
magnitude of the absolute difference between the social choice and the 
intrinsic choice, i jr s , on the mount of intrinsic maximizing value that 
individuals substitute for conformity.  
Applying the implicitly theorem on (4.4), we have     
 
 
Point ‘A´ denotes IBP 
when 
 βij → 0 
λi →1 
 
Point ‘B´ denotes SBP when 
βij →1  
λi→ 0 
 
Choice 
(x)  
 
 
. . 
 
 
 
 
. 
. 
sj* xi*= ri 
A
j 
B 
Utility 
Utility 
maximizing path 
depending on λi 
& βij 
 166 
 
 
 
   
ij j
i i ij jj
R'' x s
g'
dx
0
ds ' x r R'' x s

 
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  
   
 (4.6) 
Note that, 
j
dx
ds
> 0 implies that individual i does not make identical choice 
when separately observing two distinct choices of a peer. In extreme 
cases, 
j
dx
ds
= 0 for homo-economicus individuals and 
j
dx
ds
= 1 for 
imitators, for example, for individuals with λ =0. For intermediate 
solutions, the following propositions are in order. 
Proposition 1: Suppose that βij and λi are exogenous as we assumed so far58 
and that 1i 2s   r s  , where s1 and s2 are peer information of the same 
peer type. Let x0i*, x1i* and x2i* respectively be the indirect utility maximizing 
                                                          
58 The assumption that βij and λi are exogenously determined that we assume for 
simplicity is a restrictive assumption that may not hold always. For example, Akerlof 
(1997) shown that there is an inverted U-shaped relation between confirming peers’ choice and 
the amount of choice intrinsic choice difference from peers’ choice. Using a modified version 
of the gravitational model of motion, Akerlof (1997) show using three individuals that when 
two of the persons position initially fairly close to each other and if the value of social exchange 
is sufficiently high relative to the value of the intrinsic choice, then there will be a stable 
solution in the short run where individuals changing positions. However, either of them will 
not be affected by a third individual positioning at far distance when the social preference 
relative to the intrinsic preference is weak and when their choice is initially far from the optimal 
value. In this case, βij and λi are endogenous and the predictions of our model may not 
apply.  
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values without peer information, with observing s1 and with observing s2. 
Then,
0i 1i 2i
* * *x   x   x    . Similarly, if 1i 2s   r s  , then 
0i 1i 2i
* * *x   x   x    .  
Proof: When s1 is observable,    i i ij 1g' x r R 0' x s      at x= x0i* = ri 
< s1 since g’(y) = 0, but  1R' x 0s   
1i
*x : x x    . This implies that the 
utility-maximizing value of x is greater than x0i* when s1 is observable. Thus, 
0 i 1i
* *x   x . Similarly when s2> s1 is observable, 
   i i ij 1g' x r R 0' x s      at x = x1i* since g’(y) = 0, but
 1R' x 0s   
2i
*x : x x    , implying that 
1i 2 i
* * x  x . The proof for
1i 2s   r s    follows similar procedure.    
Accordingly, the higher is the difference between the intrinsic choice and 
the observed peers’ choice, the higher will be the amount of intrinsic 
choice to give up for conformity. The implication of Proposition 1 is that  
 
 i i
i j
d r x
0,i j
d r s

 

  (4.7). 
The result is intuitive. Provided that individuals obtain positive utility 
from confirming peers’ choices, an increase in the choice gap from the 
peers’ choice should not decrease the amount of intrinsic choice 
individuals substitute for conformity preference.  
Proposition 2: Consider a set of individuals arranged in ascending order of 
their intrinsic choice as in r1, r2, …, rn, rn+1, …, rN, where rn is the median 
choice, under the following two scenarios. Scenario (I) Individuals with 
choices: r1 and rN, r2 and rN-1, …, rn-1 and rn+1 receive each other’ choice and 
the individual with the median choice receives a confirmation of own choice. 
Scenario (II) each individual receive the median choice, rn. Then, 
a) Under imitation, peer information in Scenario II results in a mere 
change of location in terms of choice distance between matched 
 168 
 
individuals without affecting the central tendency and the 
diversion of the sample choice. Whereas, peer information in 
Scenario I substantially reduces the diversion in risk-taking.  
b) Suppose that there is no imitation of peers’ choice but adjustment 
of choice towards peer’s choice, that the reaction function given in 
(4.5) is linear59 and that the intrinsic choices are fairly symmetric 
with respect to the median. Then, there is a threshold value in the 
amount of intrinsic choices that an individual gives up to adjust 
their choices towards the peers’ choice such that peer information 
in Scenario I reduces the dispersion of the sample more than peer 
information in Scenario II does.  
Proof. Suppose that individual i receives either the median choice, rn, or a 
peer’s choice, sj, but not both. Assume for simplicity that the choices ri and sj 
are symmetric with respect to the median choice as shown in Figure 4.3.2. 
If all individuals are imitators, then exchange of peer choice information 
between individual i and individual j merely changes the location in terms 
of choice distance of individuals in that individual i adapts the choice of 
individual j and vice versa without affecting the distribution and the central 
tendency of the choice. This concludes the proof for scenario part (a). 
 
Considering (b), the assumption that choices are symmetric with respect to 
the median choice implies that the choice distance from ri to sj is twice the 
choice distance from ri to rn under Scenario II. Let y = |ri - rn| = |rn -sj| and 
                                                          
59 Bernheim (1994) and Jones (1984) also used linear reaction functions.  
ri sj rn 
Figure 4.3.2. Median versus preference based peer choice information 
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let α, 0≤ α≤1, be the proportion of y that the individual chooses to reduce 
his/her choice gab from rn, where α = 0 implies no peer effect and α=1 
implies imitation. The assumption that the reaction function is linear 
implies that if (αy) is the amount of the intrinsic choice the individual gives 
up for getting closer to rn, then (2αy) will be the amount to give up when the 
individual receives sj. What we want now to show is that there is a value of 
‘α’ such that provision of sj is better than provision of rn in terms of inducing 
individual i to choose a value that is closer to rn. Thus, providing sj is better 
than providing rn in terms of inducing choices towards rn if and only if: 
2
2 y y y y             
3
       . 
 Generally, for
i i
i n
r s
r r




and a linear reaction function, the sample 
diversion from providing sj is smaller than from providing rn if 
2
y y y y             
1
  

    

    
Thus, if individuals reduce each unit of their intrinsic choice differences 
from the peers’ choices by 
2
1




, then the sample diversion under 
the Nonrandom-peer treatment is lower than under the Population-as-
a-peer treatment.  
The model provides the following testable hypotheses that we tested 
using laboratory experiment. 
Hypothesis 1: The magnitude of intrinsic change in the Nonrandom-peer 
treatment is higher than that of the Population-as-a-peer treatment since 
|ri - si| is higher in the former treatment. This follows from Proposition 1.  
Hypothesis 2: The sample diversion under the Nonrandom-peer 
treatment is lower than under the Population-as-a-peer treatment if 
imitation is infrequent in the treatments. This follows from Preposition 2. 
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 Hypothesis 3: The peer effect is stronger for individuals lacking self-
confidence than for those having more confidence, both relative to the 
median individual in terms of confidence. This follows from the 
magnitude of λi. 
4.4. The Experimental Design 
4.4.1. The Decision-Making Problem  
The decision-making problem of the participants involved choosing the 
amount of kilometers to buy electricity for unforeseen trips. They buy the 
electricity for recharging BEVs. They were informed that electricity is 
time-of-use priced such that the amount that enables to drive one km 
costs 10 cents and zero cents respectively for charging the car during 6:00 
to 21:00 and during 21:00 to 6:00. Thus, it is always cheaper to charging 
the car between 21:00 and 6:00 unless the amount charged during this 
period is not enough to cover the daily trips. They were informed to 
assume that the car has enough battery power to drive to just planned 
trips they have today until 21:00. However, unforeseen trips may occur 
before 21:00 for that they had to buy electricity for. Not buying enough 
electricity costs 15 cents for each unit of travel distance that the amount 
of electricity they chose to buy falls short of the posterior trip distance. 
Thus, recharging both less and more than the amount required to cover 
the posterior travel distance was costly. However, the actual distance of 
the unforeseen trips was unknown at the time of decision and, thus, the 
decision-making problem involved uncertainty. In particular, they were 
informed that the unforeseen trip distance, D, is uniformly distributed 
with support (0, 60) km.  
Then, the decision-making problem of the participants was to choose the 
amount of electricity to buy, denoted by x, to minimize the expected cost 
given by  
          
electricity cost
cost of insufficient purchase implicit cost of excess purchase
c x   10 x 15 D x Pr D x 10 x D Pr D x        
 (4.8) 
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Given that  D U 0,60  so that  
x
Pr D x
60
  and E(D) = 30, the 
expected cost, E [c(x)], is given by 
  2
35 5
E c x  450 x x
2 12
       (4.9) 
This is a U-shaped, convex function with a minimum at x =21. 
Considering the endowment the participants were given to earn cash 
money after paying for the cost in (4.9), a risk-neutral individual chooses 
x to maximize   
235 25Earning  Endowment-450 x x
2 60
     (4.10) 
The endowment amount was 1300 cents for each round, which implies 
that s/he chooses xn* = 21 with the corresponding expected cost of 
266.25; whereas, risk-averse and risk-seeking individuals respectively 
choose x* > 21  and x* < 21.  
4.4.2. The Procedure 
The experiment was conducted from 06 to 18 May 2016 at the Laboratory 
for Experimental Economics (LEE) at the Department of Economics, 
University of Copenhagen using the zTree software package 
(Fischbacher, 2007). A total of 215 students (87.4 %) and non-students 
(12.6%) recruited from the LEE registered panel participated in 11 
sessions. The mean age of participants was 25 years (minimum 19, 
maximum 36) and 48.5 % of them were male.  
Upon arriving at the LEE site, participants were briefed about the general 
procedures in the laboratory and they were randomly assigned using 
cards into computers. Instructions of the experiment were provided to 
participants in printed papers and also were displayed on computer 
screens. Each session lasted between 45 minutes and 75 minutes. To 
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make sure that the participants understood the decision-making problem 
correctly, we asked each of them to answer four control questions, and 
the laboratory assistants briefed those who sought help answering the 
questions. 
After correctly answering the mandatory control questions, participants 
started the main experiment that lasted 10 rounds. The basic 
experimental setting was identical for all participants, except the type of 
peer information presented to participants in the treatments. 
Participants had to always perform the same task: to choose the amount 
of km to buy electricity for unforeseen trip that is uniformly distributed 
between 0 and 60 km, inclusive. They received 1300 cents for each round 
of decision to save for themselves after paying 10 cents for each km they 
bought electricity for and 15 cents for each distance unit that the amount 
of km they chose to buy electricity for falls short of posterior unplanned 
trip distance. To determine the actual cost participants had to pay at each 
round, traveling distance of unforeseen trips, D, was drawn randomly 
from a uniform distribution with support (0, 60) independent of the 
previous rounds and independent of each other of the participants.  
All participants were allowed to see the outcomes of their immediate 
choices as well as the outcomes of all previous rounds of decisions in a 
table that showed the amount they chose, the realized outcome of 
distance, the cost they paid for traveling and the corresponding earnings. 
In addition to that, they received non-informative information 
mentioning whether the amount they chose is lower or higher than the 
realized outcome. However, they did not observe the outcomes of other 
participants.  
At the end of the experiment, participants completed a short 
questionnaire. After which, we called them individually based on their 
computer number and received their earning plus a show up fee of 50 
Danish kroner in another room.  On average, participants earned 140 
Danish kroner.    
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4.4.3. The Treatments  
The primary goal of our experimental design was to investigate if 
tailoring the peer choice information plays a role in peer effect. The 
experiment consisted of five treatments and a control group. Each 
participant remained in the same treatment throughout the 10 rounds of 
decisions and each of them participated only in one treatment. The 
experiment consisted of two main stages. In the first stage that lasted 10 
rounds of decisions and is the actual research phase, participants made 
choices and received the choices of peers if they were eligible and were 
willing to receive peers’ choices as discussed below. In the second stage, 
participants’ relative self-confidence and analytical ability was 
determined according to math tests that we asked participants and that 
we found from the internet.    
Stage 1: All participants in the treatment group had to first make their 
choice before receiving the choices of peers. While making their decision, 
participants in all treatments were not sure if they were to get peer choice 
information since they were informed that there is 5 % chance that they 
may not get peer choice information. We did this to induce participants 
to consider their initial choice as the final decision. After they decided the 
amount to buy and confirmed it, a random number from a uniform 
distribution was drawn in each of the 10 rounds of decisions 
independently for each participant and across rounds of decisions to 
determine if the participant was to receive peer choice information. 
Participants with assigned random numbers greater than or equal to 0.05 
were eligible to receive one of the peer choice information.  
Instead of providing the peers’ choices without asking for their consent 
like previous studies did, we asked 68 % of the participants in the first 
two and in the last two rounds of decisions to choose whether they would 
like to see peers’ choices. For the remaining 32 % of the participants and 
for the 68 % of the participants from rounds three to round eight, we 
provided the peer information without asking for their consent to 
investigate if making the peer choice information available as default 
option makes a difference on peer effect when compared with 
participants who receive peer information by choice. However, as shown 
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in Table 4.5.3, we do not find a statistically significant difference (p-value 
= 0.343) between the two treatments.  
Concerning individual treatments, the Population treatment and the 
Population-as-a-peer treatment were conducted in similar sessions by 
grouping at random the participants in to the two treatments with equal 
size. Then, each of eligible participants (i.e., those who chose to see and 
were drawn to see peer choice information) received the mean of the 
choices of all participants in the same session, excluding the participant’s 
own choice. The only difference between the two treatments is the 
framing of the peer information either as ‘the mean of the choices of all 
participants excluding your choice’ or ‘the choice of a peer’. An exception 
is the provision of the 25th and 75th percentiles and the standard deviation 
of the choices in one of the three sessions to the Population treatment, but 
such information did not affect results in that we merged the data. Thus, 
any difference between the two treatments is attributed to whether 
participants valued the ‘population representative’ and ‘a peer’ 
information differently. 
In the Nonrandom-peer treatment, we first ranked participants using 
their intrinsic choice that the made before knowing whether they would 
receive the choices of others. Then, each eligible participant received the 
choice of a peer in such a way that the most risk-averse (with respect to 
the median choice) and the most risk-seeking participants received each 
other’s choices, the second most risk-averse and the second most risk-
seeking participants received each other’s choices, etc. until the last two 
participants with the closest choices to the median choice received each 
other’s choice60. This matching was conducted throughout the 10 rounds 
                                                          
60 Note that we labeled an individual as risk-averse or as risk-seeker based on 
his/her choice relative to the median choice, and thus, the labeling may not 
reflect the general risk preferences of the participants. 
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of decision in that each participant might not receive the choices of the 
same person throughout the 10 rounds of decisions.  
The Two-peer treatment is like the Nonrandom-peer treatment except 
participants in the former treatment received the choices of two peers 
such that the most risk-averse individual received the choices of the two 
most risk-seeking peers, and a risk-seeing individual received the choices 
of the most two risk-averse peers, etc.  
In the Random-peer treatment, participants were matched randomly in to 
groups of two, and each participant remained in the same group 
throughout the 10 rounds of decision. This treatment is included to 
investigate whether tailoring the peer information makes a difference on 
the peer effect when compared with random matching.  
Finally, we have a Control group who made decisions without receiving 
peer information that we use it to investigate the overall peer effect. A 
summary of treatments is presented in Table 4.  
Table 4. A summary of treatments 
Treatments  Provided peer information type  No. of 
sessions  
No. of 
participants 
Control group No peer info 2 39 
Population  Mean of choice the session (and S.D., 
25th and 75th percentiles of the 
sessions) 
3 27 
Population-as-
a-peer 
Mean of choice the session   27 
Nonrandom 
peer 
Choice based on a risk preference   2 50 
Random peer A randomly chosen peer choice 2 22 
Two-peer The choices of two peers that are 
selected based on risk preference   
2 50 
Total  11 215 
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Stage 2: The purpose of this stage was to determine the relative 
confidence and analytical ability (in terms of math test scores) of 
participants so as to investigate if these attributes contribute for the peer 
effects. We followed a similar experimental design used by Falk et al. 
(2006)61 to examine the relative analytical ability and self-confidence of 
participants. After the first stage is completed, we asked participants in 
the treatments to answer eight math questions, which we found in the 
internet. They were allowed to use calculators. Example of the questions 
include “What is the probability of getting all heads in tossing a fair coin 
twice times; give a whole number answer that solves 2x  1 ; etc.” The 
test questions are enclosed in the Appendix 3.iii (a). They were rewarded 
100 cents for each of the questions they correctly answered and they had 
a total of 200 seconds to answer as many questions as they could. The 
questions are not difficult to answer for the participants who were at least 
Bachelor degree students.  
Looking at the answers, 3.4 % of the participants correctly answered all 
questions within the given time while, in the other extreme, 2.8 % of them 
answered no question correctly. On average, they answered four 
questions correctly, and the median and mode were also four. The 
                                                          
61 There are some differences between Falk et al. (2006) tests and ours. First, the 
tests are different: they used multiplication question between a one digit and two 
digits numbers while we used various tests that we found from the internet. Second, 
they asked a series of questions that the participants could answer as many 
questions as they can within 5 minutes while we restricted the questions numbers 
to 8 and the time to answer the questions to 3.3 seconds. Third, they showed the 
results of the tests to the participants before asking them to self-assess their 
performance while did not show the results since showing the results would help 
them to better self-assess their performance. For example, 3.4 % of the participants 
answered all questions correctly and, hand we showed their performance, they 
would definitely know their relative performance.   
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distribution of participants scoring from zero to eight is fairly 
symmetrical with respect to the mean as shown in the Appendix 3. Iii (b).  
To examine self-confidence, we asked participants to choose between 
two lotteries after the math test was completed. Lottery (A) win 500 cents 
with 50 % probability and zero otherwise. Lottery (B) where a ‘high type’ 
had 80 % probability of winning 500 cents and zero otherwise while a ‘low 
type’ has 20 % of winning 500 cents and zero otherwise. A ‘high type’ 
participant is the one who answered at least as many questions correctly as 
half of the participants did and a ‘low type’ participant is the one who 
answered less questions correctly than half of the participants did. We 
never used the terms ‘high type’ and ‘low type’ in the experiment to avoid 
biases: we simply asked them to choose between the lotteries. Lotter (B) 
was presented as ‘win 500 cents with 80% probability if you answered as 
many questions correctly as HALF of the participants or win 500 cents 
with 20 % probability if you answered less questions correctly than HALF 
of the participants in the previous questions’. Obviously, participants who 
were confident in their performance relative to the performance of the 
median participant choose lottery B since the winning chance in lottery B 
(80 %) was higher than the winning chance in lottery A (50 %) while 
participants lacking self-confidence relative to the performance of the 
median participant choose lotter A since the winning chance of lottery A 
(50 %) is higher than the winning chance of lottery B (20 %) for low type 
participants.  
Interestingly 49.4 % of the participants chose Lottery B over lottery A 
while the remaining 50.6 % chose Lottery A. About 72 % of the 
participants correctly predicted that they are low type and the remaining 
28 % over-assessed their relative performance, probably indicating risk-
seeking preference. On the other hand, 65.4 % of the participants 
correctly predicted that they were high type and the reaming 34.6 % of 
them under-assessed their relative performance, probably indicating 
risk-aversion behavior. We also find that male participants had higher 
self-confidence (58 % of them) than female participants had (41 %).   
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4.5. Results  
In this section, we present the results. We first present the result about 
whether participants chose to see the choices of others. Following this, 
existence of peer effects and its variations across the treatments are 
presented.   
4.5.1. The desire to see the choices of others 
To observe whether individuals want to see the choices of other 
participants, we asked 120 of the participants in rounds 1, 2, 9 and 10 to 
choose either they want to see peers’ choices. We asked them to make the 
choice after they made decision about how many kilometers to buy 
electricity for unplanned trip but before they knew the type of peer 
information to receive if they chose so.  
Figure 4.5.1 shows that most of the participants (79 %) chose to see the 
choices of others in the first round. Unsurprisingly, the percentage 
declined by 9 % in the second round after those who chose to see peers’ 
choices observed the type of peer information and after receiving 
outcomes for the first round decision. Then, from rounds three to eight, 
we provided the peer information without asking for their consent. When 
we asked them again in round 9 about whether they wanted to see peers’ 
choices, the percentage of participants who chose to see peers’ choice still 
remains high, 64 %, slightly declining to 58 % in round 10. Tabulation of 
the panel data show that 78 % of the participants who chose to see the 
choices of peers in one round also chose to see in other rounds. And for 
those who chose not to see in one round, 69 % of them persistently chose 
not to see the choices of peers throughout the rounds.     
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Figure 4.5.1. Percentage of participants who chose to see peers’ choices. 
The large percentage of participants choosing to see the choices of peers 
may not be surprising since peer choice information was provided free of 
cost. Participants who are confidence of their own choice may even 
choose to see the choices of others for curiosity or to double check their 
choices and to correct any errors. More importantly, seeing the choices of 
others is a rational choice for participants who are not sure of whether 
they choose the optimal choice for themselves (Eyster and Rabin, 2014).  
To identify the factors inducing individuals to choose to see the choices 
of others, we estimated the following linear probability model (LMP), 
which provides good estimates of partial effects (Wooldridge, 2010).   
1 1
i i iy X            (4.11) 
where yi1 is a dummy variable indicating whether individual i wanted to 
see the choices of peers. The parameters α and β (β is a vector) are the 
population parameters to be estimated and 1i  is an error term. Xi is a 
vector of covariates including a gender dummy taking a value one for 
male participants and zero for female, age, an education dummy taking a 
value one for being a masters student or higher level of education and 
zero otherwise, learning denoting the decision rounds, self-confidence is 
a dummy taking one for self-assessed self-confident participants and zero 
otherwise, and the ‘high type’ is a analytical ability (as examined by math 
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scores) according to our test and taking a value one for participants 
correctly answering more than the median participant and zero 
otherwise. Table 4.5.1 reports the LPM estimates of the wanting to see 
the choices of peers62. 
Table 4.5.1. The probability of wanting to see the choices of peers 
Dependent variable:  Wanted to see the choices of peers  
Independent Variables Estimates Standard error 
(Robust, HC3)ζ 
t-value 
Gender (dummy: 1 = male) -0.08* 0.044 -1.86 
Age 0.01 0.009 1.2 
Education (dummy: 1 = maters 
student or higher level of education) 
-0.17*** 0.044 -3.84 
Learning  -0.02*** 0.005 -3.44 
Relative self-confidence (dummy: 1 
=self-confident) 
0.13*** 0.044 3.03 
Decision-making ability (dummy: 1 
=high type) 
 
-0.17*** 0.046 -3.64 
Constant 0.66*** 0.205 3.21 
N 
F(6, 473)    
480 
6.83 
  
0.000 
The symbols *, **, *** respectively indicate the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % statistically 
significant differences. ζ denotes heteroskedasticity-robust  standard   errors.  
                                                          
62 The estimates from logit model are similar in terms of statistical significance of the 
covariates, and, as expected the coefficients of the logit model are large (about 5 
times) than the LPM estimates. We choose to present the LPM estimates for easy of 
interpretation of coefficients. 
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Table 4.5.1 shows that most of the estimates are statistically significant 
and have the expected sign. They are also jointly significant                                    
(p-value =0.000). We find statistically significant gender difference in 
wanting to see the choices of peers: ceteris paribus, male participants are 
less interested in seeing the choices of peers than women participants do. 
The largest marginal effect comes from the level of education and 
analytical ability. As expected, the participants with relatively higher 
education achievements or higher ability wanted less to see the choices 
of peers than their counterparts. As we also saw in Figure 4.5.1., 
participants chose less to see the choices of others as they get experience 
(learning). Probability unexpected result is that participants who stated 
that they have relatively higher self-confidence wanted more to see the 
choices of others. However, wanting to see the choices of others does not 
necessarily mean using the peer information to update own choice, which 
we discuss later. The coefficient for age of the participants is not 
statistically significant.  
The next important question to ask is whether and who uses the peer 
information among those who chose to see and for who we provided 
peers’ choices without consent.  
4.5.2. The peer effect 
What is probably most important for policy use of the peer effect is 
whether and who uses the peer information to revise intrinsic plans and 
choices. We present below the overall choices participants made, the 
observed peer effect and its determinants as well as peer effects over the 
treatments.   
4.5.2.1. The Overall Result  
Over all the 10 rounds of decisions, participants chose to buy 29.3 units 
on average, 9.3 units more than the expected cost-maximizing value. Most 
of the participants (77.5 %) chose more than what a risk-neutral 
individual would chose, probably an indication of risk-aversion behavior. 
Whereas, a minority of them (about 12.6 %) chose to buy less than the 
payoff-maximizing value, and the rest (9.9 %) chose the expected cost 
minimizing value.  
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Table 4.5.2 reports a summary statistics of the treatments including for 
the control group and for the overall samples. The null hypothesis that 
the choices made by the samples for all the treatments including the 
control group over the 10 rounds of decisions are from the same 
distribution is rejected by the non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis equality 
test (p-value = 0.0021)63. We also conduct a Mann-Whitney test taking all 
the treatment samples as one group and the control group as the second 
group, and still the null hypothesis of the two samples are from the same 
distribution is also rejected at 5 % level of significance (p-value= 0.0281).  
To investigate whether the observed difference is because of the unlikely 
sampling problem in that the samples in different treatments have 
systematic difference before the treatment, we conduct a randomization 
test using the choices participants made before they received the choices 
of peers. Interestingly, we do not found statistically significant difference 
across the treatments including the control group (Kruskal-Wallis 
equality test, p-value = 0.3553). This is not surprising since participants 
were randomized across treatments. Thus, any difference across 
treatments after participants received the choices of peers can be 
attributed purely to the peer effects.  
 
 
 
                                                          
63 Kruskal-Wallis (or Mann-Whitney for two sample) testis a non-parametric 
method used to test whether two or more samples of equal or different size 
originate from the same distribution. We cannot use the parametric t-test and F-
test since it assumes that the distributions come from the normal distribution 
while the lower- and upper-bounds are 0 and 60 in the observation.      
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Table 4.5.2. The overall result 
Treatments Mean 
Choice  
Standard 
deviation 
No. of 
observations  
Two-sided 
Mann-Whitney 
test (z-values) 
Control group 
 
30.9 11.34 390 - 
Population  
 
27.5 11.74 270 2.869 *** 
Population-as-
a-peer 
 
29.8 11.40 270 0.049 
Nonrandom-
peer 
 
28.8 10.70 500 1.955 * 
Random-peer 
 
27.5 10.81 220 3.624 *** 
Two-peers 
 
30.1 9.77 500 0.615 
All treatments 29.3 10.90 2150 chi-squared =    
23.772 ***  
(Kruskal-Wallis 
Test)  
The symbols *, **, *** respectively indicate the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % statistically 
significant differences.  
 
Though the magnitude of the mean choice difference is small, it seems 
that the peer effects generally induce more risk-taking when compared 
with the control group participants who made choices in isolation. The 
overall mean choice by the control group, 30.9 units, is higher than the 
mean choice by all treatments taken together, 29.3, as well as the mean 
choice of each of the treatments. This mean choice difference is observed 
despite the fact that the mean choice of the control group at the first 
round is the second lowest, 27 units, when compared with the mean 
choices of the treatments before the participants observed peers’ choices.  
The peer effect is clearly observed in Figure 4.5.2 where the vertical axis 
presents the mean choice and the horizontal axis presents rounds of 
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decisions starting from ‘0’ to 10. Round ‘0’ denotes the first round when 
all participants made choices before receiving peer information.  
 
Figure 4.5.2. The overall peer effect 
Figure 4.5.2 shows that provision of peers’ choices induced participants 
to change their intrinsic choice. The peer effect increased risk-taking (i.e., 
the amount of kilometer participants chose to buy electricity for 
unplanned trip decreased). Overall, participants in the control group 
myopically increased their mean choice of about 27 units in round 1 to 
30.9 units overall in the 10 rounds while the participants in the 
treatments group reduced their intrinsic mean choice in round 1, 30.5 
units, to 29.3 units overall in the 10 rounds during which they received 
peers’ choices. It seems that the peer effect is not observed in the first 
round as the mean choice of the treatments group is almost the same in 
round 0 and in round 1. This arises because while 20 participants reduced 
their intrinsic choices by 13.45 units, on average, 18 participants 
increased their choice by 13.61 units, on average, resulting in only a 0.6 
mean choice difference between the intrinsic choice and the choice after 
observing peer’ choices. Otherwise, the largest peer effect in terms of the 
percentage of participants influenced by peers’ choices is observed in the 
first round as shown in Figure 4.5.3 in the upcoming section-  
To determine the significance of the differences between each treatment 
and the control group, i.e., the peer effect, we use the Mann-Whitney test. 
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As we can observe the z-values in the last right column of Table 4.5.2, the 
difference is statistically significant except for the Two-Peer and the 
Population-as-a-peer treatments. Looking at the differences within the 
five treatments, the Population and the Random-peer treatments have the 
lowest mean choices while the Two-Peer treatment has the highest. The 
Kruskal-Wallis Test rejects the null hypothesis that the distributions of 
the five treatments came from the same distribution (p-value = 0.0006).  
In terms of standard deviation, the Population treatment has the largest 
followed by the Population-as-a-peer treatment.  
4.5.2.2. Prevalence and determinants of peer effect  
Of all the 1498 decisions that participants were eligible to see the choices 
of peers and to revise their intrinsic choices afterwards, they revised their 
choices in 183 decisions (about 12 %) every time they saw the choices of 
peers indicating the direct peer effects. Figure 4.5.3 presents the 
percentage of decisions across rounds that the direct peer effect is 
observed, i.e., the percentage of decisions that participants revised their 
intrinsic choices after observing peers’ choices. As expected, the highest 
peer effect was observed in the first round (28 %), after which it declined 
continuously up to the 7th round in that only 6.4 % of the participants 
made revision as participants got more and more experience and, then, 
the peer effect moves up and down in the last three rounds of decisions.  
 
Figure 4.5.3. Percentage of revisions of intrinsic choices after seeing the choices of peers 
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There is considerable persistency from round to round in terms of not 
changing the intrinsic choice after observing the peer information. About 
90 % of those who did not change their intrinsic choice in one round did 
not also change their choices in the next round, while only about 26 % of 
those who revised their choice in one round persistently revised their 
choices in the next round after observing the choices of peers.   
Concerning the differences across treatments in terms of revising 
intrinsic choices, the overall percentage of participants who revised their 
intrinsic choice is fairly similar across treatments, the maximum being 
14.8 % in the Nonrandom-peer treatment and the minimum being 10.5 
% in the Population-as-a-peer treatment. However, there was 
considerable difference among treatments when we compare the 
revisions across rounds, the maximum difference being between the 
Nonrandom-peer treatment (23.4 %) and the Random-peer treatment (0 
%) on the 4th round of decision.  
There is also an indirect peer effect in that the choices of peers that 
participants saw in the previous round(s), call t-1, may affect the decision 
they made on the next round(s), call t, where t > 1. To examine the indirect 
peer effects, we compare the choices that participants made without 
changing their choices in response to seeing the choices of peers with the 
choices of the Control Group. The Mann-Whitney test shows that there is 
a statistically significant indirect peer effect (P-value = 0.0448). We 
present the magnitude of the indirect effect in Appendix 3 (C) in that we 
can observe that the overall choices by the Treatment Group after the 
indirect peer effect begins (the second decision round) is lower than that 
of the choices by the Control Group thought out the nine relevant (for 
observing the indirect peer effects) rounds of decisions except for the 
ninth round at which the choices between the two groups almost match.   
We next investigate the factors behind the reason for the peer effect 
inducing an overall 12 % revision of intrinsic choices as well as the factors 
that affect the extent individuals change their intrinsic choice to reduce 
the choice gap with the observed peers’ choice. We estimate a random 
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effects LPM64  to estimate the probability if peer effect is observed given 
by  
 2 2it t it i ity X c        (4.12) 
where yit2 is a dummy variable indicating whether the peer effect is 
observed (i.e., whether individual i revised his/her decision at round t), 
αt a time-variable intercept, Xit are covariates that vary across decision 
rounds and/or across individuals, ci is time-invariant individual 
heterogeneity and εit2 is idiosyncratic error. 
And we estimate random effects Poisson model to estimate the amount 
of intrinsic choice participants given up to adjust their choices towards 
peers’ choice. We choose a Poisson model since 88 % of the dependent 
variable’s observation are zero (i.e., no direct peer effects) and the 
remaining are integers with considerable repetitions, e.g., 4.27 % fives, 
2.18 % tens, etc. for which Poisson model is preferable (Wooldridge, 
2010). The random effects Poisson model is given by 
 3 3it it i it itE y | X  exp( X ),          y 0,1,2,...,60    , (4.13)      
where αi is the individual specific effects and is assumed to be gamma 
distributed with a mean of 1 and a variance of η.  
As covariates, we use: 
 ‘Peer information by choice’ – a dummy variable taking the value 
one for participants where peer choice information is presented 
if they chose to receive and taking the value zero when peer 
                                                          
64 The results in terms of sign and significance are similar to random effects logit estimates, 
except learning is more precisely estimated and expectedly the coefficients are larger in the 
random logit model (see Table 4.A.2. in the Appendix).  
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information is presented without asking for the participants 
consent to receive peers’ choices,  
  ‘|x-y|’ - the absolute difference between the participant’s choice, 
x, and the observed peers’ choice, y, (non-linearly),  
 ‘regret’ - a lagged absolute difference between choice and the 
realized outcome and 
 Learning, gender, education, relative self-confidence and 
analytical ability– as defined before.  
We have tested for differences among treatments by including treatment 
dummies but none of them are statistically significant both individually 
and jointly and thus, we omitted the dummies from the estimation. The 
estimation results from the random effects LPM and random effects 
Poisson estimates are presented in below.  
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Table 4.5.3. The probability of observing the peer effects and the 
magnitude of the peer effects 
Dependent 
variable  
Probability of being 
influenced  
Absolute amount of 
intrinsic choice change 
 (Random effects 
LPM)a 
(Random effects Poisson 
model)b 
 Estimates  Estimates  
Peer information by 
choice 
0.0214                                     
(0.95) 
0.138                                                        
(0.53) 
 
Relative self-
confidence 
-0.0178                                           (-
0.70) 
-0.159                                                           (-
0.48) 
 
High type -0.0685*** -0.986** 
 (-2.83) (-1.97) 
   
Gender -0.0185 -0.251 
 (-0.75) (-0.74) 
   
|x-y| 0.00954*** 0.130*** 
 (3.57) (4.51) 
   
(x-y)2 -0.000154** -0.00153** 
 (-2.17) (-2.33) 
   
Regret 0.00109 0.00200 
 (1.28) (0.23) 
   
Education -0.00698 -0.131 
 (-0.29) (-0.40) 
   
Learning  -0.00576 -0.0385 
 (-1.44) (-1.09) 
   
Constant  0.0878** -0.829* 
 (2.26) (-1.74) 
Lnalpha  1.970***                                                                 (11.71) 
N 1358 1358 
t statistics in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The superscripts ‘a’ and ‘b’ 
respectively denote that cluster robust and bootstraps (100) standard errors are used.  
Table 4.5.3 shows that the covariates are jointly statistically significant. 
Looking at individual estimates, intuitively, participants with relatively 
 190 
 
higher analytical ability and having relative self-confidence are less 
influenced by the choices of peers though the latter is less precisely 
estimated, probably because of the high correlation between the two 
variables. Further looking at the data, we find that about 79 % of the pees 
effects are observed among participants of ‘low type’ who constitute 52.5 
% of the participants. Similarly, about 62 % of the peer effects are 
observed among participants lacking relative self-confidence. 
Analytically less able individuals are more likely to make errors and to 
make more random choices than analytically able individuals (Andersson 
et al., 2015; Eyster and Rabin, 2014)). Consistent with this, we found that 
the standard deviation (= 14.4) of the choices by participants who revised 
their intrinsic choices is larger than the standard deviation (= 12.5) of the 
choices who did not revise their choice for the decisions they made before 
receiving peer information. This result is in line with Hypothesis 3.  
Bursztyn et al. (2014) find a similar result in a well-designed field 
experiment in that social learning has a statistically significant effect on 
risk-taking among financially unsophisticated investors, but not among 
financially sophisticated investors.  
As we can see on the random effects Poisson model estimates in Table 
4.5.3, analytical ability has also a statistically significant (inverse) effect 
on the magnitude of the peer effects, i.e., on the mount of intrinsic choice 
participants substituted for getting closer to the peers’ choices. Thus, the 
main reason behind being influenced by the choices of peers in the 
absence of payoff complementarities and social utility may be are lower 
analytical ability and lack of self-confidence relative to the peer.   
Another factor contributing for peer effect is the magnitude of the 
individual’s choice from the peer choice. The probability of making 
revisions towards the choices of the peer increases as the difference 
between owns choice and the peer’s choice increases. However, there is 
a threshold beyond which, the probability declines as the gap between 
the choices increases. One explanation for this may be that when 
individuals (at the margin in terms of analytical ability) observe 
significant differences between their choices and the peers’ choices, then 
they may start doubting their own analytical ability and adjust their 
choice towards peers’ choices. However, if the peers’ choices are too far, 
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then they may doubt the peer’s analytical ability instead of theirs in that 
the probability of the peer influence declines.  
Expectedly, regret on own previous decision increases the probability of 
being influenced by peers’ choices while learning (experience) and higher 
education level reduce the probability. However, all regret, education and 
learning are less precisely estimated.     
We next examine the extent individuals adjust their choices towards 
peers’ choice. A further look of the data show that 10 % of the observed 
peer effects were imitations in that participants adapted peers’ choices. 
The rest of the observed revisions are adjustments towards the peer 
information in that they substituted some of their intrinsic choice for 
getting closer to the choices of peers. We find that participants reduced 
each unit of their choice difference from the peers’ choices by 0.65 units, 
on average.  As we can see on Table 4.5.3, the individuals’ choices absolute 
difference from the peers’ choices difference, however, has a non-linear 
effect on the amount of intrinsic choices individuals substituted for 
getting closer to the observed peers’ choices.  
4.5.2.3. A Population representative versus a 
random peer effects 
 In this section, we investigate whether providing the same peer choice 
information either as ‘a peer’s choice’, the Population-as-a-peer 
treatment, or as ‘the mean choice of all the participants excluding the 
individual’s choice’, the Population treatment, makes a different in the 
peer effect.  
Figure 4.5.4 reports the mean choices of the two treatments and the 
control group across the 10 rounds of decision. The graph at decision 
round ‘0’ denotes the mean intrinsic choices that the participants made 
at the very first of decision before the participants in the two treatments 
received Peers’ choices.  At round 0, the mean choice of participants in the 
Population treatment, 31.1 units, is lower than the other treatment, 32.4 
units. However, we fail to reject the hull hypothesis of equality of 
distributions of the two sample before the peer treatment is introduced 
(a two-sided Mann-Whitney test, p-value = -0.429). 
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Figure 4.5.4.  A peer versus peers effect 
The graph shows that after ‘round 1’, the mean choice of the Population-
as-a-peer treatment is at least as high as that of the Population treatment. 
More interestingly, while the mean choice of the latter treatment 
gradually decreases towards the choice of a risk-neutral individual, the 
mean choice of the former treatment lacks a clear patter and oscillates 
around 29 units particularly after the fourth round. The overall mean 
choice of the Population treatment, 27.5 units, is lower than that of the 
Population-as-a-peer treatment. Moreover, while we fail to reject the hull 
hypothesis that there is no statistically significant peer effect in the 
Population-as-a-peer treatment (Mann-Whitney test, p-value =0.9610), 
we reject the same hull hypothesis for the Population treatment (p-value 
= 0.0053). Thus, there is an interesting and clear difference between the 
two treatments despite the fact that the participants received identical 
peer information.   
4.5.2.4. Matching the risk-averse with the risk-
seeker 
We now test the first two hypotheses about the magnitude of peer effect 
and the peer effect on convergence of choices towards the median choice 
in the Nonrandom-peer versus in the Population-as-a-peer treatments. 
We already saw before that while we fail to reject the null hypothesis that 
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the samples from the control group and the Population-as-a-peer 
treatment came from the same distribution (p-value = 0.9610), we 
rejected the same hypothesis for the control group and the Nonrandom-
peer treatment (p-value = 0.0505).  
Figure 4.5.5 presents the differences in peer effects between the two 
treatments in terms of the percentage of peer effects observed over the 
10 rounds of decisions. There is a clear difference between the two 
treatments in that, except on decisions rounds one and seven, the peer 
effect is higher in the Nonrandom-peer treatment than in the Population-
as-a-peer treatment throughout the rounds of decisions, which is in line 
to Hypothesis 1 and Preposition 2 (b).  
   
 
Figure 4.5.5. Risk preference based versus median choice peer effects  
Moreover, the peer effect in the Nonrandom-peer treatment contributes 
for the median absolute deviation and the standard deviation of the 
sample to decrease by 3.5 units, respectively, from 10.9 to 7.4 units and 
from 14.2 to 10.7 units. Whereas the peer effect in the Population-as-a-
peer treatment contributed the same diversion measures to decrease by 
only 1.5 units each, which is in line to Preposition 2 (b) and Hypothesis 2. 
However, we saw before that the absolute choice difference from the 
peer’ choice has a non-linear effect in that there is a threshold level 
beyond which the peer effect declines both in terms of percentage of 
individuals being influenced by peers and the amount of intrinsic choice 
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they give up to get closer to peers’ choices.     
Actually, peer effect in terms of percentages of participants being 
influenced by peers’ choices in the Nonrandom-peer treatment is higher 
than that of the Population treatment as well throughout the 10 rounds 
of decisions, except on the first round as we can see on Figure 4.5.6. 
Overall, while the peer effect is observed in about 14.8 % of the 
observations in the Nonrandom-peer treatment, the percentage is 10.7 % 
for the Population treatment and 10.5 % for the Population-as-a-peer 
treatment. Thus, providing the choices of a peer systematically in such a 
way that the most risk-averse and the most risk-seeking individuals 
observe each other’s choice, the second most risk-averse and the second 
most risk-seeing individuals receive each other’s choice, etc. induces 
higher peer effect than providing the mean choice the population.  
 
Figure 4.5.6. Nonrandom-peer versus Population treatments 
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4.6. Conclusion   
This study contributes to the emerging field and laboratory studies about 
peer effect in risk-taking when peers’ choices do not convey new 
information and when there is no payoff commonality and social utility.  
The first purpose of the study is to observe if individuals choose to see the 
choices of others at all given that seeing the choices of others does not 
convey new information about the decision-making problem. Asking for 
individuals consent if they want to receive (controllable) peer 
information is better than providing without consent not to annoy 
participants who do not want to observe peers’ choices and to reduce any 
boomerang effect. For example, Beshears et al. (2015) find in a field study 
about pension saving that providing the choices of high earning 
employees to low income employees resulted in oppositional reaction in 
that the latter decreased their contribution to pension after receiving the 
contributions of the former. Even in our study where oppositional 
reaction is unlikely to occur since the participants received the choices of 
anonymous participants, 21 % of the participants chose not to see peers’ 
choices, where the percentage grows up to 42 % after participants 
observed peers’ choices in previous rounds of decisions. Unsurprisingly, 
however, a lion share of them chose to see peers’ choices. Participants 
who are confidence of their own choice may even choose to see the 
choices of others for curiosity or to double check if they made errors. 
More importantly, seeing the choices of others is a rational choice for 
participants who are not sure of whether they choose the optimal choice 
for themselves (Eyster and Rabin, 2014). We find that male participants, 
participants with lower analytical ability and those with higher education 
level are less interested in observing peers’ choices.  
The second purpose of this study is to examine the pervasiveness of the 
peer effects, and to investigate the factors that (not) induced the peer 
effects. This is important for policy use of the peer effects. The large 
interests in seeing peers’ choices that we saw before does not, however, 
lead to using the peer information to revise the intrinsic choices. We find 
that participants changed their choices in about 12 % of the overall 
decisions whenever they saw the choices of peers. We call this the direct 
peer effect whereas there we also found indirect peer effect in that the 
 196 
 
choices that the peers made in previous rounds influences the choices 
that the peer choice recipients made on the next round. In real life where 
the probability of gain/loss is not clearly known, the percentage of 
individuals being influenced by peers could be higher since peers’ choices 
may convey new (real/perceived) information about the quality of the 
choices. For example, Bursztyn et al. (2014) find social learning effect 
increasing the number of participates invested in a risky asset by 29 %.   
Insights about the behavior of individuals who are influenced most 
frequently by the choices of others is worth considering for the use peer 
effect in policy making. Interestingly, we find that the peer effect is 
significantly higher among participants with relatively lower math score. 
Specifically, we find that of all the direct peer effects in that participants 
changed their choices whenever they observed the choices of peers, 79 % 
was by the participants who scored less than the median score in the 
math test that we asked participants to solve. One implication of this 
result is that, one may improve the choices of these individuals through 
consultation or by providing better choices of peers.  
Peer effects may have both intended and unintended outcomes. We find 
that while the peer effects helped to increase the earning of participants 
in 89 decisions by increasing mean risk-taking from 38.2 to 25.9 units, it 
reduced the influenced-participants’ earnings in 92 decisions by reducing 
mean risk-taking from 20.2 units to 30.1 units. (Recall that lower 
purchase amount implies higher risk taking in our experiment). Zafar 
(2011) find also that charity contribution could be boosted or reduced by 
showing higher (lower) contributions of others. Similarly, Falk and Ichino 
(2006) find that labor productivity could be increased (reduced) by 
showing higher (lower) performances of others as did household energy 
consumption (Schultz et al., 2007). The results show how selective one as 
to be in terms of choosing the individuals used to induce peer effects since 
some individuals may follow the choice of the peers without giving due 
emphasis for the quality of the peer choice information. 
Another interesting result we find is that the peer type plays a significant 
role in peer effects. We find that while framing peers’ choice information 
as ‘mean choice of all participants’ induced a significant peer effect, 
providing the same information as a choice of a peer dose not result in a 
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statistically significant risk-taking. Moreover, while the mean choice of 
the latter treatment gradually decreased towards the choice of a risk-
neutral individual, the mean choice of the former treatment lacks a clear 
patter. Thus, there is an interesting and clear difference between the two 
treatments even though the participants received similar peer 
information except the framing difference. Similarly, we find that the 
largest peer effect in terms of percentage of participants influenced by 
peers’ choices is observed in the Nonrandom-peer treatment where the 
most risk-averse and the most risk-seeing participants received each 
other’s choice, the second most risk-averse and the second most risk-
seeking participants received each other’s choice, etc.       
To sum-up, we find that most participants choose to see the choices of 
others. Only a moderate percentage of the participant who received peer 
information either by choice or by default changed their choices every 
time they saw the choices of peers while some of them referred the 
choices of peers they observed in previous rounds to make their choice in 
the next round instead of revising their choices every time they saw 
peers’ choices. Most of the direct peer effects were observed among 
participants with relatively lower analytical ability or among participants 
lacking self-confidence relative to peers’ decision-making ability, 
probably indicating that the main reason for the peer effects in the 
context of this study could be lack of decision-making ability or lack of 
self-confidence relative to the peers in decision-making ability. 
Accordingly, the use of peer influences to induce individuals to choose 
one or the other action may largely depend on the analytical ability of the 
society at large. Moreover, providing the average choice of the community 
may have a stronger peer effect when compared with providing the 
choices of random individuals. 
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Appendix 3  
A) Supplementary results  
i. The probability of wanting to see the choices of 
peers 
Table 4.A. Logit model – The probability of wanting to see the choices 
of peers 
Dependent variable:  Wanted to see the choices of peers  
 
Estima
tes 
Standard error 
(Robust, HC3)ζ 
z-
valu
e 
Gender  -0.41 0.225 -1.81 
Age 0.05 0.045 1.17 
Education  -0.87 0.233 -3.73 
Learning  -0.09 0.026 -3.43 
Relative self-confidence (dummy: 1 
=self-confident) 0.70 
0.230 3.02 
Decision-making ability  (dummy: 1 
=”high type”) 
 
-0.84 0.233 -3.58 
Constant 0.68 1.073 0.63 
N 
R2 
F(6, 473)    
480 
0.07 
6.83 
  
 
0.00
0 
The symbols *, **, *** respectively indicate 10 %, 5 % and 1 % statistically significant 
differences. ζ denotes heteroskedasticity-robust  standard   errors.  
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ii. Probability of being influenced by peers’ choices 
Table 4.A.2. Random logit - Probability of being influenced by peers 
Dependent variable: Probability of being influenced by peers’ 
choices 
(Random effects logit) 
Covariates  Estimates Std. Err. Z-values 
Peer information by 
choice 0.31 0.3012 1.04 
Relative self-confidence -0.20 0.3687 -0.55 
High type  -1.21*** 0.4207 -2.87 
Gender  -0.43 0.3422 -1.25 
|x-y|  0.13*** 0.0319 4.04 
(x-y)2 0.002*** 0.0008 -2.87 
Regret 0.01 0.0085 1.5 
Education  -0.06 0.3423 -0.16 
Learning  -0.08* 0.0405 -1.91 
Constant  -3.16 0.5045 -6.26 
/lnsig2u .7726717   
sigma_u 1.471579   
Rho   .3969533   
Wald chi2(7) 42.72   
Prob > chi2 0.0000   
N 1358   
Likelihood-ratio test of rho=0: chibar2(01) =    62.41 Prob >= chibar2 = 0.000 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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iii. Math Test for examining analytical ability and self-
confidence  
 
a)  Test Questions 
 
1. What is the probability of getting all heads in tossing a 
coin three times? 
2. Which number complete the following series:     144     121      
100      81       64?  
3. A trader buys coffee for $1200 and sells it for $1500. For 
each bag of coffee, he earns a profit of $50. How many 
bags of coffee did he has?  
4. Mary, who is twelve years old, is four times as old as her 
brother. How old will Mary be when she is twice as old as 
her brother?  
5. Choose the number that is 1/4 of 1/2 of 1/5 of 200  
6. What is the expected value of getting 50 with probability 
of 50% and getting 10 with probability of 50%? 
7. Give a whole number answer that solve x2 = 1  
8. What is the expected value of getting 80 with 50% 
probability and losing 60 with 50% probability? 
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b)  Histogram of correctly answered math tests 
 
Figure 4.B.1. Histogram of correctly answered tests. The bare heights denote the 
percentage of participants correctly answering the corresponding number of questions. 
About 2.8 % of the participants answered no questions correctly while about 3.4 % of 
them correctly answered all 8 questions.   
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iv. The indirect peer effects  
 
Figure 4.C. The indirect peer effect. The indirect peer effect in that the 
choices of peers that participants saw in the previous round(s), call t-1, 
may affect the decision they made on the next round(s), call t, where t > 
1. The graph compares the choices that participants in all treatments 
combined made without changing their choices in response to seeing the 
choices of peers with the choices of the Control Group.  
B) Experimental Instructions  
1. General Instruction  
Welcome. Thank you for your participation.  
The purpose of this experiment is to analyze decision making under risk. 
The experiment will take about an hour. You will earn a considerable sum 
of money that depends on the decisions you will make in the experiment. 
The experiment ends with a short questionnaire and you will be called for 
cash payment individually after the experiment is over. 
Please refrain from talking or trying to communicate by any means with 
other participants once the experiment begins. If you have any questions 
or problems at any point during the experiment, please raise your hand 
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and one of the laboratory   assistants will come to you and answer your 
questions in private. Participants intentionally violating the rules may be 
asked to leave the experiment and will not be paid.  
Description  
In this experiment, you will be buying electricity to charge electric car. 
For that, consider that you an electric car that uses electricity instead of 
fuel. Charing the car battery is similar to charging a mobile phone battery.  
Electricity is time-of-used priced such that a unit of electricity used to 
drive one km costs 10 cents if you charge between the time 6:00 and 
21:00 and Zero otherwise.  
Consider that the battery level available at the moment you are making 
decision is just enough (not more not less) to cover planned trips you 
have until 21:00. However, unplanned trip may occur before 21:00 for 
that you need to buy electricity now. If you do not buy electricity now, 
then you have to cancel the trip, use a taxi, or order a fast charging of your 
EV. Each of these alternatives costs higher cents per km distance that the 
amount of electricity you buy is short of the unplanned trip distance than 
the electricity tariff.  
Travel cost and your task 
Electricity needed to travel one kilometer (km) costs 10 cents. Thus, if 
you buy electricity for X km, you will pay 10*X cents. Whereas, if the 
amount X that you buy is less than the actual distance, D, that you have 
to travel, then you have to pay 15 cents for each kilometer distance that 
X falls short of D. Thus, total cost of travel is  
 
 
10* X                                                             if  D X  
Total cost  
10* X 15 D X                                        if  D X

    
, 
where X is the amount of km that you buy electricity for and D is the actual 
distance of the unplanned trip.  
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The unplanned trip distance, D, is uniformity distributed between 0 
and 60 km, inclusive. That is, it can be 0, 1 km, 2 km, …, 60 km, where 
each number has equal chance of occurrence. The realization of the actual 
distance of the unplanned trip is simulated by a computer randomly 
drawing a number between 0 and 60 after you make a decision.    
Knowing this, your task is to decide for how much kilometers to buy 
electricity for so that you can earn high cash from the experiment. 
[Peer information here, given below] 
Payoffs  
The amount of money that you earn in this experiment depends on the 
decisions you will make. You are given 1300 cents for each round of 
decision for you to pay for travel and to save the rest for yourself. 
Specifically, your earnings (in cents) per decision round are calculated as 
follows: 
Your earning  1300 –  Total cost   
In total, you will be making 10 rounds of decisions. 
Note that your earning from the experiment exclusively depends on your 
choice and will not be affected by the choices of other participants. Your 
earnings and decision in one round will not be also affected by other 
rounds. For example, you cannot use the amount of km you buy electricity 
for in a round for other rounds. Similarly, the random draw of a number 
to detriments the actual distance is independent across rounds of 
decisions and across participants.  
You can use the computer calculator by clinking on the calculator button 
on your screen that looks like  
Enjoy the experiment! 
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[The peer information]  
[To the Population Treatment] 
After you make a decision, you may get the chance to see the average 
(mean) choice of all participants. Your choice is not included in the 
calculation. A random number draw determines whether you will get the 
peer information. If you are drawn to see the information, you may be 
asked whether you would like to see the information.  If you choose to see 
and if you get this information, you may revise your initial choice if you 
want, but you MUST consider each of your decisions as the final decision 
since it is highly likely that you may not get the information.  
[To the Population-as-a-peer, Nonrandom-peer and Random-peer 
treatments] 
After you make a decision, you may get the chance to see the choice of 
another participant. A random number draw determines whether you 
will get the information. If you are drawn to see the information, you may 
be asked whether you would like to see the information.  If you choose to 
see and if you get this information, you may revise your initial choice if 
you want, but you MUST consider each of your decisions as the final 
decision since it is highly likely that you may not get the information. 
Moreover, if you get the information, the other peer whose choice you 
observe will not get your choice. 
[To the Two-peer Treatment] 
After you decide, you may get the chance to see the choices of two 
participants. A random number draw determines whether you will get 
the information. If you are drawn to see the information, you may be 
asked whether you would like to see the information.  If you choose to see 
and if you get this information, you may revise your initial choice if you 
want, but you MUST consider each of your decisions as the final decision 
since it is highly likely that you may not get the information. Moreover, if 
you get the information, the other participants whose choices you 
observe will not get your choice. 
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Abstract 
Analyzing the factors that affect the energy efficiency of vehicles is crucial 
to the overall efficiency improvement in the transport sector, one of the 
top polluting sectors at the global level. This study analyzes the energy 
consumption rate of battery electric vehicle (EVs) and provides insight 
into the factors that affect energy consumption by harnessing big data 
from real-world driving. The analysis considers four data sources: (i) 
driving pattern data collected from 741 drivers over a two-year period; 
(ii) drivers’ characteristics; (iii) road type; (iv) weather conditions. The 
results of the analysis measure the (unweighted) mean energy 
consumption rate (ECR) of electric vehicles at about 0.183 kWh/km. We 
find that weather condition has a very strong effect on the ECR of EVs: on 
average, trips in December consume as high as 65 % more energy than 
the trips do in July or August, where the overall winter season trips mean 
ECR is higher by 39 % than that of the summer season trips. Moreover, 
the results of the analysis show that driving speed, acceleration and 
temperature have non-linear effects on the energy consumption rate, 
while season and precipitation level have a strong linear effect. The 
findings from this study enlighten the consumers to be more informed 
and manufacturers to be more aware about the actual utilization of 
battery electric vehicles.  
Keywords: fully battery electric vehicles, energy consumption rate, 
driving range, driving environment  
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5.1. Introduction 
As the transport sector is one of the largest contributors of greenhouse 
gas at a global level (see, e.g., Alessandrini et al., 2012; Zahabi et al., 2014), 
there have been efforts by car-makers, car drivers and governments to 
improve fuel efficiency, to reduce pollution and to limit dependence on 
fossil fuel. For example, some of the EU and US governments have set 
standards that limit the pollution level of cars and they use incentives and 
taxes to induce car manufacturers to produce, and car users to use fuel-
efficient vehicles (Kono et al., 2008). China has planned to take millions 
of old cars off roads to improve air quality (Duggan, 2014). Battery 
electric vehicles (henceforth, BEVs) are considered as one alternative to 
curtail pollution from the sector and to reduce dependence on the scarce 
and insecure petroleum since the electricity needed to charge BEVs can 
be obtained from renewable resources such as wind, solar power and 
hydro.  
However, the market penetration rate of BEVs has been lethargic, mainly 
because of high purchase prices, limited recharging infrastructures, 
limited driving range coupled with long recharging time, uncertainties 
concerning driving range and battery life, and risk aversion behavior in 
adopting new technologies (see, e.g., Egbue and Long, 2012; Birrell et al., 
2014; Kihm and Trommer, 2014). Uncertainty plays a role when factoring 
in that customers have limited knowledge about the performances of 
BEVs and their sensitivity to driving environments, adversely affecting 
the demand for BEV (Birrell et al., 2014). Accordingly, providing insight 
into the factors that affect the energy (electricity for BEVs) consumption 
rate (ECR), i.e. the amount of electricity consumption per unit distance, 
and the corresponding driving range of BEVs under different driving 
environments is very relevant to support, on the one hand, consumers in 
choosing appropriate vehicles that suit their needs, and, on the other 
hand, manufacturers in distinguishing and targeting different customers 
depending on the driving environments that the customers live and move 
in.  
Insights into the factors that affect the ECR and information about the 
driving range of conventional vehicles have been provided extensively, as 
the fuel consumption of conventional cars is well-documented in both the 
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theoretical literature (Nam and Giannelli, 2005; Mellios et al., 2011) and 
in the empirical literature (Ericsson, 2001; Brundell-Freij and Ericsson, 
2005; Hu et al., 2012). Existing studies show that the fuel consumption 
rate of conventional vehicles is affected by road width (Brundell-Freij and 
Ericsson, 2005; Yao et al., 2007; Kono et al., 2008; Hu et al., 2012), road 
grade (Nam and Giannelli, 2005; Wang et al., 2008), traffic congestion and 
speed limits (Brundell-Freij and Ericsson, 2005) as well as by traffic 
information provided to drivers (Kono et al., 2008; Fotouhi et al., 2014). 
Existing studies also illustrate that driving patterns (in terms of speed 
and acceleration profiles) are the main factors affecting fuel consumption 
of conventional vehicles (Ericsson, 2001; El-Shawarby et al., 2005; 
Nesamani and Subramanian, 2006; Wang et al., 2008; Heide and 
Mohazzabi, 2013). Moreover, a number of studies have provided 
mathematical and technical detailed accounts of the effects of different 
car characteristics on the fuel consumption of conventional cars (see, e.g., 
Brundell-Freij and Ericsson, 2005; Nam and Giannelli, 2005; Heide and 
Mohazzabi, 2013; U.S.E.P.A., 2014). It should be noted that the effects of 
car features on fuel consumption are usually taken into account during 
the design of the vehicle by the manufacturers, and are usually made 
available to the consumers during the purchase of the vehicle (Kono et al., 
2008; Ben-Chaim et al., 2013). 
The factors that affect the ECR of hybrid electric vehicles (HEVs) that use 
both fuel and rechargeable batteries have been provided to a lesser 
extent. For example, winter season (in Canada) has been related to a 
decrease of 20 % in the fuel efficiency of HEVs, and the overall fuel 
economy of HEVs with respect to conventional vehicles has been 
evaluated as possibly overweighed by the poor performance of HEVS in 
cold weather locations (Zahabi et al., 2014). The temperature has been 
found as relevant in other studies that have focused also on the driving 
environment (Fontaras et al., 2008; Alvarez and Weilenmann, 2012; 
Lohse-Busch et al., 2013), while technical features such as the power ratio 
of HEV components and the applied control strategy have been 
demonstrated analytically related to the ECR of HEVs (Banjac et al., 2009). 
Insights into the factors that influence the ECR of BEVs have been scarce, 
mainly because of their recent market penetration. Most studies include 
technical analyzes that investigate the effects of car components on the 
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ECR (see, e.g., Duke et al., 2009) and reports by car manufacturers and 
other stakeholders. Large differences about fuel consumption of 
passenger cars are usually observed between the results of car 
manufacturers and the results observed in real-world driving (Huo et al., 
2011), mainly because manufacturers test cars by performing a long and 
continue test drive from a fully charged battery to a completely flat 
battery, thus, ignoring basic real-world energy expenditures such as the 
energy used to overcome the inertia force to propel a parked car and the 
energy used to cool down a propelling car for each short trips. A limited 
number of studies have focused on the ECR and the driving range of BEVs: 
ECR of BEVs was estimated by taking into account driving patterns and 
car features from GPS data, and in-city driving was deemed more energy 
efficient than freeway driving (Wu et al., 2015); ECR of BEVs was 
compared by considering the driving range reported by the manufacturer 
versus the actual driving range of drivers (Birrell et al., 2014). However, 
these studies present limitations: (i) the study samples consisted 
respectively of one (Wu et al., 2015) and 11 drivers (Birrell et al., 2014), 
with obvious consequences on the possibility of generalizing findings as 
the authors point out; (ii) the data collections did not cover both the 
winter and summer seasons simultaneously; (iii) the data analyzes did 
not control for possible confounders, with obvious consequences on the 
possibility of assessing whether the differences were caused by other 
factors. 
As aforementioned, the uncertainty and the consequent anxiety about the 
driving range and the ECR of BEVs is one of the major barriers to their 
wider market penetration. It is therefore essential to provide insights into 
the actual ECR and driving range of BEVs under different driving 
environments as well as the factors that affect them. Providing accurate 
information to people about the ECR of BEVs using real-world data where 
the drivers are the people themselves is crucial not to damage the 
credibility and sustainability of BEVs, particularly in the current situation 
where big carmakers are facing challenges for incorrectly reporting the 
fuel economy of the cars they make. (For example, carmakers Volkswagen 
and Mitsubishi Motors are expected to pay billions of dollars fine and 
compensation fees for measuring fuel efficiency incorrectly (Randazzo & 
Boston, 2016; Kubota 2016).). Analyzes of the factors affecting ECR of 
BEVs is also relevant to figure out the ways to improve the electricity 
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efficiency of BEVs (Wu et al., 2015). The current study contributes to the 
existing literature by analyzing real-world data collected over a two-year 
period in Denmark.  Namely this study addresses questions about the ECR 
of BEVs considered in this study, the sensitivity of BEVs to various driving 
environments including speed and acceleration profiles, wind speed, 
temperature, and precipitation.  
Big data are used for providing answers to these questions. More than a 
quarter of a million trips performed by 741 BEV drivers have been 
analyzed in the current study. The data were collected over a two-year 
period between January 2012 and January 2014 by Clever A/S, an electric 
mobility operator in Denmark, using three models of BEVs, namely 
Citroen C-Zero, Peugeot Ion and Mitsubishi iMiev. The data contained 
information for each trip about vehicle positioning (i.e., longitude, 
latitude), driving patterns (i.e., speed profile, acceleration profile), 
battery charge level, time and duration of the trip, and road 
characteristics after map-matching. Data included also information about 
the weather conditions during each trip as well as the drivers’ household 
characteristics. The analysis focus on the computation of the ECR and the 
corresponding driving range of BEVs from the large sample of trips in 
real-world driving conditions, and the estimation of the effects of driving 
patterns, road characteristics and weather conditions on the ECR of BEVs 
from the estimation of individual-specific fixed effects econometric 
models. Moreover, the analysis proposes a simple formula that allows 
consumers to compare BEVs and conventional vehicles in terms of fuel 
(electricity) cost under varying intensity of the winter season. The 
current study contributes to the literature about energy efficiency of 
BEVs by overcoming limitations of existing studies: (i) the sample of the 
study is significantly larger than previous studies with about 2.3 million 
km driven; (ii) the seasonal variation is accounted for, as the study period 
covers two summer and three winter seasons; (iii) the weather effects are 
considered, as the study looks at the effect of temperature, precipitation 
and wind speed; (iv) the actual driving patterns are analyzed, as the speed 
and acceleration profiles are collected for each trip; (v) econometric 
models are used to disentangle the effect of each variable on the ECR after 
controlling for possible confounders.  
 216 
 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The next section 
presents the data collection and the methods used to compute the ECR of 
BEVs and to estimate the model of the ECR of BEVs. Then, the results of 
the computation and the estimation are presented, and conclusions and 
further research directions are offered in the last section.  
5.2. Methods 
5.2.1. Data Collection  
Four data sources were used for this paper: (i) driving patterns collected 
from GPS data loggers installed on 200 BEVs used by 741 drivers65 for 
276,102 trips and about 2.3 million km travelled; (ii) drivers’ 
characteristics obtained from registration during receiving BEVs for 3 to 
6 months drive; (iii) road characteristics collected from the map-
matching of the GPS data with the Danish road network; (iv) weather 
information obtained from the Danish Meteorological Institute (DMI). 
Clever A/S collected the driving pattern data from customers who have 
been driving BEVs for a period of 3 to 6 months in a project called “test-
en-elbil” (in English: “test an electric car”) where Danish drivers were 
invited to drive BEVs and were proposed an agreement to collect 
information about their trips during the period. The data were collected 
using GPS during the period from January 2012 to January 2014, and the 
GPS data loggers were mounted on three fully BEV models, namely 
Citroen C-Zero, Peugeot Ion, and Mitsubishi iMievst, which are technically 
identical.  
Variables related to driving patterns (i.e., speed profiles, acceleration 
profiles), date and time of each trip, distance and duration of each trip, 
geographical coordinates of each trip, and percentage change in the 
battery charge level for each trip, were extracted from the data logger. 
                                                          
65 The total number of individuals participated in the project was higher than 741, 
but the number of drivers with relevant data for this paper is 741. Each driver had 
been using a BEV for 3 to 6 months, after which, the BEV was given to other drivers.    
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Time-of-day periods and seasonal variation were defined on the basis of 
the date and time stamps of the GPS loggers.  
Variables related to income and demographic characteristics of drivers’ 
households were collected during the registration process for testing 
BEVs. The drivers were men (56%), had average age of 44 years old, and 
heterogeneous distribution of self-reported income, 48% of them 
declared a yearly income higher than the then mean national income.  
Controlling for the road and traffic characteristics revealed cumbersome 
since road grade and traffic congestion are dynamic even within a trip. 
However, it was considered that road grade is not relevant to Denmark as 
one of the flattest countries in the world, and we use rush hour as a proxy 
to traffic congestion hours. Moreover, it was discerned whether each trip 
was performed on a highway in order to account for road variability.  
Controlling for the weather conditions revealed also cumbersome 
because weather varies dynamically across time and location even for a 
single trip. It was considered that a driver could experience different 
types and level of weather conditions, but the changes would have 
marginal effects when considering that most trips in Denmark are rather 
short. Accordingly, and similarly to existing literature, we use the mean 
values for temperature, precipitation, wind speed and visibility during 
each trip as reported by DMI. A descriptive statistic of the variables is 
presented in Table 5(B) in the Appendix.  
Considering the initially registered 276,102 trips, the data cleaning 
process implied looking for missing values and possible errors in the 
variables. In particular, 10,977 trips had missing information about the 
battery charge status, 10,420 trips had unreliable information with 
extremely low or high values of battery charge level variation, and 9,394 
trips had missing information concerning the identity of the driver. 
Following the data cleaning process, the data analysis focused on 239,247 
trips for the descriptive part and 229,853 trips for the regression part.  
 218 
 
5.2.2. Data analysis method  
5.2.2.1. Measuring the energy consumption 
of electric cars  
This study examine the performance of BEVs in terms of ECR (analogous 
to the fuel consumption rate for conventional cars). Namely, the ECR is 
calculated as the ratio between the power consumed during the trip and 
the distance traveled: 
Power consumed (kWh)
ECR = 
Distance traveled (km) 
  (5.1) 
The lower is the ECR, the better is the energy efficiency. In this study, the 
data contained the percentage change in battery charge level before and 
after each trip, which implied that the value obtained from the data 
collection had to be multiplied by the watt-hour of the battery of the 
vehicle (which is 16 kWh as reported in the specification of the cars) in 
order to obtain the power consumed in kWh.  
Given the ECR, the driving range of BEVs was computed as follows: 
Power of a fully charged BEV (kWh)
Driving Range = 
ECR (kWh/km)
 (5.2) 
It should be noted that the driving range depends on the battery capacity, 
the car performance, or both. Accordingly, a higher driving range would 
not necessarily indicate that the BEV performs better in terms of ECR, but 
could possibly relate to a higher battery capacity that comes at a heftier 
price. For this reason, comparing ECR between BEVs provides more 
correct insight into the energy efficiency of BEVs. To reduce (the possible) 
error in obtaining ECR using equation (5.1), for example if it is not 
technically possible to use the whole battery power of the BEV (e.g., for 
the sake of the battery-life), one can also compute the ECR in percentage 
terms (denoted by ECRP) by dividing the percentage change in the 
battery-recharging-status at end of the trip by the trip distance traveled. 
That is, 
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
  , (5.3) 
where B0 and B1 are the battery recharging status at the beginning and 
end of the trip, respectively, and D is trip distance in km.   
The driving range of the BEV is then simply found by dividing 100 
(representing fully charged battery) by ECRP, i.e., driving range = 100/ 
ECRP. Note that ECRP >1 for BEVs with shorter than 100 km mean driving 
range and ECRP <1 for BEVs with longer than 100 km mean driving range, 
and thus, ECRP cannot be used to compare the energy efficiency of 
different types of BEVs.       
5.2.2.2. Modeling analysis of the ECR of 
BEVs 
Explaining the factors that affect the ECR of BEVs under different driving 
environments is relevant to consumers for choosing vehicles that suit 
their driving needs and to manufacturers to distinguish and target market 
segments according to driving environments. Accordingly, this study 
provides the estimation of a model that unravels the sign and magnitude 
of the factors that affect the ECR.       
There could be unobservable (latent) characteristic of individuals that 
vary across individuals but are similar across trips by an individual, 
which are potentially correlated with one or more of the independent 
variables. An unobserved effects model was used because this is the most 
suitable model for panel data as the ones collected in this study 
(Wooldridge, 2010). Accordingly, an unobserved individual specific effect 
model was estimated to explain the ECR variation, which controls for 
unobserved variables that are invariant across trips of a driver. A general 
model that can be used to estimate the factors explaining the variation in 
ECR can be given by  
it t i it it it it i itX S W YECR Z                (5.4) 
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where ECRit is the ECR in trip t by driver i (i = 1, 2, 3, …,N denoting the 
drivers), Xi is a row vector of the characteristics of the vehicle used by 
individual i, Sit is driving characteristics (e.g., speed of driving and 
acceleration and traffic congestion of individual i in trip t, Wit is a row 
vector of weather variables that may vary among individuals i and across 
trips for an individual, Yit is a row vector of road characteristics that may 
vary across individuals i and across trips t, Zit is a row vector of household 
characteristics that could vary across individuals i and across trips t, ϕi is 
individual-specific unobserved effect that is trip-invariant but varies 
across individuals, υit is the idiosyncratic error term with mean zero and 
is (assumed to be) uncorrelated with any of the explanatory variables, 
and the column vectors α, λ, β, γ and δ contain the population parameters 
to be estimated. The inclusion of the intercept allows for the aggregate 
ECR to vary over time. 
The choice of the appropriate model among unobserved effects models 
mainly depends on how the ϕi is correlated with the explanatory 
variables. The random effects model is preferred to fixed effects model 
when ϕi is uncorrelated with explanatory variables, and when the main 
variables of interest are dummies. Whereas the fixed effects model is 
preferred when there is strong correlation between the unobserved 
factors and the explanatory variables included in the model. One way of 
choosing between random and fixed effects models is to conduct the 
Hausman test (Wooldridge, 2010). Having found that the fixed effects 
model is preferred to random effects model via a Hausman test for the 
data collected in this study, a fixed effects model was estimated to 
investigate the factors that explain the variation of ECR. Correspondingly, 
the explanatory variables Xi, and Zi and the latent variable, ϕi, were 
canceled out by trip-demeaning given that these variables did not vary 
across the trips of a driver. Accordingly, the model we estimated is given 
by  
       t t it i it it it ii ti it iW W S S Y Y v vECR ECR              
,    (5.5) 
where the bars subtracted on each corresponding variable denotes the 
mean of each variable computed over trips by each driver individually. 
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For example, 
1
iti
t
ECR ECR
T
  , 
1
i it
t
W W
T
  , and so on, where T is 
the number of trips by individual i for i = 1, 2, 3, …,741. This 
transformation enables to cancel out the time-invariant latent variable 
that could bias the estimation results otherwise, and the model provides 
consistent estimates regardless of the correlation between the latent 
variable and the explanatory variables (Wooldridge, 2010).  
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5.3. Results  
In this section, the results from the data analyzes are presented. The main 
results presented in this section include descriptive statistics results 
about the trips, ECR (by different categories), and result from the fixed 
effects model estimation of the factors explaining ECR variation.    
5.3.1. Overview of trips by BEVs  
On average, each driver had 307.1 trips during the average 90.7 days that 
the individuals used BEVs. This is equivalent to a mean of 3.4 trips per 
day per driver, which is higher than the 2.73 average number of trips in 
2014 in Denmark obtained from the Danish National Survey 
(Christiansen & Skougaard, 2015). Concerning the length of the trips, 
about 50% of trips were less than 5 km, and only about 1 % of the total 
trips were over 50 km, where the mean trip distance is about 9 km as 
shown in Figure 5.3.1. A possible reason for the short trip distances in our 
data could be the way that a trip is defined in our data: a trip constitutes 
when the vehicle starts moving until it stops and the engine is set off. For 
example, an individual shopping on the way from workplace to home is 
considered as having two trips: one from workplace to the supermarket 
and the other from the supermarket to home while it is most likely 
regarded as a trip in surveys. This may also explain the relatively larger 
per day average trips we observe in our data. Another possible reason for 
the short trip distances could be the fact that about 39% of Danes 
commuted less than 5 km in 2013 (Denmark Statistics, 2014), and 
another reason may be that the customers had a range anxiety problem 
and used the BEV for short distances.  
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Figure 5.3.1. Trip distances (in km) histogram observed in the data 
Related to frequency of recharging, a lion share of drivers did not 
recharge their BEVs upon the arrival from each trip: the frequency of 
recharging observed in the data is 21.4 % of the total number of trips. This 
means that, on average, drivers had been recharging their car after using 
the BEVs for about 4.7 trips. Given the observed short trip distances, it is 
not surprising that a great share of individuals did not recharge the BEVs 
upon arrival from each trip. It is however interesting that the infrequent 
recharging does not correspond to waiting for having an empty battery: 
the mean and the median of battery charge status when the recharging 
was performed were, respectively, 55.5% and 56%, namely individuals 
recharged their BEVs well before risking to have their batteries empty.  
The time-of-day trip patterns by BEVs could be also of interest, for 
example, to observe whether BEVs had been used for daily routine trips 
in that, we expect, trips by BEVs to have similar trip-time pattern to the 
general population. Figure 5.3.2 and Figure 5.3.3 respectively present the 
kernel density of the frequency of trips with the BEVs in our sample and 
trip patterns by passenger car from the Danish National Survey according 
to the departure time of the trips. These densities show similarity that 
most of the weekday trips in both cases were performed during the peak 
hours in the morning (i.e., 7.00 am - 8.30 am) and in the afternoon (i.e., 
3.00 pm - 5.30 pm). The same applies also for the weekends, as most of 
the weekend trips were performed between 9.00 am and 5.00 pm. This 
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could indicate that, like conventional cars, BEV had been used for routine 
trips at least for the data that we used. 
 
Figure 5.3.2. Departure time of trips by BEVs, kernel density 
 
Figure 5.3.3. Departure time of trip computed from the 2013 Danish National 
Travel Survey 
Source: Own computation using the 2013 Danish National Travel Survey 
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5.3.2. Observed ECR of BEVs 
5.3.2.1. Overall ECR  
Figure 5.3.4 shows that the distribution of the ECR presents high 
heterogeneity. The mean ECR in the sample is about 0.183 kWh/km, namely 
each km traveled consumes on average 183 Watt-hour (= 0.183 kWh). The 
corresponding driving range of the 16 kWh BEVs considered in this study 
is about 87.4 km. 66 About 80 % of the trips consumed between 0.113 
kWh/km and 0.274 kWh/km electricity consumption rate, where the 
median ECR is about 0.169 kWh/km and the standard deviation is about 
65. A possible reason for the heterogeneity is the difference in driving 
environments whose investigation motivated the modeling of the 
variation of the ECR presented later. Moreover, we found that only about 
7 % of the trips could achieve the 150 km maximum driving range of the 
BEVs reported by the New European Driving Cycle (NEDC) test (Peugeot-
iOn, 2015). (Using the mean ECR, we present a comparison between 
conventional cars and BEVs in terms only of fuel (electricity) cost for 
running the car. Interested readers can refer Appendix A for the result.) 
                                                          
66 We also computed ECR in terms of percentage battery consumption changes, i.e.,  
ECRP, as given in equation (5.3), and interestingly, we found similar result that  ECRP 
= 1.14, which means that the recharging status of the battery decreases, on average, 
by about 1.14 for each km distance traveled. The corresponding driving range is 
100/1.14 = 87.7 km.  
 226 
 
 
Figure 5.3.4: The distribution of ECR, and observed versus reported ECR of BEVs 
5.3.2.2. ECR by season  
The ECR was computed for the summer and the winter seasons, where 
winter in this paper context represents months from November to March, 
both inclusive, and the rest of the months are considered as summer. 
Results from this paper reveal that ECR is higher, and, consequently, the 
driving range is shorter in winter with respect to summer: the average 
ECR is about 0.157 kWh/km during the summer and about 0.219 
kWh/km during winter, with an observed 39.5% increase in electricity 
consumption in winter per km driven.  
Both a parametric t-test and a non-parametric Mann-Whitney test proved 
the difference to be statistically significant, and the difference is higher 
than the 20% reported in Canada for hybrid vehicles (Zahabi et al., 2014).  
 Figure 5.3.5 presents the monthly variation of ECR along with the mean 
temperature across the months. The Figure clearly reveals that the mean 
ECR is highly sensitive to weather conditions. For example, the mean ECR 
is higher by about 65 % in December than in July (or in August).  
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Figure 5.3.5: Mean ECR (in watt-hour per km) and the men temperature (in 0C) by 
month. The monthly mean ECR is presented on the y-axis to the right and the monthly 
mean temperature recorded during the trips is presented on the y-axis to the left.  
5.3.2.3. ECR by trip distance 
As driving patterns could vary with the trip distance (Fosgerau, 2005), 
and in turn the distance could affect the ECR (Ericsson, 2001), it is 
relevant to consider the ECR for different trip distances in order  to know 
for which trip distances BEVs are, on average, more energy efficient. The 
distribution of the distances in the trips analyzed in this study suggested 
considering short trips (less than 2 km), medium trips (between 2 and 10 
km) and long trips (longer than 10 km). 
Table 5.3.1 presents the mean, median and percentiles of the 
distributions of ECR and driving range for the three trip distance bands 
considered. Obviously, it emerges that the mean ECR decreases (and 
consequently the mean driving range increases) with the increase of the 
trip distance: for example, on average short trips consume 40 Wh/km 
more energy than medium trips do and 57 Wh/km more energy than long 
trips do. The difference is observed for all percentiles except the lower 
one, and it is statistically significant according to both a parametric t-test 
and a non-parametric Mann-Whitney test. Roughly speaking, these 
findings suggest that BEVs are more energy-efficient for individuals with 
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relatively longer commuting distance rather than ones with shorter 
commuting distance (less than 10 km).   
Table 5.3.1: ECR and driving range of BEVs by trip distance 
 Short Trips (< 2 
km) 
Medium Trips (≥ 2 
& < 10 km) 
Long Trips (≥ 10 
km) 
 ECR 
(Wh/km) 
Driving 
range 
(km) 
ECR 
(Wh/km) 
Driving 
range 
(km) 
ECR 
(Wh/km) 
Driving 
range 
(km) 
Mean 223 82 183 96 166 102 
5 
percentile  
112 143 111 144 114 141 
25 
percentile 
162 99 136 117 134 119 
Median 209 76 169 95 159 101 
75 
percentile 
281 57 222 72 192 83 
95 
percentile 
366 44 298 54 238 67 
Standard 
dev. 
79 30 59 28 39 23 
No. obs.  54,161  108,605  73,809 
 
5.3.2.4. ECR by road type 
As road characteristics have an effect on the fuel economy of conventional 
and hybrid vehicles (Brundell-Freij and Ericsson, 2005; Ericsson, 2001; 
Zahabi et al., 2014), ECR was computed for highway and non-highway 
trips. 
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Table 5.3.2: ECR and driving range of BEVs by road type 
 Trips on highways Trips not on highways 
 
ECR 
(Wh/km) 
Driving 
range 
(km) 
ECR 
(Wh/km) 
Driving 
range 
(km) 
Mean 174 96 187 94 
5 percentile  121 132 111 144 
25 percentile 145 111 138 116 
Median 168 95 172 93 
75 percentile 198 81 223 72 
95 percentile 243 66 318 50 
Standard dev. 39 21 63 29 
No. obs. 16,369   210,984 
 
Table 5.3.2 presents the mean, median and percentiles of the 
distributions of ECR and driving range for the two road types considered. 
No clear difference emerges between driving on highway or non-highway 
roads, although the average ECR is slightly lower for highway portions of 
the trips. More specifically, while the 5th and 25th percentiles of the ECR 
of trips on highway are higher (and consequently the driving ranges are 
shorter) than for trips on non-highways, the opposite is observed when 
looking at the mean, median, 75th and 95th percentile of the ECR of BEVs. 
However, the differences are not statistically significant according to both 
a parametric t-test and a non-parametric Mann-Whitney test. 
It is very important to note that the observed differences in ECR and the 
corresponding driving ranges by trip distance (short, medium and long), 
season (winter versus summer), and route type (dummy for highway) 
that we discuss above are mean comparisons without controlling for 
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other cofounding factors. It is importance to conduct further analysis to 
disentangle the impacts of each factor by controlling for other 
confounding factors that affect ECR. For this end, we conducted 
regression analysis that is presented in later section of the paper.   
5.3.3. Estimates of the ECR  
Table 5.3.3. presents the estimation results of the unobserved individual 
specific fixed effects model from 229,853 trips. Interestingly, most of the 
explanatory variables are statistically significant and have the expected 
sign also when considering non-linearity in their relation to the ECR. The 
model estimates present effects on the ECR, i.e., electricity consumption 
per km traveled, which means that the potential effects when considering 
yearly travel distances are considerably high. 
The most important determinants of energy consumption rate of BEVs 
are found to be driving patterns (acceleration and speed of driving, both 
non-linearly) and seasonal variation (a winter dummy), temperature 
(non-linearly) and precipitation. It should be noted that the lower the ECR 
is, the better is the fuel efficiency, ceteris paribus, and, thus, estimates 
with negative signs (and that are statistically significant) indicate the 
variables having a positive effect in terms of fuel efficiency and driving 
range. 
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Table 5.3.3: ECR model estimates: Fixed Effects model67 
Dependent variable: ECR (watt hour/km) 
Explanatory Variables  Estimate  
Cluster Robust 
std. error 
 p-value 
Mean driving speed (m/s) -19.000 0.365 0.0000 
Mean driving speed square 0.761 0.015 0.0000 
Median acceleration (m/s2) 55.521 7.156 0.0000 
Median acceleration square 27.828 9.150 0.0020 
Trip distance (km) -1.110 0.062 0.0000 
Trip distance square 0.010 0.001 0.0000 
Winter (dummy: 1 = trip during winter 
season) 
14.687 0.364 0.0000 
Highway (dummy: 1 = trip on highway) 0.534 0.381 0.1610 
Rush hour (dummy: 1 = trip during 
rush-hours of traffic) 
-1.926 0.204 0.0000 
Battery level at trip start (%) 3.401 0.206 0.0000 
Battery level at trip start square -0.056 0.003 0.0000 
Battery level at trip start cube 0.0003 0.000 0.0000 
Temperature (0C) -4.807 0.040 0.0000 
Temperature square  0.081 0.002 0.0000 
Wind speed (m/s) 0.695 0.042 0.0000 
Visibility duration in the journey 
(minutes) 
-0.118 0.005 0.0000 
                                                          
67 We also estimated the energy consumption rate in percentages (see equation (5.3) 
for details) directly computed from the battery recharging status changes after the 
trip. The result is presented in Appendix C (Table 5.C). Note, however, that the 
coefficients are not directly comparable since the dependent variables are different: 
ECR versus ECRP.        
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Precipitation (mm) 5.287 0.229 0.0000 
Constant  135.489 6.378 0.0000 
R-square: within 0.2714 sigma_u 20.0258 
R-square: between 0.7020 sigma_e 44.8110 
R-square: overall 0.4078 Rho 0.1665 
Number of observations 229,853 
   
 
An interesting finding from the model estimation is that the mean driving 
speed presents a quadratic term, namely trips at both very slow and very 
fast speed increases the ECR (and, correspondingly, decreases driving 
range), where the ECR minimizing driving speed according to our 
estimation is 12.5 m/s (= 45 km/h)68, ceteris paribus. Driving at slower 
speed than at an ideal speed may increase ECR since more energy could 
be required for keeping the BEV moving for a longer period, while a 
possible reason for the high speed of driving consuming higher energy 
could be linked to the higher per unit time energy consumption. To 
substantiate this finding, we also run a non-parametric locally weighted 
scatter plot smoothing estimation of the effect of speed of driving on ECR. 
Figure 6 presents the fitted curve, where the horizontal axis represents 
the driving speed and the vertical axis represents the ECR. The model 
predicts that trips with mean driving speed of between 45 and 56 km/h 
(minimum at about 52 km/h) demonstrate relatively lower ECR at least 
for the driving environment considered in this study, which is lower than 
                                                          
68 Similar result is obtained from the estimation of ECRP (see Table 5.C. in Appendix C for 
comparison and equation (5.3) about computation of  ECRP), indicating the (possible) 
measurement error converting the energy consumption rate from battery recharging status 
indicator to watt-hours is ignorable since ECRP is not subjected to such measurement error. 
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the fuel saving driving speed for conventional vehicles of 65 km/h (El-
Shawarby et al., 2005).69  
 
Figure 5.3.6: The effect of driving speed on the ECR of BEVs 
 Table 5.3.3 reveals also that acceleration is the most important 
determinant of ECR in terms of marginal effect. It increases ECR at an 
increasing rate, ceteris paribus. A number of studies also found significant 
impact of acceleration on fuel consumption rate of conventional and 
hybrid cars. See, for example, Zahabi et al. (2014). Besides to testing the 
impact of acceleration on ECR of BEVs, the contribution of this paper is to 
indicate the non-linearity of the impact. 
The seasonal variation has a significant impact on the ECR, with a higher 
ECR in winter with respect to summer, even when controlling for the 
weather effects such as temperature, precipitation, and wind. Thus, the 
winter dummy variable presented in the table should be interpreted as 
variable denoting seasonal variations such as snow on the street and 
                                                          
69 This result seems a contradiction to physics which states that ECR should increase strictly 
monotonically with driving speed, and thus, the interpretation of the result requires 
consciousness. By speed and ECR relationship, we are referring the effect of average speed of 
trips (not the speed variation within a trip) on the corresponding ECR.  
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energy consumption for heating/cooling the car, which we do not control 
for. 
Another interesting result from the model estimation is that the outside 
temperature has a non-linear U-shaped effect on the ECR, namely driving 
at both too low and too high temperature affects (negatively) the energy 
efficiency of BEVs. This finding is in line with the results presented by 
Lohse-Busch et al. (2013) that observed an increase of about 100% in the 
ECR of BEVs in a controlled laboratory experiment with temperature 
falling from 70 °F to 20 °F. However, Birrell et al. (2014) do not find any 
relation between temperature and ECR, possibly because there was not 
enough variation in the temperature for a study conducted between May 
and October. It should be noted that previous studies did not consider 
non-linearity that appears intuitively relevant, as lower temperatures 
require more energy for warming the vehicle, etc., and higher 
temperatures need more energy for cooling the vehicle, etc. Ceteris 
paribus, our mode predicts that the most favorable temperature in terms 
of energy efficiency of BEVs is about 29.7 °C. Similar result is obtained 
from the estimation of ECRP in the Appendix for comparison (see Table 5 
(C)).  
Wind speed and precipitation have positive and statistically significant 
effect on ECR, whereas visibility (sunshiness) has a positive and 
statistically significant effect. Driving on highway does not seem to have 
a statistically significant effect. This may not be surprising since the main 
differences between driving on highways and on non-highway streets, 
speed of driving and acceleration, are already controlled for. We also 
found that trip distance has a U-shaped effect on ECR, where both too 
short and too long trips are associated with high ECR, ceteris paribus. Still 
another interesting result is that driving BEVs during traffic rush-hour 
has a negative effect on ECR, ceteris paribus, which is consistent with 
previous studies, for example, by Wu et al. (2015), because of the de-
generating characteristic of BEVs’ batteries once other variables affecting 
ECR channeled through rush-hour driving (such as speed of driving and 
acceleration) are controlled for.  
Moreover, it is very interesting that the initial level of the battery has a 
polynomial (third degree) effect on the ECR. Specifically, individuals can 
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observe different rates of battery power consumption for driving in the 
same environment for the same distance, just because of a different 
battery charge level at the beginning of the trip. Figure 7 presents a locally 
weighted scatterplot smoothing estimation of the battery power 
depletion rate per km distance traveled, which was obtained by running-
line least squares smoothing with 0.80 bandwidth (i.e., 80% of the 
observation is used to estimate each point of the curve). The graph 
reveals that the depletion rate of the battery power is polynomial, and the 
rate of depletion per km traveled is very high (mean value equal to 1.22% 
of the battery per km traveled) when the battery power is about 100% 
charged, then declines at a higher rate as the battery power decreases 
until the local minimum (equal to 1.17% per km) when the battery power 
is about 77%, and then gradually increases until the local maximum 
(equal to 1.12% per km) after which the depletion rate is slow. The 
information from this graph could help BEV customers in having a better 
feeling for the range that they would be able to drive with the battery 
power they are left with. There is also the possibility that new BEV 
customers would be worried by observing that a fully charged battery 
drops very quickly after only a short drive. 
 
Figure 5.3.7. Depletion of the battery power  
Finally, the paper is not without limitations. The main limitations of the 
paper attributes to potential measurement errors. One of the limitations 
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is that most of the trips in the data used in this study are short, mean trip 
distance is about 9 kilometers. As we saw in Table 5.3.1, this may 
overestimate ECR if participants in this data collection systematically 
used BEVs for short trips than the trips they actually have or if the 
participants were individuals in the population who generally have short 
trips when compared with the population representatives (i.e., if there is 
a self-selection problem that we do not check for due to insufficient data). 
Another potential measurement error could come from the way energy 
consumption was measured: it was measured in terms of percentage 
changes on the charging status of the battery in that the marginal changes 
in energy consumption in units of energy was not observed. In this case, 
a trip that reduced the amount of the battery power from 80.49 to 79.51 
percentage points could be observed as consuming the same amount of 
energy to a trip that reduced the amount of the battery power from 79.51 
to 79.49 percentage points since the charging status displayer could show 
that each of the trips consumed 1 % of the battery power by reducing the 
charging status from 80 % to 79 %. Moreover, we assumed that all the 16-
kWh battery power of the BEVs used in the data is useable while in 
practice there could be a minimum amount of energy reserved for 
technical that is not usable for driving (Clever A/S, 2016).  
We still get consistent estimates from the fixed effects models since the 
measurement errors on the energy consumption rate, the dependent 
variable, are mechanical that are serially uncorrelated and they are 
uncorrelated across individuals in that the trip-demeaning removes the 
errors. We expect minimal measurement error problem among 
covariates, which otherwise cause inconsistency in estimates, since the 
variables were mechanically measured including speed of driving, 
acceleration, weather variables and road types.  
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5.4. Conclusions  
This study presents energy consumption and its determinants of battery 
electric cars by harnessing big data obtained from a variety of sources. 
The study is innovative in its investigation of a very large number of 
drivers, an immense number of trips (over 230,000) and km travelled 
(about 2.3 million), and a great number of sources of information 
concerning trip details, roads, weather and seasons.  
The findings from this study provide insight into the actual energy 
efficiency of BEVs. The overall mean ECR is about 0.183 KWh/km, which 
for a traditional battery capacity of 16 KWh of a Citroen C-Zero 
corresponds to a mean driving range of about 87 km, far less than the 
driving range of 150 km maximum driving range set at the New European 
Driving Test. The consumption of electricity is significantly higher in 
winter, as the ECR increases by about 39.5 % with respect to summer 
conditions, which for countries with longer (shorter) winters implies a 
lower (higher) driving range. Most relevantly, the findings from the 
calculation of the ECR allow understanding where the price of electricity 
should be for consumers to have convenience from an energy cost 
perspective of purchasing a BEV rather than a conventional vehicle.   
The most significant findings from this study provide insight into the effect of 
several variables on the ECR variation. Remarkably, some variables have 
quadratic effects. This appears logical for example for temperature, given 
that more energy needs to be spent to warm the vehicle at lower 
temperatures and to cool it down at higher temperatures, and for speed, 
given that more energy requires to be spent to move the vehicle from 
lower speeds and to maintain higher driving regimes. Optimal values for 
the temperature at 29 °C and for the driving speed at about 52 km/h are 
found from the model estimation results, and these are on the one hand 
good indicative values for potential consumers of BEVs who might want 
to maximize the use of their battery and hence their vehicle. Interestingly, 
the battery charge level at the beginning of the trip has a polynomial effect 
that indicates how the battery level decreases drastically for full charge 
rather than for lower charge levels, and these are on the other hand not 
so good indicative values for potential customers of BEVs who might want 
not to take chances given anxiety about the performance of the vehicles.  
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The results from this study could be used in order to perform a cost-
benefit analysis of the introduction of BEVs under different market 
penetration scenarios, to estimate more accurately the level of emissions 
of BEVs in comparison with conventional vehicles (while accounting the 
emissions related to the recharging), and to predict more precisely the 
driving range of BEVs that causes the anxiety hindering most consumers 
to prefer BEVs over conventional vehicles. Specifically, the results 
indicate that optimal driving speed and acceleration within given 
weather conditions can be selected by consumers in order to have energy 
efficient vehicles guaranteeing to reach the destination without the need 
for recharging.  
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Appendix 4 
Appendix A: How cheap is to drive BEVs in terms of fuel (electricity) 
cost? 
Having the mean ECR from the analyzed data allows formulating an 
equation for the (rough) comparison of BEVs and conventional vehicles 
in terms of fuel efficiency, at least in the Danish driving environments 
considered in this study.  
Consider the mean ECR of BEVs analyzed in the data, 0.183 kWh/km. The 
average cost of electricity used to drive one km is 0.183 Pe, where Pe is the 
recharging fee per kWh of electricity. Thus, a consumer who is comparing 
a BEV and a conventional car based only on fuel cost has to buy a BEV if 
and only if  
 0.183
e fP vP  , (5.6) 
where Pf is the per litter fuel price and v is the average fuel consumption 
per kilometer of a conventional car.  
For example, if the fuel cost Pf = 11 DKK/liter (i.e., current price of 
gasoline in Denmark) and if ν = 0.05 liters (i.e., 20 km/liter), then it would 
be cheaper to drive a BEV if and only if the electricity tariff Pe ≤3 
DKK/kWh. 
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Appendix B: Descriptive Statistics of variables used in the energy estimation  
Table 5.B. Descriptive Statistics of variables 
Variable No. Obs. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
Trip distance (km) 242335 8.94 10.37 0.40 117.15 
Mean driving speed (m/s) 242335 10.70 4.08 0.71 28.49 
Median acceleration  242335 0.28 0.13 0.04 4.80 
Battery level at trip start (%) 242335 73.96 21.11 2 100 
Temperature (0C) 240030 9.24 7.35 -20.60 31.7 
Wind speed (m/s) 240030 4.64 2.49 0 29.1 
Visibility duration in the 
journey (minutes) 240030 18.62 23.34 0 60.00 
Precipitation (mm) 240030 0.08 0.43 0 23.80 
Highway (dummy: 1 = trip on 
highway) 232882 0.08 0.27 0 1 
Winter (dummy: 1 = trip 
during winter season) 242335 0.41 0.49 0 1 
Rush hour (dummy: 1 = trip 
during rush-hours of traffic) 242335 0.40 0.49 0 1 
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Appendix C. Estimating ECRp  
Table 5.C. Estimation of energy consumption rate per km distance 
traveled (in terms of percentage change in the battery recharging status) 
Dependent variable: 
Energy consumption (in 
%) per km 
Variables 
 
Coef. 
 
Cluster 
robust Std. 
Err. 
 
P>t 
Mean driving speed 
(m/s) 
-0.125162 0.002 0.0000 
Mean driving speed 
square 
0.005109 0.000 0.0000 
Median acceleration 
(m/s2) 
0.3685535 0.032 0.0000 
Median acceleration 
square 
0.2002235 0.037 0.0060 
Trip distance (km) -0.005766 0.000 0.0000 
Trip distance square 0.000000 0.000 0.0000 
Temperature (0C) -0.030126 0.001 0.0000 
Temperature square  0.000506 0.000 0.0000 
Wind speed (m/s) 0.004327 0.000 0.0000 
Visibility duration in the 
journey (minutes) 
-0.000738 0.000 0.0000 
Precipitation (mm) 0.033106 0.002 0.0000 
Highway (dummy: 1 = 
trip on highway) 
0.003320 0.003 0.2690 
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Winter (dummy: 1 = trip 
during winter season) 
0.091853 0.006 0.0000 
Rush hour (dummy: 1 = 
trip during rush-hours of 
traffic) 
-0.012167 0.002 0.0000 
Battery level at trip start 
(%) 
0.019350 0.001 0.0000 
Battery level at trip start 
square 
-0.000312 0.000 0.0000 
Battery level at trip start 
cube 
0.000002 0.000 0.0000 
Constant  1.522922 0.027 0.0000     
Number of observations 230617 sigma_u 0.12973 
corr(u_i, xb) 0.1254 sigma_e 0.28877 
R-square: within 0.2709 rho                             
0.167927  
R-square: between 0.7032 
  
R-square: overall 0.4075 
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